(1) To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to individual or public interests;
(2) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction;
(3) To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state which constitute each offense;
(4) To differentiate upon reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor;
and
(5) To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 201; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 202. All offenses defined by statute.
(a) No conduct constitutes a criminal offense unless it is made a criminal offense by this Criminal Code or by another law.
(b) This section does not affect the power of a court to punish for civil contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by
law for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 202; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 203. Principles of construction.
The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this Criminal Code, but the provisions
herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the purposes of the law,
as stated in § 201 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 203; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 204. Territorial applicability.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed
by the person's own conduct or by the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable if:
(1) Either the conduct or the result which is an element of the offense occurs within Delaware; or
(2) Conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under Delaware law to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within
the State and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within the State; or
(3) Conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy
to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of Delaware; or
(4) The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by Delaware law with respect to domicile, residence
or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in the State; or
(5) The offense is based on a statute of Delaware which expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears
a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the defendant knows or should know that the defendant's conduct
is likely to affect that interest.
(b) Paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply when causing a particular result is an element of an offense and the result
is caused by conduct occurring outside Delaware which would not constitute an offense if the result had occurred in the same
place, unless the defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused the result within Delaware.
(c) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily impact causing death constitutes a "result"
within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of this section and if the body of a homicide victim is found within this State it
is presumed that the result occurred within the State.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 204; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 205. Time limitations.
(a) A prosecution for murder or any class A felony, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of
limitation:
(1) A prosecution for any felony except murder or any class A felony, or any attempt to commit said crimes, must be commenced
within 5 years after it is committed;
(2) A prosecution for a class A misdemeanor must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed;
(3) A prosecution for a class B misdemeanor, a class C misdemeanor, an unclassified misdemeanor or a violation must be commenced
within 2 years after it is committed.
(c) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense in which the accused's
acts include or constitute forgery, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or actively concealed theft or misapplication of property
by an employee, pledgee, bailee or fiduciary may be commenced within 2 years after discovery of the offense has been made
or should have been made in the exercise of ordinary diligence by an aggrieved party or by an authorized agent, fiduciary,
guardian, personal representative or parent (in the case of an infant) of an aggrieved party who is not a party to the offense.
In no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than an additional 3 years beyond
the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense based upon misconduct
in office by a public officer or employee may be commenced at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment
or within 2 years thereafter. In no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more
than an additional 3 years beyond the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(e) Notwithstanding the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section, a prosecution for any crime that is delineated
in Subpart D of Subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title, or is otherwise defined as a "sexual offense" by § 761 of this title
except §§ 763, 764 or 765 of this title, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time. No prosecution
under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of the victim that has been recovered through psychotherapy unless there
is some evidence of the corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory. This subsection applies to all causes of action
arising before, on or after July 15, 1992, and to the extent consistent with this subsection, it shall revive causes of action
that would otherwise be barred by this section.
(f) An offense is committed either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course
of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated. Time
starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.
(g) For purposes of this section, a prosecution is commenced when either an indictment is found or an information is filed.
(h) The period of limitation does not run:
(1) During any time when the accused is fleeing or hiding from justice so that the accused's identity or whereabouts within
or outside the State cannot be ascertained, despite a diligent search for the accused; or
(2) During any time when the accused in a prosecution has become a fugitive from justice by failing to appear for any scheduled
court proceeding related to such prosecution for which proper notice under the law was provided or attempted. It is no defense
to a prosecution under this paragraph that the person did not receive notice of the scheduled court proceeding.
(3) During any time when a prosecution, including a prosecution under a defective indictment or information, against the accused
for the same conduct has been commenced and is pending in this State.
(i) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense in this title may
be commenced within 10 years after it is committed if based upon forensic DNA testing.
(j) In any prosecution in which subsection (c), (d), (e), (h) or (i) of this section is sought to be invoked to avoid the
limitation period of subsection (b) of this section, the State must allege and prove the applicability of subsection (c),
(d), (e), (h) or (i) as an element of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 205; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 60 Del. Laws, c. 401, § 1; 68 Del. Laws, c. 397, §§ 1, 2; 70 Del. Laws, c. 92, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 264, §§ 1, 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 320, §§ 1, 2; 74 Del. Laws, c. 56, § 1; 75 Del. Laws, c. 367, § 1.;
§ 206. Method of prosecution when conduct constitutes more than 1 offense.
(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than 1 offense, the defendant may be prosecuted
for each offense. The defendant's liability for more than 1 offense may be considered by the jury whenever the State's case
against the defendant for each offense is established in accordance with § 301 of this title. The defendant may not, however,
be convicted of more than 1 offense if:
(1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (b) of this section; or
(2) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the other; or
(3) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses.
(b) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense
is so included when:
(1) It is established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(3) It involves the same result but differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk
of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
(c) The court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in
the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 206; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 207. When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for the same offense.
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provisions and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution,
it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside. There is an acquittal if the
prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination by the court that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive
offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information had been filed or the indictment found, by a final order
or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction
which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting
a judgment or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subdivision there is an improper termination
of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness
is sworn but before verdict. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper:
a. The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or otherwise, the right to object to the termination.
b. The trial court declares a mistrial in accordance with law.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 207; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 208. When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for different offense.
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory provision or is based on different facts, it is barred
by a former prosecution in a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the second prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined
in § 207 of this title and the subsequent prosecution is for:
a. Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; or
b. The same conduct, unless:
1. The offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
2. The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not
been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated as improper termination is defined in § 207(4) of this title and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 208; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 209. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction; when a bar.
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States or another state,
a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined
in § 207 of this title and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless:
a. The offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
b. The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by
a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order
or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the
offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted; or
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated as improper termination is defined in § 207(4) of this title and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 209; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 210. Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by defendant.
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of §§ 207, 208 and 209 of this title under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or
(2) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and
with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise be imposed; or
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which was held invalid on appeal or in a subsequent proceeding
on a writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis or similar process.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 210; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 211. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities.
(a) The repeal of any statute creating, defining or relating to any criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State,
shall not have the effect of releasing or extinguishing any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute,
unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as remaining in full force and effect
for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability.
(b) Any action, case, prosecution, trial or other legal proceeding in progress under or pursuant to any statute relating to
any criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State shall be preserved and shall not become illegal or terminated
in the event that such statute is later amended by the General Assembly, irrespective of the stage of such proceeding, unless
the amending act expressly provides to the contrary. For the purposes of such proceedings, the prior law shall remain in full
force and effect.
71 Del. Laws, c. 263, § 1.;
§§ 212-220. [Reserved.]
§ 221. Principles of definitions.
(a) In this Criminal Code when the word "means" is employed in defining a word or term, the definition is limited to the meaning
given.
(b) In this Criminal Code, when the word "includes" is employed in defining a word or term, the definition is not limited
to the meaning given, but in appropriate cases the word or term may be defined in any way not inconsistent with the definition
given.
(c) If a word used in this Criminal Code is not defined herein, it has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as
appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the provision as declared in § 201 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 221; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 222. General definitions.
When used in this Criminal Code:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft. Where a building consists
of 2 or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.
(2) "Controlled substance" or "counterfeit substance" shall have the same meaning as used in Chapter 47 of Title 16.
(3) "Conviction" means a verdict of guilty by the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, or a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendere accepted by the court.
(4) "Dangerous instrument" means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, or any disabling
chemical spray, as defined in paragraph (6) of this section or any electronic control devices including but not limited to
a neuromuscular incapacitation device designed to incapacitate a person.
(5) "Deadly weapon" includes a "firearm", as defined in paragraph (12) of this section, a bomb, a knife of any sort (other
than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles,
slingshot, razor, bicycle chain or ice pick or any "dangerous instrument", as defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which
is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury. For the purpose of this definition, an ordinary
pocketknife shall be a folding knife having a blade not more than 3 inches in length.
(6) "Disabling chemical spray" includes mace, tear gas, pepper spray or any other mixture containing quantities thereof, or
any other aerosol spray or any liquid, gaseous or solid substance capable of producing temporary physical discomfort, disability
or injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air, or any cannister, container or device designed or intended
to carry, store or disperse such aerosol spray or such gas or solid.
(7) "Defraud" means to acquire a gain or advantage by fraud.
(8) "Drug" means any substance or preparation capable of producing any alteration of the physical, mental or emotional condition
of a person.
(9) "Elderly person" means any person who is 62 years of age or older. Thus, the terms "elderly person" and "person who is
62 years of age or older" shall have the same meaning as used in this Code or in any action brought pursuant to this Code.
(10) "Electronic control device" is a device designed to incapacitate a person, including but not limited to a neuromuscular
incapacitation device.
(11) "Female" means a person of the female sex.
(12) "Firearm" includes any weapon from which a shot, projectile or other object may be discharged by force of combustion,
explosive, gas and/or mechanical means, whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded. It does not include a BB gun.
(13) "Fraud" means an intentional perversion, misrepresentation or concealment of truth.
(14) "Law" includes statutes and ordinances. Unless the context otherwise clearly requires, "law" also includes settled principles
of the common law of Delaware governing areas other than substantive criminal law.
(15) "Law-enforcement officer" includes police officers, the Attorney General and the Attorney General's deputies, sheriffs
and their regular deputies agents of the State Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Enforcement, correctional officers, state fire
marshals, municipal fire marshals that are graduates of a Delaware Police Academy which is accredited/authorized by the Council
on Police Training, sworn members of the City of Wilmington Fire Department who have graduated from a Delaware Police Academy
which is authorized/accredited by the Council on Police Training, environmental protection officers, enforcement agents of
the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, and constables.
(16) "Lawful" means in accordance with law or, where the context so requires, not prohibited by law.
(17) "Male" means a person of the male sex.
(18) "Mental defect" means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as defective, as compared with an average
or normal condition, by a substantial part of the medical profession.
(19) "Mental illness" means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as a mental disease by a substantial part
of the medical profession.
(20) "Narcotic drug" shall have the same definition as contained in § 4701(24) of Title 16.
(21) "Oath or affirmation," for the purpose of warrants, can be made via videophone, telephone, secure electronic means or
in person.
(22) "Person" means a human being who has been born and is alive, and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation,
a trust, a firm, a joint stock company, a union, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental
instrumentality.
(23) "Physical force" means any application of force upon or toward the body of another person.
(24) "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
(25) "Serious physical injury" means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and
prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ,
or which causes the unlawful termination of a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant female.
(26) "Telephone," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any computer (as defined in § 931 of this title) or any other
electronic device which is actually used to engage in a wire communication (as defined in § 2401(20) of this title) with any
other telephone, computer or electronic device.
(27) "Therapeutic abortion" means an abortion performed pursuant to subchapter IX of Chapter 17 of Title 24.
(28) "Unlawful" means contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by law. It does not mean wrongful or
immoral.
(29) "Vehicle" includes any means in or by which someone travels or something is carried or conveyed or a means of conveyance
or transport, whether or not propelled by its own power.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 222; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 59 Del. Laws, c. 203, § 1; 63 Del. Laws, c. 92, § 1; 64 Del. Laws, c. 17, § 1; 68 Del. Laws, c. 378, §§ 1-3; 69 Del. Laws, c. 24, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 383, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 374, §§ 1-3; 72 Del. Laws, c. 34, § 8; 72 Del. Laws, c. 43, § 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 50, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 371, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 379, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 126, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 249, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 413, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, § 4; 74 Del. Laws, c. 250, § 2; 76 Del. Laws, c. 270, §§ 1, 2; 77 Del. Laws, c. 64, § 3.;
§ 223. Words of gender or number.
Unless the context otherwise requires, words denoting the singular number may, and where necessary shall, be construed as
denoting the plural number, and words denoting the plural number may, and where necessary shall, be construed as denoting
the singular number, and words denoting the masculine gender may, and where necessary shall, be construed as denoting the
feminine gender or the neuter gender.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 223; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 224. Valuation of property.
Whenever the value of property is determinative of the degree of an accused's criminal guilt or otherwise relevant in a criminal
prosecution, it shall be ascertained as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the
crime, or if that cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after
the crime.
(2) Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, the value of certain written instruments, not including those having
a readily ascertainable market value, shall be ascertained as follows:
a. The value of an instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed
the amount due or collectible thereon or thereby, that figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any
portion thereof which has been satisfied.
b. The value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege
or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer
by virtue of the loss of the instrument.
(3) When the value of property cannot satisfactorily be ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than $100.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 224; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 225-230. [Reserved.]
§ 231. Definitions relating to state of mind.
(a) "Criminal negligence". -- A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person
fails to perceive a risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation.
(b) "Intentionally". -- A person acts intentionally with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or a result thereof, it is the person's conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause that result; and
(2) If the element involves the attendant circumstances, the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes
or hopes that they exist.
(c) "Knowingly". -- A person acts knowingly with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or the attendant circumstances, the person is aware that the
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(2) If the element involves a result of the person's conduct, the person is aware that it is practically certain that the
conduct will cause that result.
(d) "Negligence". -- A person acts with negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person fails to exercise
the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(e) "Recklessly". -- A person acts recklessly with respect to an element of an offense when the person is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary
intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 231; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 63 Del. Laws, c. 88, § 6; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 232. Definition relating to elements of offense.
"Elements of an offense" are those physical acts, attendant circumstances, results and states of mind which are specifically
included within the definition of the offense or, if the definition is incomplete, those states of mind which are supplied
by the general provisions of this Criminal Code. Facts establishing jurisdiction and venue and establishing that the offense
was committed within the time period prescribed in § 205 of this title must also be proved as elements of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 232; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 233. Definition and classification of offenses.
(a) "Crime" or "offense" means an act or omission forbidden by a statute of this State and punishable upon conviction by:
(1) Imprisonment; or
(2) Fine; or
(3) Removal from office; or
(4) Disqualification to hold any office of trust, honor or profit under the State; or
(5) Other penal discipline.
(b) An act or omission is forbidden by a statute of this State if a statute makes the act or omission punishable by any form
of punishment mentioned in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) An offense is either a felony, a misdemeanor or a violation. Any offense not specifically designated by law to be a felony
or a violation is a misdemeanor.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 233; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 234. Definition of terms requiring certain sentences.
When used for the purpose of describing or requiring a sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to this title, the terms
"minimum," "mandatory," "minimum mandatory" and "mandatory minimum" shall be construed as being synonymous.
71 Del. Laws, c. 98, § 1.;
§§ 235-240. [Reserved.]
§ 241. Conviction to precede punishment.
The punishments prescribed by this Criminal Code or by any other statute of a criminal nature may be inflicted only after
a judgment of conviction by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and over the subject matter.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 241; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 242. Requirements for criminal liability in general.
A person is not guilty of an offense unless liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which the person is physically capable of performing.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 242; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 243. Definition of voluntary act.
"Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously or habitually as a result of effort or determination, and includes
possession if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of the defendant's control thereof
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 243; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§§ 244-250. [Reserved.]
§ 251. Proof of state of mind required unless otherwise provided; strict liability.
(a) No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that the person had the state of mind required by the
law defining the offense or by subsection (b) of this section.
(b) When the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense is not prescribed by law, that element is established
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
(c) It is unnecessary to prove the defendant's state of mind with regard to:
(1) Offenses which constitute violations, unless a particular state of mind is included within the definition of the offenses;
or
(2) Offenses defined by statutes other than this Criminal Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose strict liability
for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.
In all cases covered by this subsection, it is nevertheless necessary to prove that the act or omission on which liability
is based was voluntary as provided in §§ 242 and 243 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 251; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 252. Prescribed state-of-mind requirement applies to all material elements.
When a statute defining an offense prescribes the state of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, without
distinguishing among the elements thereof, the provision shall apply to all the elements of the offense, unless a contrary
legislative purpose plainly appears.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 252; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 253. Substitutes for criminal negligence, recklessness and knowledge.
Whenever a statute provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element is also established
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence. When a statute provides that criminal negligence
suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is established if a person
acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is
established if a person acts intentionally.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 253; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 76 Del. Laws, c. 101, § 7.;
§ 254. Conditional intention.
The fact that a defendant's intention was conditional is immaterial unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought
to be prevented by the statute defining the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 254; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 255. Knowledge of high probability.
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes that it does not exist.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 255; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§§ 256-260. [Reserved.]
§ 261. Causation.
Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 261; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 262. Intentional or knowing causation; different result from that expected.
The element of intentional or knowing causation is not established if the actual result is outside the intention or the contemplation
of the defendant unless:
(1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different
person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more
serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 262; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 263. Reckless or negligent causation; different result from that expected or overlooked.
The element of reckless or negligent causation is not established if the actual result is outside the risk of which the defendant
is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which the defendant should be aware unless:
(1) The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is
injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 263; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 264. Causation in offenses of strict liability.
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense for which strict liability is imposed by law, the element is
not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 264; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 265-270. [Reserved.]
§ 271. Liability for the conduct of another -- Generally.
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when:
(1) Acting with the state of mind that is sufficient for commission of the offense, the person causes an innocent or irresponsible
person to engage in conduct constituting the offense; or
(2) Intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense the person:
a. Solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or
b. Aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or
c. Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so; or
(3) The person's conduct is expressly declared by this Criminal Code or another statute to establish the person's complicity.
Nothing in this section shall apply to any law-enforcement officer or the officer's agent while acting in the lawful performance
of duty.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 271; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 272. Liability for the conduct of another -- No defense.
In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person
pursuant to § 271 of this title, it is no defense that:
(1) The other person is not guilty of the offense in question because of irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption,
or because of unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the accused's criminal purpose, or because
of other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense; or
(2) The other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based on the conduct in question, or has previously
been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different offense or in a different degree, or has legal immunity from
prosecution for the conduct in question; or
(3) The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class of persons, and the defendant, not belonging
to that class, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity, unless imposing liability
on the defendant is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing the defendant's incapacity.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 272; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 273. Liability for the conduct of another -- Exemption.
Unless otherwise provided by this Criminal Code or by the statute defining the offense, a person is not liable for an offense
committed by another person if:
(1) The person is a victim of that offense; or
(2) The offense is so defined that the person's conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) The person terminates complicity prior to commission of the offense and:
a. Wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or
b. Gives timely warning to the Attorney General or the police or otherwise makes a proper effort to prevent the commission
of the offense.
If the actor's conduct constitutes a separate offense, the actor is liable for that offense only and not for the conduct or
offense committed by the other person.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 273; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 274. Offenses involving 2 or more persons; convictions for different degrees of offense.
When, pursuant to § 271 of this title, 2 or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees,
each person is guilty of an offense of such degree as is compatible with that person's own culpable mental state and with
that person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 274; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 275. Indictment as principal and conviction as accomplice; indictment as accomplice and conviction as principal.
(a) A person indicted for committing an offense may be convicted as an accomplice to another person guilty of committing the
offense.
(b) A person indicted as an accomplice to an offense committed by another person may be convicted as a principal.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 275; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 276-280. [Reserved.]
§ 281. Criminal liability of organizations.
An organization is guilty of an offense when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed
on organizations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or recklessly tolerated
by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the organization;
or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the organization while acting within the scope of employment
and in behalf of the organization and:
a. The offense is a misdemeanor or a violation; or
b. The offense is one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability
on an organization.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 281; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 1, 2.;
§ 282. Criminal liability of an individual for organizational conduct.
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which the person performs or causes to be performed in the
name of or in behalf of an organization to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in the person's own name or behalf.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 282; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3.;
§ 283. Impermissible organizational activity no defense.
In any prosecution for an offense alleged to have been committed by an organization, it is no defense that the act charged
to constitute the offense was an impermissible organizational activity.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 283; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3.;
§ 284. Definitions relating to organizational liability.
(a) "Agent" means any director, officer or employee of an organization, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf
of the organization.
(b) "High managerial agent" means an officer of an organization or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with
respect to the formulation of organizational policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.
(c) "Organization" means any entity listed in the definition of "person" contained in § 222 of this title, other than an individual
human being.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 284; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3, 5.;
(1) To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to individual or public interests;
(2) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction;
(3) To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state which constitute each offense;
(4) To differentiate upon reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor;
and
(5) To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 201; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 202. All offenses defined by statute.
(a) No conduct constitutes a criminal offense unless it is made a criminal offense by this Criminal Code or by another law.
(b) This section does not affect the power of a court to punish for civil contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by
law for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 202; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 203. Principles of construction.
The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this Criminal Code, but the provisions
herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the purposes of the law,
as stated in § 201 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 203; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 204. Territorial applicability.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed
by the person's own conduct or by the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable if:
(1) Either the conduct or the result which is an element of the offense occurs within Delaware; or
(2) Conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under Delaware law to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within
the State and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within the State; or
(3) Conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy
to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of Delaware; or
(4) The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by Delaware law with respect to domicile, residence
or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in the State; or
(5) The offense is based on a statute of Delaware which expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears
a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the defendant knows or should know that the defendant's conduct
is likely to affect that interest.
(b) Paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply when causing a particular result is an element of an offense and the result
is caused by conduct occurring outside Delaware which would not constitute an offense if the result had occurred in the same
place, unless the defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused the result within Delaware.
(c) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily impact causing death constitutes a "result"
within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of this section and if the body of a homicide victim is found within this State it
is presumed that the result occurred within the State.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 204; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 205. Time limitations.
(a) A prosecution for murder or any class A felony, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of
limitation:
(1) A prosecution for any felony except murder or any class A felony, or any attempt to commit said crimes, must be commenced
within 5 years after it is committed;
(2) A prosecution for a class A misdemeanor must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed;
(3) A prosecution for a class B misdemeanor, a class C misdemeanor, an unclassified misdemeanor or a violation must be commenced
within 2 years after it is committed.
(c) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense in which the accused's
acts include or constitute forgery, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or actively concealed theft or misapplication of property
by an employee, pledgee, bailee or fiduciary may be commenced within 2 years after discovery of the offense has been made
or should have been made in the exercise of ordinary diligence by an aggrieved party or by an authorized agent, fiduciary,
guardian, personal representative or parent (in the case of an infant) of an aggrieved party who is not a party to the offense.
In no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than an additional 3 years beyond
the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense based upon misconduct
in office by a public officer or employee may be commenced at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment
or within 2 years thereafter. In no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more
than an additional 3 years beyond the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(e) Notwithstanding the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section, a prosecution for any crime that is delineated
in Subpart D of Subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title, or is otherwise defined as a "sexual offense" by § 761 of this title
except §§ 763, 764 or 765 of this title, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time. No prosecution
under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of the victim that has been recovered through psychotherapy unless there
is some evidence of the corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory. This subsection applies to all causes of action
arising before, on or after July 15, 1992, and to the extent consistent with this subsection, it shall revive causes of action
that would otherwise be barred by this section.
(f) An offense is committed either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course
of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated. Time
starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.
(g) For purposes of this section, a prosecution is commenced when either an indictment is found or an information is filed.
(h) The period of limitation does not run:
(1) During any time when the accused is fleeing or hiding from justice so that the accused's identity or whereabouts within
or outside the State cannot be ascertained, despite a diligent search for the accused; or
(2) During any time when the accused in a prosecution has become a fugitive from justice by failing to appear for any scheduled
court proceeding related to such prosecution for which proper notice under the law was provided or attempted. It is no defense
to a prosecution under this paragraph that the person did not receive notice of the scheduled court proceeding.
(3) During any time when a prosecution, including a prosecution under a defective indictment or information, against the accused
for the same conduct has been commenced and is pending in this State.
(i) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense in this title may
be commenced within 10 years after it is committed if based upon forensic DNA testing.
(j) In any prosecution in which subsection (c), (d), (e), (h) or (i) of this section is sought to be invoked to avoid the
limitation period of subsection (b) of this section, the State must allege and prove the applicability of subsection (c),
(d), (e), (h) or (i) as an element of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 205; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 60 Del. Laws, c. 401, § 1; 68 Del. Laws, c. 397, §§ 1, 2; 70 Del. Laws, c. 92, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 264, §§ 1, 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 320, §§ 1, 2; 74 Del. Laws, c. 56, § 1; 75 Del. Laws, c. 367, § 1.;
§ 206. Method of prosecution when conduct constitutes more than 1 offense.
(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than 1 offense, the defendant may be prosecuted
for each offense. The defendant's liability for more than 1 offense may be considered by the jury whenever the State's case
against the defendant for each offense is established in accordance with § 301 of this title. The defendant may not, however,
be convicted of more than 1 offense if:
(1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (b) of this section; or
(2) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the other; or
(3) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses.
(b) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense
is so included when:
(1) It is established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(3) It involves the same result but differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk
of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
(c) The court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in
the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 206; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 207. When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for the same offense.
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provisions and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution,
it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside. There is an acquittal if the
prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination by the court that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive
offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information had been filed or the indictment found, by a final order
or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction
which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting
a judgment or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subdivision there is an improper termination
of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness
is sworn but before verdict. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper:
a. The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or otherwise, the right to object to the termination.
b. The trial court declares a mistrial in accordance with law.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 207; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 208. When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for different offense.
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory provision or is based on different facts, it is barred
by a former prosecution in a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the second prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined
in § 207 of this title and the subsequent prosecution is for:
a. Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; or
b. The same conduct, unless:
1. The offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
2. The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not
been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated as improper termination is defined in § 207(4) of this title and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 208; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 209. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction; when a bar.
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States or another state,
a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined
in § 207 of this title and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless:
a. The offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
b. The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by
a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order
or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the
offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted; or
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated as improper termination is defined in § 207(4) of this title and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 209; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 210. Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by defendant.
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of §§ 207, 208 and 209 of this title under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or
(2) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and
with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise be imposed; or
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which was held invalid on appeal or in a subsequent proceeding
on a writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis or similar process.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 210; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 211. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities.
(a) The repeal of any statute creating, defining or relating to any criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State,
shall not have the effect of releasing or extinguishing any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute,
unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as remaining in full force and effect
for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability.
(b) Any action, case, prosecution, trial or other legal proceeding in progress under or pursuant to any statute relating to
any criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State shall be preserved and shall not become illegal or terminated
in the event that such statute is later amended by the General Assembly, irrespective of the stage of such proceeding, unless
the amending act expressly provides to the contrary. For the purposes of such proceedings, the prior law shall remain in full
force and effect.
71 Del. Laws, c. 263, § 1.;
§§ 212-220. [Reserved.]
§ 221. Principles of definitions.
(a) In this Criminal Code when the word "means" is employed in defining a word or term, the definition is limited to the meaning
given.
(b) In this Criminal Code, when the word "includes" is employed in defining a word or term, the definition is not limited
to the meaning given, but in appropriate cases the word or term may be defined in any way not inconsistent with the definition
given.
(c) If a word used in this Criminal Code is not defined herein, it has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as
appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the provision as declared in § 201 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 221; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 222. General definitions.
When used in this Criminal Code:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft. Where a building consists
of 2 or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.
(2) "Controlled substance" or "counterfeit substance" shall have the same meaning as used in Chapter 47 of Title 16.
(3) "Conviction" means a verdict of guilty by the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, or a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendere accepted by the court.
(4) "Dangerous instrument" means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, or any disabling
chemical spray, as defined in paragraph (6) of this section or any electronic control devices including but not limited to
a neuromuscular incapacitation device designed to incapacitate a person.
(5) "Deadly weapon" includes a "firearm", as defined in paragraph (12) of this section, a bomb, a knife of any sort (other
than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles,
slingshot, razor, bicycle chain or ice pick or any "dangerous instrument", as defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which
is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury. For the purpose of this definition, an ordinary
pocketknife shall be a folding knife having a blade not more than 3 inches in length.
(6) "Disabling chemical spray" includes mace, tear gas, pepper spray or any other mixture containing quantities thereof, or
any other aerosol spray or any liquid, gaseous or solid substance capable of producing temporary physical discomfort, disability
or injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air, or any cannister, container or device designed or intended
to carry, store or disperse such aerosol spray or such gas or solid.
(7) "Defraud" means to acquire a gain or advantage by fraud.
(8) "Drug" means any substance or preparation capable of producing any alteration of the physical, mental or emotional condition
of a person.
(9) "Elderly person" means any person who is 62 years of age or older. Thus, the terms "elderly person" and "person who is
62 years of age or older" shall have the same meaning as used in this Code or in any action brought pursuant to this Code.
(10) "Electronic control device" is a device designed to incapacitate a person, including but not limited to a neuromuscular
incapacitation device.
(11) "Female" means a person of the female sex.
(12) "Firearm" includes any weapon from which a shot, projectile or other object may be discharged by force of combustion,
explosive, gas and/or mechanical means, whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded. It does not include a BB gun.
(13) "Fraud" means an intentional perversion, misrepresentation or concealment of truth.
(14) "Law" includes statutes and ordinances. Unless the context otherwise clearly requires, "law" also includes settled principles
of the common law of Delaware governing areas other than substantive criminal law.
(15) "Law-enforcement officer" includes police officers, the Attorney General and the Attorney General's deputies, sheriffs
and their regular deputies agents of the State Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Enforcement, correctional officers, state fire
marshals, municipal fire marshals that are graduates of a Delaware Police Academy which is accredited/authorized by the Council
on Police Training, sworn members of the City of Wilmington Fire Department who have graduated from a Delaware Police Academy
which is authorized/accredited by the Council on Police Training, environmental protection officers, enforcement agents of
the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, and constables.
(16) "Lawful" means in accordance with law or, where the context so requires, not prohibited by law.
(17) "Male" means a person of the male sex.
(18) "Mental defect" means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as defective, as compared with an average
or normal condition, by a substantial part of the medical profession.
(19) "Mental illness" means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as a mental disease by a substantial part
of the medical profession.
(20) "Narcotic drug" shall have the same definition as contained in § 4701(24) of Title 16.
(21) "Oath or affirmation," for the purpose of warrants, can be made via videophone, telephone, secure electronic means or
in person.
(22) "Person" means a human being who has been born and is alive, and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation,
a trust, a firm, a joint stock company, a union, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental
instrumentality.
(23) "Physical force" means any application of force upon or toward the body of another person.
(24) "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
(25) "Serious physical injury" means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and
prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ,
or which causes the unlawful termination of a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant female.
(26) "Telephone," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any computer (as defined in § 931 of this title) or any other
electronic device which is actually used to engage in a wire communication (as defined in § 2401(20) of this title) with any
other telephone, computer or electronic device.
(27) "Therapeutic abortion" means an abortion performed pursuant to subchapter IX of Chapter 17 of Title 24.
(28) "Unlawful" means contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by law. It does not mean wrongful or
immoral.
(29) "Vehicle" includes any means in or by which someone travels or something is carried or conveyed or a means of conveyance
or transport, whether or not propelled by its own power.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 222; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 59 Del. Laws, c. 203, § 1; 63 Del. Laws, c. 92, § 1; 64 Del. Laws, c. 17, § 1; 68 Del. Laws, c. 378, §§ 1-3; 69 Del. Laws, c. 24, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 383, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 374, §§ 1-3; 72 Del. Laws, c. 34, § 8; 72 Del. Laws, c. 43, § 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 50, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 371, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 379, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 126, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 249, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 413, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, § 4; 74 Del. Laws, c. 250, § 2; 76 Del. Laws, c. 270, §§ 1, 2; 77 Del. Laws, c. 64, § 3.;
§ 223. Words of gender or number.
Unless the context otherwise requires, words denoting the singular number may, and where necessary shall, be construed as
denoting the plural number, and words denoting the plural number may, and where necessary shall, be construed as denoting
the singular number, and words denoting the masculine gender may, and where necessary shall, be construed as denoting the
feminine gender or the neuter gender.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 223; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 224. Valuation of property.
Whenever the value of property is determinative of the degree of an accused's criminal guilt or otherwise relevant in a criminal
prosecution, it shall be ascertained as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the
crime, or if that cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after
the crime.
(2) Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, the value of certain written instruments, not including those having
a readily ascertainable market value, shall be ascertained as follows:
a. The value of an instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed
the amount due or collectible thereon or thereby, that figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any
portion thereof which has been satisfied.
b. The value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege
or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer
by virtue of the loss of the instrument.
(3) When the value of property cannot satisfactorily be ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than $100.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 224; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 225-230. [Reserved.]
§ 231. Definitions relating to state of mind.
(a) "Criminal negligence". -- A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person
fails to perceive a risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation.
(b) "Intentionally". -- A person acts intentionally with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or a result thereof, it is the person's conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause that result; and
(2) If the element involves the attendant circumstances, the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes
or hopes that they exist.
(c) "Knowingly". -- A person acts knowingly with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or the attendant circumstances, the person is aware that the
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(2) If the element involves a result of the person's conduct, the person is aware that it is practically certain that the
conduct will cause that result.
(d) "Negligence". -- A person acts with negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person fails to exercise
the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(e) "Recklessly". -- A person acts recklessly with respect to an element of an offense when the person is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary
intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 231; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 63 Del. Laws, c. 88, § 6; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 232. Definition relating to elements of offense.
"Elements of an offense" are those physical acts, attendant circumstances, results and states of mind which are specifically
included within the definition of the offense or, if the definition is incomplete, those states of mind which are supplied
by the general provisions of this Criminal Code. Facts establishing jurisdiction and venue and establishing that the offense
was committed within the time period prescribed in § 205 of this title must also be proved as elements of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 232; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 233. Definition and classification of offenses.
(a) "Crime" or "offense" means an act or omission forbidden by a statute of this State and punishable upon conviction by:
(1) Imprisonment; or
(2) Fine; or
(3) Removal from office; or
(4) Disqualification to hold any office of trust, honor or profit under the State; or
(5) Other penal discipline.
(b) An act or omission is forbidden by a statute of this State if a statute makes the act or omission punishable by any form
of punishment mentioned in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) An offense is either a felony, a misdemeanor or a violation. Any offense not specifically designated by law to be a felony
or a violation is a misdemeanor.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 233; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 234. Definition of terms requiring certain sentences.
When used for the purpose of describing or requiring a sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to this title, the terms
"minimum," "mandatory," "minimum mandatory" and "mandatory minimum" shall be construed as being synonymous.
71 Del. Laws, c. 98, § 1.;
§§ 235-240. [Reserved.]
§ 241. Conviction to precede punishment.
The punishments prescribed by this Criminal Code or by any other statute of a criminal nature may be inflicted only after
a judgment of conviction by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and over the subject matter.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 241; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 242. Requirements for criminal liability in general.
A person is not guilty of an offense unless liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which the person is physically capable of performing.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 242; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 243. Definition of voluntary act.
"Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously or habitually as a result of effort or determination, and includes
possession if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of the defendant's control thereof
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 243; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§§ 244-250. [Reserved.]
§ 251. Proof of state of mind required unless otherwise provided; strict liability.
(a) No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that the person had the state of mind required by the
law defining the offense or by subsection (b) of this section.
(b) When the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense is not prescribed by law, that element is established
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
(c) It is unnecessary to prove the defendant's state of mind with regard to:
(1) Offenses which constitute violations, unless a particular state of mind is included within the definition of the offenses;
or
(2) Offenses defined by statutes other than this Criminal Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose strict liability
for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.
In all cases covered by this subsection, it is nevertheless necessary to prove that the act or omission on which liability
is based was voluntary as provided in §§ 242 and 243 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 251; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 252. Prescribed state-of-mind requirement applies to all material elements.
When a statute defining an offense prescribes the state of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, without
distinguishing among the elements thereof, the provision shall apply to all the elements of the offense, unless a contrary
legislative purpose plainly appears.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 252; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 253. Substitutes for criminal negligence, recklessness and knowledge.
Whenever a statute provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element is also established
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence. When a statute provides that criminal negligence
suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is established if a person
acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is
established if a person acts intentionally.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 253; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 76 Del. Laws, c. 101, § 7.;
§ 254. Conditional intention.
The fact that a defendant's intention was conditional is immaterial unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought
to be prevented by the statute defining the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 254; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 255. Knowledge of high probability.
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes that it does not exist.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 255; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§§ 256-260. [Reserved.]
§ 261. Causation.
Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 261; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 262. Intentional or knowing causation; different result from that expected.
The element of intentional or knowing causation is not established if the actual result is outside the intention or the contemplation
of the defendant unless:
(1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different
person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more
serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 262; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 263. Reckless or negligent causation; different result from that expected or overlooked.
The element of reckless or negligent causation is not established if the actual result is outside the risk of which the defendant
is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which the defendant should be aware unless:
(1) The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is
injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 263; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 264. Causation in offenses of strict liability.
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense for which strict liability is imposed by law, the element is
not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 264; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 265-270. [Reserved.]
§ 271. Liability for the conduct of another -- Generally.
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when:
(1) Acting with the state of mind that is sufficient for commission of the offense, the person causes an innocent or irresponsible
person to engage in conduct constituting the offense; or
(2) Intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense the person:
a. Solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or
b. Aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or
c. Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so; or
(3) The person's conduct is expressly declared by this Criminal Code or another statute to establish the person's complicity.
Nothing in this section shall apply to any law-enforcement officer or the officer's agent while acting in the lawful performance
of duty.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 271; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 272. Liability for the conduct of another -- No defense.
In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person
pursuant to § 271 of this title, it is no defense that:
(1) The other person is not guilty of the offense in question because of irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption,
or because of unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the accused's criminal purpose, or because
of other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense; or
(2) The other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based on the conduct in question, or has previously
been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different offense or in a different degree, or has legal immunity from
prosecution for the conduct in question; or
(3) The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class of persons, and the defendant, not belonging
to that class, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity, unless imposing liability
on the defendant is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing the defendant's incapacity.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 272; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 273. Liability for the conduct of another -- Exemption.
Unless otherwise provided by this Criminal Code or by the statute defining the offense, a person is not liable for an offense
committed by another person if:
(1) The person is a victim of that offense; or
(2) The offense is so defined that the person's conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) The person terminates complicity prior to commission of the offense and:
a. Wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or
b. Gives timely warning to the Attorney General or the police or otherwise makes a proper effort to prevent the commission
of the offense.
If the actor's conduct constitutes a separate offense, the actor is liable for that offense only and not for the conduct or
offense committed by the other person.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 273; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 274. Offenses involving 2 or more persons; convictions for different degrees of offense.
When, pursuant to § 271 of this title, 2 or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees,
each person is guilty of an offense of such degree as is compatible with that person's own culpable mental state and with
that person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 274; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 275. Indictment as principal and conviction as accomplice; indictment as accomplice and conviction as principal.
(a) A person indicted for committing an offense may be convicted as an accomplice to another person guilty of committing the
offense.
(b) A person indicted as an accomplice to an offense committed by another person may be convicted as a principal.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 275; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 276-280. [Reserved.]
§ 281. Criminal liability of organizations.
An organization is guilty of an offense when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed
on organizations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or recklessly tolerated
by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the organization;
or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the organization while acting within the scope of employment
and in behalf of the organization and:
a. The offense is a misdemeanor or a violation; or
b. The offense is one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability
on an organization.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 281; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 1, 2.;
§ 282. Criminal liability of an individual for organizational conduct.
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which the person performs or causes to be performed in the
name of or in behalf of an organization to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in the person's own name or behalf.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 282; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3.;
§ 283. Impermissible organizational activity no defense.
In any prosecution for an offense alleged to have been committed by an organization, it is no defense that the act charged
to constitute the offense was an impermissible organizational activity.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 283; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3.;
§ 284. Definitions relating to organizational liability.
(a) "Agent" means any director, officer or employee of an organization, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf
of the organization.
(b) "High managerial agent" means an officer of an organization or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with
respect to the formulation of organizational policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.
(c) "Organization" means any entity listed in the definition of "person" contained in § 222 of this title, other than an individual
human being.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 284; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3, 5.;
(1) To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to individual or public interests;
(2) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction;
(3) To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state which constitute each offense;
(4) To differentiate upon reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor;
and
(5) To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 201; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 202. All offenses defined by statute.
(a) No conduct constitutes a criminal offense unless it is made a criminal offense by this Criminal Code or by another law.
(b) This section does not affect the power of a court to punish for civil contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by
law for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 202; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 203. Principles of construction.
The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this Criminal Code, but the provisions
herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the purposes of the law,
as stated in § 201 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 203; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 204. Territorial applicability.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed
by the person's own conduct or by the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable if:
(1) Either the conduct or the result which is an element of the offense occurs within Delaware; or
(2) Conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under Delaware law to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within
the State and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within the State; or
(3) Conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy
to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of Delaware; or
(4) The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by Delaware law with respect to domicile, residence
or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in the State; or
(5) The offense is based on a statute of Delaware which expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears
a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the defendant knows or should know that the defendant's conduct
is likely to affect that interest.
(b) Paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not apply when causing a particular result is an element of an offense and the result
is caused by conduct occurring outside Delaware which would not constitute an offense if the result had occurred in the same
place, unless the defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused the result within Delaware.
(c) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily impact causing death constitutes a "result"
within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of this section and if the body of a homicide victim is found within this State it
is presumed that the result occurred within the State.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 204; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 205. Time limitations.
(a) A prosecution for murder or any class A felony, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of
limitation:
(1) A prosecution for any felony except murder or any class A felony, or any attempt to commit said crimes, must be commenced
within 5 years after it is committed;
(2) A prosecution for a class A misdemeanor must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed;
(3) A prosecution for a class B misdemeanor, a class C misdemeanor, an unclassified misdemeanor or a violation must be commenced
within 2 years after it is committed.
(c) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense in which the accused's
acts include or constitute forgery, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or actively concealed theft or misapplication of property
by an employee, pledgee, bailee or fiduciary may be commenced within 2 years after discovery of the offense has been made
or should have been made in the exercise of ordinary diligence by an aggrieved party or by an authorized agent, fiduciary,
guardian, personal representative or parent (in the case of an infant) of an aggrieved party who is not a party to the offense.
In no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than an additional 3 years beyond
the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense based upon misconduct
in office by a public officer or employee may be commenced at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment
or within 2 years thereafter. In no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more
than an additional 3 years beyond the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
(e) Notwithstanding the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section, a prosecution for any crime that is delineated
in Subpart D of Subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title, or is otherwise defined as a "sexual offense" by § 761 of this title
except §§ 763, 764 or 765 of this title, or any attempt to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time. No prosecution
under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of the victim that has been recovered through psychotherapy unless there
is some evidence of the corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory. This subsection applies to all causes of action
arising before, on or after July 15, 1992, and to the extent consistent with this subsection, it shall revive causes of action
that would otherwise be barred by this section.
(f) An offense is committed either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course
of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated. Time
starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.
(g) For purposes of this section, a prosecution is commenced when either an indictment is found or an information is filed.
(h) The period of limitation does not run:
(1) During any time when the accused is fleeing or hiding from justice so that the accused's identity or whereabouts within
or outside the State cannot be ascertained, despite a diligent search for the accused; or
(2) During any time when the accused in a prosecution has become a fugitive from justice by failing to appear for any scheduled
court proceeding related to such prosecution for which proper notice under the law was provided or attempted. It is no defense
to a prosecution under this paragraph that the person did not receive notice of the scheduled court proceeding.
(3) During any time when a prosecution, including a prosecution under a defective indictment or information, against the accused
for the same conduct has been commenced and is pending in this State.
(i) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired, a prosecution for any offense in this title may
be commenced within 10 years after it is committed if based upon forensic DNA testing.
(j) In any prosecution in which subsection (c), (d), (e), (h) or (i) of this section is sought to be invoked to avoid the
limitation period of subsection (b) of this section, the State must allege and prove the applicability of subsection (c),
(d), (e), (h) or (i) as an element of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 205; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 60 Del. Laws, c. 401, § 1; 68 Del. Laws, c. 397, §§ 1, 2; 70 Del. Laws, c. 92, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 264, §§ 1, 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 320, §§ 1, 2; 74 Del. Laws, c. 56, § 1; 75 Del. Laws, c. 367, § 1.;
§ 206. Method of prosecution when conduct constitutes more than 1 offense.
(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than 1 offense, the defendant may be prosecuted
for each offense. The defendant's liability for more than 1 offense may be considered by the jury whenever the State's case
against the defendant for each offense is established in accordance with § 301 of this title. The defendant may not, however,
be convicted of more than 1 offense if:
(1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (b) of this section; or
(2) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the other; or
(3) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses.
(b) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense
is so included when:
(1) It is established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(3) It involves the same result but differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk
of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
(c) The court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in
the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 206; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 207. When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for the same offense.
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provisions and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution,
it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside. There is an acquittal if the
prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination by the court that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive
offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information had been filed or the indictment found, by a final order
or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction
which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting
a judgment or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subdivision there is an improper termination
of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness
is sworn but before verdict. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper:
a. The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or otherwise, the right to object to the termination.
b. The trial court declares a mistrial in accordance with law.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 207; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 208. When prosecution is barred by former prosecution for different offense.
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory provision or is based on different facts, it is barred
by a former prosecution in a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the second prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined
in § 207 of this title and the subsequent prosecution is for:
a. Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; or
b. The same conduct, unless:
1. The offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
2. The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not
been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated as improper termination is defined in § 207(4) of this title and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 208; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 209. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction; when a bar.
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States or another state,
a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal which has not subsequently been set aside or in a conviction as defined
in § 207 of this title and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless:
a. The offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense
and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
b. The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by
a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order
or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the
offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted; or
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated as improper termination is defined in § 207(4) of this title and the
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been
improperly terminated.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 209; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 210. Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by defendant.
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of §§ 207, 208 and 209 of this title under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or
(2) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and
with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise be imposed; or
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which was held invalid on appeal or in a subsequent proceeding
on a writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis or similar process.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 210; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 211. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities.
(a) The repeal of any statute creating, defining or relating to any criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State,
shall not have the effect of releasing or extinguishing any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute,
unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as remaining in full force and effect
for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability.
(b) Any action, case, prosecution, trial or other legal proceeding in progress under or pursuant to any statute relating to
any criminal offense set forth under the laws of this State shall be preserved and shall not become illegal or terminated
in the event that such statute is later amended by the General Assembly, irrespective of the stage of such proceeding, unless
the amending act expressly provides to the contrary. For the purposes of such proceedings, the prior law shall remain in full
force and effect.
71 Del. Laws, c. 263, § 1.;
§§ 212-220. [Reserved.]
§ 221. Principles of definitions.
(a) In this Criminal Code when the word "means" is employed in defining a word or term, the definition is limited to the meaning
given.
(b) In this Criminal Code, when the word "includes" is employed in defining a word or term, the definition is not limited
to the meaning given, but in appropriate cases the word or term may be defined in any way not inconsistent with the definition
given.
(c) If a word used in this Criminal Code is not defined herein, it has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as
appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the provision as declared in § 201 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 221; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 222. General definitions.
When used in this Criminal Code:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft. Where a building consists
of 2 or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.
(2) "Controlled substance" or "counterfeit substance" shall have the same meaning as used in Chapter 47 of Title 16.
(3) "Conviction" means a verdict of guilty by the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, or a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendere accepted by the court.
(4) "Dangerous instrument" means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, or any disabling
chemical spray, as defined in paragraph (6) of this section or any electronic control devices including but not limited to
a neuromuscular incapacitation device designed to incapacitate a person.
(5) "Deadly weapon" includes a "firearm", as defined in paragraph (12) of this section, a bomb, a knife of any sort (other
than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles,
slingshot, razor, bicycle chain or ice pick or any "dangerous instrument", as defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which
is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury. For the purpose of this definition, an ordinary
pocketknife shall be a folding knife having a blade not more than 3 inches in length.
(6) "Disabling chemical spray" includes mace, tear gas, pepper spray or any other mixture containing quantities thereof, or
any other aerosol spray or any liquid, gaseous or solid substance capable of producing temporary physical discomfort, disability
or injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air, or any cannister, container or device designed or intended
to carry, store or disperse such aerosol spray or such gas or solid.
(7) "Defraud" means to acquire a gain or advantage by fraud.
(8) "Drug" means any substance or preparation capable of producing any alteration of the physical, mental or emotional condition
of a person.
(9) "Elderly person" means any person who is 62 years of age or older. Thus, the terms "elderly person" and "person who is
62 years of age or older" shall have the same meaning as used in this Code or in any action brought pursuant to this Code.
(10) "Electronic control device" is a device designed to incapacitate a person, including but not limited to a neuromuscular
incapacitation device.
(11) "Female" means a person of the female sex.
(12) "Firearm" includes any weapon from which a shot, projectile or other object may be discharged by force of combustion,
explosive, gas and/or mechanical means, whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded. It does not include a BB gun.
(13) "Fraud" means an intentional perversion, misrepresentation or concealment of truth.
(14) "Law" includes statutes and ordinances. Unless the context otherwise clearly requires, "law" also includes settled principles
of the common law of Delaware governing areas other than substantive criminal law.
(15) "Law-enforcement officer" includes police officers, the Attorney General and the Attorney General's deputies, sheriffs
and their regular deputies agents of the State Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Enforcement, correctional officers, state fire
marshals, municipal fire marshals that are graduates of a Delaware Police Academy which is accredited/authorized by the Council
on Police Training, sworn members of the City of Wilmington Fire Department who have graduated from a Delaware Police Academy
which is authorized/accredited by the Council on Police Training, environmental protection officers, enforcement agents of
the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, and constables.
(16) "Lawful" means in accordance with law or, where the context so requires, not prohibited by law.
(17) "Male" means a person of the male sex.
(18) "Mental defect" means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as defective, as compared with an average
or normal condition, by a substantial part of the medical profession.
(19) "Mental illness" means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as a mental disease by a substantial part
of the medical profession.
(20) "Narcotic drug" shall have the same definition as contained in § 4701(24) of Title 16.
(21) "Oath or affirmation," for the purpose of warrants, can be made via videophone, telephone, secure electronic means or
in person.
(22) "Person" means a human being who has been born and is alive, and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation,
a trust, a firm, a joint stock company, a union, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental
instrumentality.
(23) "Physical force" means any application of force upon or toward the body of another person.
(24) "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
(25) "Serious physical injury" means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and
prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ,
or which causes the unlawful termination of a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant female.
(26) "Telephone," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any computer (as defined in § 931 of this title) or any other
electronic device which is actually used to engage in a wire communication (as defined in § 2401(20) of this title) with any
other telephone, computer or electronic device.
(27) "Therapeutic abortion" means an abortion performed pursuant to subchapter IX of Chapter 17 of Title 24.
(28) "Unlawful" means contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by law. It does not mean wrongful or
immoral.
(29) "Vehicle" includes any means in or by which someone travels or something is carried or conveyed or a means of conveyance
or transport, whether or not propelled by its own power.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 222; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 59 Del. Laws, c. 203, § 1; 63 Del. Laws, c. 92, § 1; 64 Del. Laws, c. 17, § 1; 68 Del. Laws, c. 378, §§ 1-3; 69 Del. Laws, c. 24, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 383, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 374, §§ 1-3; 72 Del. Laws, c. 34, § 8; 72 Del. Laws, c. 43, § 2; 72 Del. Laws, c. 50, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 371, § 1; 72 Del. Laws, c. 379, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 126, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 249, § 1; 73 Del. Laws, c. 413, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, § 4; 74 Del. Laws, c. 250, § 2; 76 Del. Laws, c. 270, §§ 1, 2; 77 Del. Laws, c. 64, § 3.;
§ 223. Words of gender or number.
Unless the context otherwise requires, words denoting the singular number may, and where necessary shall, be construed as
denoting the plural number, and words denoting the plural number may, and where necessary shall, be construed as denoting
the singular number, and words denoting the masculine gender may, and where necessary shall, be construed as denoting the
feminine gender or the neuter gender.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 223; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 224. Valuation of property.
Whenever the value of property is determinative of the degree of an accused's criminal guilt or otherwise relevant in a criminal
prosecution, it shall be ascertained as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the
crime, or if that cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after
the crime.
(2) Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, the value of certain written instruments, not including those having
a readily ascertainable market value, shall be ascertained as follows:
a. The value of an instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed
the amount due or collectible thereon or thereby, that figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any
portion thereof which has been satisfied.
b. The value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege
or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer
by virtue of the loss of the instrument.
(3) When the value of property cannot satisfactorily be ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than $100.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 224; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 225-230. [Reserved.]
§ 231. Definitions relating to state of mind.
(a) "Criminal negligence". -- A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person
fails to perceive a risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation.
(b) "Intentionally". -- A person acts intentionally with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or a result thereof, it is the person's conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause that result; and
(2) If the element involves the attendant circumstances, the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes
or hopes that they exist.
(c) "Knowingly". -- A person acts knowingly with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or the attendant circumstances, the person is aware that the
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(2) If the element involves a result of the person's conduct, the person is aware that it is practically certain that the
conduct will cause that result.
(d) "Negligence". -- A person acts with negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person fails to exercise
the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(e) "Recklessly". -- A person acts recklessly with respect to an element of an offense when the person is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary
intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 231; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 63 Del. Laws, c. 88, § 6; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 232. Definition relating to elements of offense.
"Elements of an offense" are those physical acts, attendant circumstances, results and states of mind which are specifically
included within the definition of the offense or, if the definition is incomplete, those states of mind which are supplied
by the general provisions of this Criminal Code. Facts establishing jurisdiction and venue and establishing that the offense
was committed within the time period prescribed in § 205 of this title must also be proved as elements of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 232; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 233. Definition and classification of offenses.
(a) "Crime" or "offense" means an act or omission forbidden by a statute of this State and punishable upon conviction by:
(1) Imprisonment; or
(2) Fine; or
(3) Removal from office; or
(4) Disqualification to hold any office of trust, honor or profit under the State; or
(5) Other penal discipline.
(b) An act or omission is forbidden by a statute of this State if a statute makes the act or omission punishable by any form
of punishment mentioned in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) An offense is either a felony, a misdemeanor or a violation. Any offense not specifically designated by law to be a felony
or a violation is a misdemeanor.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 233; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 234. Definition of terms requiring certain sentences.
When used for the purpose of describing or requiring a sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to this title, the terms
"minimum," "mandatory," "minimum mandatory" and "mandatory minimum" shall be construed as being synonymous.
71 Del. Laws, c. 98, § 1.;
§§ 235-240. [Reserved.]
§ 241. Conviction to precede punishment.
The punishments prescribed by this Criminal Code or by any other statute of a criminal nature may be inflicted only after
a judgment of conviction by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and over the subject matter.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 241; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 242. Requirements for criminal liability in general.
A person is not guilty of an offense unless liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which the person is physically capable of performing.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 242; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 243. Definition of voluntary act.
"Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously or habitually as a result of effort or determination, and includes
possession if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of the defendant's control thereof
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 243; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§§ 244-250. [Reserved.]
§ 251. Proof of state of mind required unless otherwise provided; strict liability.
(a) No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that the person had the state of mind required by the
law defining the offense or by subsection (b) of this section.
(b) When the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense is not prescribed by law, that element is established
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
(c) It is unnecessary to prove the defendant's state of mind with regard to:
(1) Offenses which constitute violations, unless a particular state of mind is included within the definition of the offenses;
or
(2) Offenses defined by statutes other than this Criminal Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose strict liability
for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.
In all cases covered by this subsection, it is nevertheless necessary to prove that the act or omission on which liability
is based was voluntary as provided in §§ 242 and 243 of this title.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 251; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 252. Prescribed state-of-mind requirement applies to all material elements.
When a statute defining an offense prescribes the state of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, without
distinguishing among the elements thereof, the provision shall apply to all the elements of the offense, unless a contrary
legislative purpose plainly appears.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 252; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 253. Substitutes for criminal negligence, recklessness and knowledge.
Whenever a statute provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element is also established
if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence. When a statute provides that criminal negligence
suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is established if a person
acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, the element also is
established if a person acts intentionally.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 253; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 76 Del. Laws, c. 101, § 7.;
§ 254. Conditional intention.
The fact that a defendant's intention was conditional is immaterial unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought
to be prevented by the statute defining the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 254; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 255. Knowledge of high probability.
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes that it does not exist.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 255; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§§ 256-260. [Reserved.]
§ 261. Causation.
Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 261; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§ 262. Intentional or knowing causation; different result from that expected.
The element of intentional or knowing causation is not established if the actual result is outside the intention or the contemplation
of the defendant unless:
(1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different
person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more
serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 262; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 263. Reckless or negligent causation; different result from that expected or overlooked.
The element of reckless or negligent causation is not established if the actual result is outside the risk of which the defendant
is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which the defendant should be aware unless:
(1) The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is
injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 263; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 264. Causation in offenses of strict liability.
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense for which strict liability is imposed by law, the element is
not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 264; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 265-270. [Reserved.]
§ 271. Liability for the conduct of another -- Generally.
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when:
(1) Acting with the state of mind that is sufficient for commission of the offense, the person causes an innocent or irresponsible
person to engage in conduct constituting the offense; or
(2) Intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense the person:
a. Solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or
b. Aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or
c. Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so; or
(3) The person's conduct is expressly declared by this Criminal Code or another statute to establish the person's complicity.
Nothing in this section shall apply to any law-enforcement officer or the officer's agent while acting in the lawful performance
of duty.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 271; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 272. Liability for the conduct of another -- No defense.
In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person
pursuant to § 271 of this title, it is no defense that:
(1) The other person is not guilty of the offense in question because of irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption,
or because of unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the accused's criminal purpose, or because
of other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense; or
(2) The other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based on the conduct in question, or has previously
been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different offense or in a different degree, or has legal immunity from
prosecution for the conduct in question; or
(3) The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class of persons, and the defendant, not belonging
to that class, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity, unless imposing liability
on the defendant is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing the defendant's incapacity.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 272; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 273. Liability for the conduct of another -- Exemption.
Unless otherwise provided by this Criminal Code or by the statute defining the offense, a person is not liable for an offense
committed by another person if:
(1) The person is a victim of that offense; or
(2) The offense is so defined that the person's conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) The person terminates complicity prior to commission of the offense and:
a. Wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or
b. Gives timely warning to the Attorney General or the police or otherwise makes a proper effort to prevent the commission
of the offense.
If the actor's conduct constitutes a separate offense, the actor is liable for that offense only and not for the conduct or
offense committed by the other person.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 273; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 274. Offenses involving 2 or more persons; convictions for different degrees of offense.
When, pursuant to § 271 of this title, 2 or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees,
each person is guilty of an offense of such degree as is compatible with that person's own culpable mental state and with
that person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 274; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1.;
§ 275. Indictment as principal and conviction as accomplice; indictment as accomplice and conviction as principal.
(a) A person indicted for committing an offense may be convicted as an accomplice to another person guilty of committing the
offense.
(b) A person indicted as an accomplice to an offense committed by another person may be convicted as a principal.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 275; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.;
§§ 276-280. [Reserved.]
§ 281. Criminal liability of organizations.
An organization is guilty of an offense when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed
on organizations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or recklessly tolerated
by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the organization;
or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the organization while acting within the scope of employment
and in behalf of the organization and:
a. The offense is a misdemeanor or a violation; or
b. The offense is one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability
on an organization.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 281; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 1, 2.;
§ 282. Criminal liability of an individual for organizational conduct.
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which the person performs or causes to be performed in the
name of or in behalf of an organization to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in the person's own name or behalf.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 282; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3.;
§ 283. Impermissible organizational activity no defense.
In any prosecution for an offense alleged to have been committed by an organization, it is no defense that the act charged
to constitute the offense was an impermissible organizational activity.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 283; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3.;
§ 284. Definitions relating to organizational liability.
(a) "Agent" means any director, officer or employee of an organization, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf
of the organization.
(b) "High managerial agent" means an officer of an organization or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with
respect to the formulation of organizational policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.
(c) "Organization" means any entity listed in the definition of "person" contained in § 222 of this title, other than an individual
human being.
11 Del. C. 1953, § 284; 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1; 74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §§ 2, 3, 5.;
