(a) "Viable" defined.- For purposes of a prosecution under this title, "viable" has the meaning stated in § 20-209 of the Health - General Article.
(b) Prosecution authorized.- Except as provided in subsections (d) through (f) of this section, a prosecution may be instituted for murder or manslaughter of a viable fetus.
(c) Intent.- A person prosecuted for murder or manslaughter as provided in subsection (b) of this section must have:
(1) intended to cause the death of the viable fetus;
(2) intended to cause serious physical injury to the viable fetus; or
(3) wantonly or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the person's actions would cause the death of or serious physical injury to the viable fetus.
(d) Inapplicable to termination of pregnancy.- Nothing in this section applies to or infringes on a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy as stated in § 20-209 of the Health - General Article.
(e) Inapplicable to medical professionals administering lawful care.- Nothing in this section subjects a physician or other licensed medical professional to liability for fetal death that occurs in the course of administering lawful medical care.
(f) Inapplicable to actions of woman carrying fetus.- Nothing in this section applies to an act or failure to act of a pregnant woman with regard to her own fetus.
(g) Section does not confer personhood on fetus.- Nothing in this section shall be construed to confer personhood or any rights on the fetus.
(h) Crime not considered "aggravating circumstance".- The commission of first degree murder of a viable fetus under this section, in conjunction with the commission of another first degree murder arising out of the same incident, does not constitute an aggravating circumstance subjecting a defendant to the death penalty under § 2-303(g)(ix) of this title.
(a) "Viable" defined.- For purposes of a prosecution under this title, "viable" has the meaning stated in § 20-209 of the Health - General Article.
(b) Prosecution authorized.- Except as provided in subsections (d) through (f) of this section, a prosecution may be instituted for murder or manslaughter of a viable fetus.
(c) Intent.- A person prosecuted for murder or manslaughter as provided in subsection (b) of this section must have:
(1) intended to cause the death of the viable fetus;
(2) intended to cause serious physical injury to the viable fetus; or
(3) wantonly or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the person's actions would cause the death of or serious physical injury to the viable fetus.
(d) Inapplicable to termination of pregnancy.- Nothing in this section applies to or infringes on a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy as stated in § 20-209 of the Health - General Article.
(e) Inapplicable to medical professionals administering lawful care.- Nothing in this section subjects a physician or other licensed medical professional to liability for fetal death that occurs in the course of administering lawful medical care.
(f) Inapplicable to actions of woman carrying fetus.- Nothing in this section applies to an act or failure to act of a pregnant woman with regard to her own fetus.
(g) Section does not confer personhood on fetus.- Nothing in this section shall be construed to confer personhood or any rights on the fetus.
(h) Crime not considered "aggravating circumstance".- The commission of first degree murder of a viable fetus under this section, in conjunction with the commission of another first degree murder arising out of the same incident, does not constitute an aggravating circumstance subjecting a defendant to the death penalty under § 2-303(g)(ix) of this title.
(a) "Viable" defined.- For purposes of a prosecution under this title, "viable" has the meaning stated in § 20-209 of the Health - General Article.
(b) Prosecution authorized.- Except as provided in subsections (d) through (f) of this section, a prosecution may be instituted for murder or manslaughter of a viable fetus.
(c) Intent.- A person prosecuted for murder or manslaughter as provided in subsection (b) of this section must have:
(1) intended to cause the death of the viable fetus;
(2) intended to cause serious physical injury to the viable fetus; or
(3) wantonly or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the person's actions would cause the death of or serious physical injury to the viable fetus.
(d) Inapplicable to termination of pregnancy.- Nothing in this section applies to or infringes on a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy as stated in § 20-209 of the Health - General Article.
(e) Inapplicable to medical professionals administering lawful care.- Nothing in this section subjects a physician or other licensed medical professional to liability for fetal death that occurs in the course of administering lawful medical care.
(f) Inapplicable to actions of woman carrying fetus.- Nothing in this section applies to an act or failure to act of a pregnant woman with regard to her own fetus.
(g) Section does not confer personhood on fetus.- Nothing in this section shall be construed to confer personhood or any rights on the fetus.
(h) Crime not considered "aggravating circumstance".- The commission of first degree murder of a viable fetus under this section, in conjunction with the commission of another first degree murder arising out of the same incident, does not constitute an aggravating circumstance subjecting a defendant to the death penalty under § 2-303(g)(ix) of this title.
