State Codes and Statutes
Statutes > Connecticut > Title51 > Chap882 > Sec51-196Sec. 51-196. Review of sentence or commitment. Decision. (a) The review division shall, in each case in which an application for review is filed in accordance with section 51-195, review the judgment so far as it relates to the sentence or commitment imposed, either increasing or decreasing the penalty, and any other sentence imposed on the person at the same time, and may order such different sentence or sentences to be imposed as could have been imposed at the time of the imposition of the sentence under review, or may decide that the sentence or commitment under review should stand.
(b) In reviewing any judgment, the review division may, for good cause, waive its authority to increase the penalty and may, thereafter, conduct a hearing on such application without the applicant being present. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an applicant from having counsel present or from appearing pro se at the hearing. In reviewing any judgment, said division may require the production of presentence or precommitment reports and any other records, documents or exhibits connected with such review proceedings.
(c) At a hearing held under this section, the review division shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the division for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence or commitment of the defendant should be increased or decreased or should stand. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the review division and the review division shall make such statement a part of the record at the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "victim" means the victim, the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.
(d) If the review division orders a different sentence or disposition of the case, the Superior Court shall resentence the defendant or make any other disposition of the case ordered by the review division. Time served on the sentence reviewed shall be deemed to have been served on the sentence substituted. The decision of the review division in each case shall be final and the reasons for such decision shall be stated therein.
(e) The secretary of the review division shall act as its clerk or, if there is no such secretary, the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which the review division is meeting shall act as the clerk of the division. The acting clerk of the review division shall send the original of each decision to the clerk of the court where the judgment was rendered and a copy thereof to the Chief Justice, the judge who imposed the sentence or commitment reviewed, the person sentenced or committed, the principal officer of the correctional institution in which such person is confined and the Reporter of Judicial Decisions, who shall select therefrom for publication such decisions as the reporter deems will be useful as precedents or will serve the public interest and shall prepare them for publication in the manner in which decisions of the Supreme Court are prepared. Decisions thus prepared for publication shall be published in the Connecticut Law Journal and, if the Reporter of Judicial Decisions so directs, in the Connecticut Supplement.
(1957, P.A. 436, S. 3; September, 1957, P.A. 14, S. 3; 1959, P.A. 194; 1963, P.A. 584, S. 2; P.A. 75-567, S. 31, 80; P.A. 82-472, S. 136, 183; P.A. 97-37; P.A. 03-129, S. 2.)
History: 1959 act added provisions re secretary and acting clerk of review division, deleted provision that all decisions be published in Connecticut Supplement and added provision re selection of decisions and provision re publication in Connecticut Law Journal and Connecticut Supplement; 1963 act included reformatory commitments and added reference to clerk of circuit court; P.A. 75-567 replaced reference to circuits with reference to judicial districts, circuit court functions having been transferred to court of common pleas by P.A. 74-183; P.A. 82-472 substituted a reference to the superior court for the "judicial district" for the superior court for the "county"; P.A. 97-37 added provision authorizing the division to waive its authority to increase the penalty and thereafter conduct a hearing without the applicant being present, added provision re the right of an applicant to have counsel present or to appear pro se, deleted provision re modification of reformatory commitments and deleted obsolete language re court locations; P.A. 03-129 divided existing provisions into Subsecs. (a), (b), (d) and (e), added new Subsec. (c) authorizing a crime victim to appear and make a statement before the division or submit a written statement to the division and defining "victim" and amended Subsec. (e) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
A convicted person is afforded an opportunity for what is, in effect, a limited appeal for a reconsideration of the sentence. The jeopardy, so far as the sentence is concerned, is a single continuing one, and any change in the sentence results from the sentenced person's own voluntary act. There is no double jeopardy. 149 C. 692. Denial of due process and defendant placed in double jeopardy when board increased sentence after defendant served the sentence imposed by the trial court. 152 C. 426. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Petitioner has constitutional right to counsel at hearing before sentence review division. 153 C. 673, 677. Resentencing did not involve double jeopardy where review division erroneously increased defendant's sentence when he was not represented before division by counsel. 156 C. 598. Cited. 168 C. 623. Cited. 187 C. 109. Cited. 192 C. 471. Cited. 214 C. 195. Sec. 51-195 et seq. cited. 224 C. 347.
Cited. 1 CA 724. Cited. 19 CA 48. Sec. 51-195 et seq. cited. 46 CA 486. Decision by the review division that defendant is not entitled to the review procedure is a non-appealable final judgment, but is reviewable under a writ of error, and a writ of habeas corpus may not be substituted for a writ of error. 57 CA 145.
Grievance relating to guilt of accused is not within power of division to review. 21 CS 381. In sentencing under uniform state narcotic drug act court must follow rigorous penalty provisions set forth therein. Id., 388, 392. Proof of variation from sentences given in comparable cases does not necessarily mean that sentence in issue is improper. Id., 388, 434. Enumeration of factors to be considered in setting a sentence. Id., 384, 412. The division cannot evaluate other cases where it is claimed that lesser sentences were imposed unless it has before it the facts of such cases. Id., 415. In determining a proper sentence, trial court owes duty to public as much as it does to accused. Id., 418. Maximum sentences given to defendants who were first offenders under uniform state narcotic drug act reduced from ten to seven years as both had used drugs for a short time only and neither sold narcotics. Id., 421. It is function of the board of parole, not sentence review division, to determine when a person should be released from prison. Id., 423. Sentence of narcotics offender reduced where background showed prior voluntary submission to arrest in an effort to break narcotic habit. Id., 426. Defendant sentenced to reformatory and then to prison, terms to be served consecutively; prison sentence suspended for presumably he would be reformed while serving reformatory sentence. Id., 431. Relatively more severe sentences may be justified in crimes involving injury or risk of injury to children. Id., 434. Purpose of division is to achieve more rational sentences and greater equality of treatment for offenders; considerations of clemency and postprison reform are matters outside its scope. Id., 448. In sentencing, deterrence of such conduct on the part of others is a desired goal since public has right to be protected against crimes threatening high social and personal injury. Id., 452. Defendant received a higher penalty than his codefendant though tried on a lesser charge, sentence held proper. Id., 455. Defendant charged as second offender; fact that all who might have been presented as second offenders have not been so presented cannot aid defendant. Id., 457. Defendant convicted of manslaughter; in view of circumstances of the killing, defendant's inclination to violence as shown by his criminal record and his knowledge, when he pleaded guilty, of what sentence would be recommended, his sentence held proper. Id., 461. Under uniform state narcotic drug act, conviction of defendant as second offender made compulsory minimum imprisonment term of ten years, once court deemed confinement was required, and defendant's claim that this amounts to a life sentence because of his age is a request based on considerations of clemency and more properly addressed to the board of pardons. Id., 463. Court's objective to impose a maximum sentence which would ensure that defendant would be under jurisdiction of parole board for the rest of his life could be accomplished with a lesser sentence, so sentence modified accordingly. Id., 468. Mere fact that defendant received a higher sentence than his codefendant affords no sound basis of comparison without the consideration of other pertinent surrounding circumstances. Id., 468, 474. The stress is not alone upon the criminal act but upon make-up of the offender and chances of his reform. Id., 474. Because the trial judge has opportunity to weigh and consider factors personal to defendant in connection with evidence, his opinion as to appropriateness of a sentence deserves great weight. Id., 477. Sentence increased where defendant was second offender and his sentence was less than that given for first offense. Id., 480. Matters which are administrative in nature are not reviewable by the review division. 22 CS 208. Trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel in place of public defender was not matter with which review division could concern itself. 25 CS 3. Function limited to harshness of sentence. Id. Sentence of three to seven years for blackmail found proper in view of heinous nature of crime and defendant's poor juvenile record. Id., 5. Division not empowered to comply with request of person convicted of violating narcotics act to send him to Kentucky hospital. Id., 7. Defendant's war record, being recited in presentence report, was before court at time of sentencing and cannot now be used to mitigate sentence. Id., 55. All factors must be weighed in reviewing sentences, not just those favorable to defendant. Id., 57. Sentence increased where robberies were vicious and no consideration for victims was shown. Id., 68. Sentence reduction denied where defendant had some knowledge of what is proper in law and order and chose to assume control on his own. Id., 73. Division not empowered to transfer prisoner from jail to a place where he could receive psychiatric help. Id., 145. Cited. Id., 149; Id., 473, 474, 484. Cited. 26 CS 176. Where defendant sentenced as second offender asked review division to reduce his maximum term on ground that parole board had denied him parole, held it is not function of division thus to pass on actions of parole board. Id., 196. Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for indefinite term for crime for which adult could be confined only thirty days, sentence too severe. Id., 506. Where maximum sentence that could have been imposed would be aggregate of one hundred twenty days except for reformatory commitment, sentence of not more than two years without possibility of parole for nine months too severe. 27 CS 81. Where, if court had imposed maximum penalty on all charges, result would be substantial fine and sentence in excess of two years and in view of defendant's presentence behavior, commitment to reformatory for not more than two years with basic minimum of nine months on good behavior fair and should stand. Id., 89. Where minor defendant committed to reformatory to be detained not more than two years was witness for state and helped state obtain a conviction and had been unable to post bond, being jailed over three months prior to conviction, sentence too severe. Id., 100. Evidence of reform after conviction outside scope of division's consideration. Id., 221. Unnecessary for division to find facts and interpret statutes to determine its jurisdiction to modify sentence to comply with law limiting commitments to reformatory to males between sixteen and twenty-one when matter not raised before division. Id., 239. Different sentences were ordered where trial court had failed to comply with section 54-121, by fixing minimum and maximum sentences on all counts of a concurrent sentence. Id., 330.
Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 416.
