§1-14  Words have usual meaning.  Thewords of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usualsignification, without attending so much to the literal and strictlygrammatical construction of the words as to their general or popular use ormeaning. [CC 1859, §9; RL 1925, §9; RL 1935, §10; RL 1945, §9; RL 1955, §1-17;HRS §1-14]

 

Attorney General Opinions

 

  Cited in construing "child".  Att. Gen. Op. 93-1.

 

Case Notes

 

  Where statute does not refer to renewal of a license andtreats all licenses as similar whether first or subsequent, circumstance thatin popular mind there is a difference not sufficient to alter plain meaning. 12 H. 303, 306.

  Where words are defined in statute express declaration ofmeaning governs.  15 H. 29, 34; 33 H. 371, 374; 36 H. 170, 178; 37 H. 314, 319,aff'd 174 F.2d 21; 37 H. 374, reh'g denied.  37 H. 380; 38 H. 16, 28; 49 H.426, 421 P.2d 294; 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 664, 667.

  Presumption is that words used in usual sense.  25 H. 669,686; 31 H. 625, 629, aff'd 52 F.2d 411; 41 H. 156, 159; 43 H. 154, 160; 44 H.519, 530, 356 P.2d 1028; 46 H. 375, 399, 381 P.2d 687.  Other cases where usualsense given or statute cited:  3 H. 793; 5 H. 321; 8 H. 259; 25 H. 747, 754; 39H. 100, 109.  But most known and usual sense may be repelled by the context, 25H. 669, 686; 34 H. 269, 272, reh'g denied.  34 H. 324, aff'd 105 F.2d 286; orwhere would lead to absurdity or inconsistency, 43 H. 154, 157; 44 H. 220, 227,352 P.2d 846.  Compare where strict construction called for.  22 H. 618, 625;38 H. 421, 426; 44 H. 59, 67, 352 P.2d 335; 45 H. 167, 177, 363 P.2d 990.

  Modern meaning given, as distinguished from ancientrestricted meaning.  34 H. 245.  Commonly accepted meaning, as distinguishedfrom fine distinctions of law of future interests.  46 H. 375, 381 P.2d 687.

  More natural interpretation may be rejected where would leadto unconstitutionality.  36 H. 170, 182; 40 H. 257, 259.

  While common meaning is general rule, where statute involvesa trade presumption is that words have trade meaning.  45 H. 167, 177, 363 P.2d990.

  There must be substantial justification for disregardinggenerally accepted meaning, but court must look to evils which provisionexpected to cure.  50 H. 212, 437 P.2d 99.

  Words of any statute, usually read in their ordinary andpopular sense.  52 H. 279, 474 P.2d 538.

  Usual meaning should be rejected if it results in absurdity. 55 H. 55, 515 P.2d 621.

  Statute may be construed contrary to literal meaning whereliteral meaning results in absurdity and the words are susceptible of anotherconstruction carrying out the manifest intent.  57 H. 84, 549 P.2d 737.

  Whatever is necessarily or plainly implied is as much a partof the statute as that which is expressed.  58 H. 53, 564 P.2d 436.

  Courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute ifsuch a construction can legitimately be found.  60 H. 487, 591 P.2d 607.

  Cited in construing "accident".  1 H. App. 625, 623P.2d 1271.

  Mentioned:  9 H. App. 325, 839 P.2d 530.