§1-15  Construction of ambiguous context. Where the words of a law are ambiguous:

(1)  The meaning of the ambiguous words may be soughtby examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, andsentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.

(2)  The reason and spirit of the law, and the causewhich induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover itstrue meaning.

(3)  Every construction which leads to an absurdityshall be rejected. [CC 1859, §10; RL 1925, §10; RL 1935, §11; RL 1945, §10; amL 1955, c 57, §1(c); RL 1955, §1-18; HRS §1-15]

 

Case Notes

 

Construction, generally.

  Where no ambiguity, no room for construction.  17 H. 389,391; 22 H. 31, 33; 22 H. 557, 566; 30 H. 116, 121; 30 H. 685, 690, aff'd 36F.2d 159; 33 H. 239, 242; 33 H. 915, 920; 35 H. 248, 251; 35 H. 429; 35 H. 788,794; 40 H. 478; 41 H. 1.  Intent shown by language used is primaryconsideration, and mischief sought to be remedied to be considered only wherelanguage ambiguous.  9 H. 106; 19 H. 83, 85.  But where literal meaning wouldlead to injustice, repugnancy or absurdity, room for construction.  21 H. 6, 8;23 H. 220, 222; 23 H. 541, 544; 40 H. 96; 40 H. 604, 612; 41 H. 89, 103; 50 H.150, 433 P.2d 220; compare 1 H. 31; 1 H. 254; 17 H. 389, 391.

  Effect of rule of strict construction on other rules.  Evenwhere strict construction called for, statute should be construed in harmonywith its purpose.  44 H. 59, 67, 352 P.2d 335.  Rule of strict construction oftax statutes does not have preferred status, being applicable only afterconsideration of other possible aids to construction.  45 H. 167, 193, 363 P.2d990.  Rule that penal statute cannot be extended beyond its express terms (22H. 31; 22 H. 618, 625; 35 H. 248, 251; 42 H. 29) does not mean that penalstatute must be susceptible of only one construction.  23 H. 133, 136; 40 H.257, 260; 44 H. 665, 680, 361 P.2d 1044; 49 H. 624, 634, 425 P.2d 1014.

  On legislative silence after judicial construction.  50 H.603, 446 P.2d 171.

  Rules of construction in tax cases.  50 H. 603, 446 P.2d 171.

  Title may be resorted to for meaning of act.  51 H. 1, 449P.2d 130.

  Applied in construing public accountancy statute.  51 H. 80,452 P.2d 94.

  Court will not usurp legislative power and enter intolegislative field.  51 H. 87, 93, 451 P.2d 809, 813; 51 H. 540, 465 P.2d 580.

  Interpretation of law adopted from foreign jurisdiction withchanges in words.  51 H. 540, 465 P.2d 580.

  Where statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasionfor construction.  52 H. 577, 482 P.2d 151. 54 H. 563, 512 P.2d 1.

  Even in absence of ambiguity, departure from literalconstruction is justified when such construction produces absurd and unjustresult and is clearly inconsistent with purposes of act.  53 H. 208, 490 P.2d899.

  Generally, statute should be so construed that no sentence,clause, or word is rendered superfluous.  54 H. 356, 507 P.2d 169.

  No room for construction where there is no ambiguity inlanguage of statute and literal application produces no absurd result.  55 H.610, 525 P.2d 586.

  Rules of construction in tax cases.  56 H. 321, 536 P.2d 91.

  Court is bound by plain, clear, unambiguous language of act. 56 H. 404, 537 P.2d 1190.

  Where language is plain and unambiguous, court is bound togive effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.  61 H. 572,608 P.2d 383.

  Court is bound to plain language of statutes.  61 H. 596, 607P.2d 415.

  Where there is no ambiguity, there is no room forconstruction.  62 H. 159, 612 P.2d 1168.

  Rule of strict construction of tax statutes should beresorted to only after other possible aids to construction have beenconsidered.  63 H. 199, 624 P.2d 1346.

 

Absurdity.

  It is presumed legislature did not intend absurdity.  7 H.505.  Construction rejected as absurd.  9 H. 171, 176; 11 H. 370; 20 H. 114; 41H. 527, 551-2; 50 H. 150, 433 P.2d 220; see 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 664, 666.

  Even in absence of ambiguity, departure from literalconstruction is justified when such construction produces absurd and unjustresult and is clearly inconsistent with purposes of act.  53 H. 208, 490 P.2d899.

  Usual meaning should be rejected if it results in absurdity. 55 H. 55, 515 P.2d 621.

  Departure from literal construction justified if such constructionproduces absurdity.  57 H. 557, 560 P.2d 490.

  Unless it would produce an absurd result, court is bound byplain language.  60 H. 497, 591 P.2d 611.

  There is ambiguity if literal interpretation would lead tounreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences.  61 H. 385, 605 P.2d 496.

  Literal application of language rejected as leading tounreasonable and absurd consequences.  63 H. 222, 624 P.2d 1353.

  Cited:  3 H. 90, 97; 3 H. 223, 229; 11 H. 221, 225; 17 H.428, 437; 17 H. 539, 544; 19 H. 214, 217; 40 H. 96, 105; 40 H. 257, 260; 41 H.89, 103.

 

Context.

  Words or phrases in a statute cannot be given a meaningforeign to their context.  44 H. 665, 673-74, 361 P.2d 1044.  Statute should beso construed as to make it consistent in all its parts and so that effect maybe given to every section, clause or part of it.  17 H. 142, 145; 22 H. 557,564.  Word "applicant" read as "appellant" afterconsidering context.  15 H. 590.

  "Noscitur a sociis".  236 F.2d 622, 626; 9 H. 64,66; 17 H. 135, 139; 23 H. 387, 393; 43 H. 154, 161; 49 H. 624, 636, 425 P.2d1014; 55 H. 572, 524 P.2d 890.

  "Ejusdem generis".  236 F.2d 622, 626; 260 F.2d744; 10 H. 278; 23 H. 1; 23 H. 387, 393; 42 H. 184, 187; 44 H. 370, 376, 355P.2d 25; 44 H. 665, 671, 361 P.2d 1044; 55 H. 531, 523 P.2d 299.

  Title or preamble as an aid to construction.  160 F. 842,845; 15 H. 325, 331; 20 H. 600, 604-5, modified 20 H. 675; 43 H. 103, 112; 43H. 154, 165; 49 H. 651, 652, 426 P.2d 626.

  Language must be read in context of entire statute.  53 H.208, 490 P.2d 899.

  Cited:  5 H. 73, 74; 17 H. 428, 439.

 

Reason and spirit.

  Policy and objects of legislature as guide to construction. 1 H. 31; 1 H. 165 (291); 4 H. 427; 5 H. 73; 8 H. 227, 229; 18 H. 221, 239; 20H. 669, 672; 23 H. 220, 222; 25 H. 644; 40 H. 96; 40 H. 257, 260; 40 H. 485,490; 40 H. 523, 538; 41 H. 89, 103; 44 H. 220, 225, 352 P.2d 846; 44 H. 665,674, 361 P.2d 1044; 46 H. 261, 377 P.2d 703; 49 H. 624, 636, 425 P.2d 1014; 49H. 651, 656, 426 P.2d 626; 50 H. 150, 433 P.2d 220; 50 H. 212, 437 P.2d 99.

  Circumstances at time of enactment may be considered.  23 H.387, 395.

  Statute should be construed in light of problem intended tobe dealt with, and not always literally.  52 H. 395, 477 P.2d 780.

  Legislative studies by non-legislators do not have probativevalue of committee reports or debates.  52 H. 577, 482 P.2d 151; 54 H. 578, 513P.2d 156.

  In case of incompleteness or ambiguity of expression thereason and spirit of the statute should be considered.  58 H. 53, 564 P.2d 436.

  Cited:  3 H. 223, 229; 5 H. 73, 74; 17 H. 428, 437; 20 H.114, 119; 34 H. 150, 158; 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 664, 666.