ARTICLE
IV.



RELEVANCY
AND ITS LIMITS



 



Rule 401  Definition of "relevant
evidence".  "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1]



 



Rule 401 Commentary



 



  This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 401.  The rule
draws upon the traditional common law definition of "relevancy," that
is, "[T]he tendency of the evidence to establish a material
proposition," McCormick §185; however, it is formulated to eliminate the
lexically ambiguous requirement that a proposition be "material,"
which has been variously construed to mean "important," "necessary,"
"substantial," and "essential," as well as simply related
to an issue in the action, see 26A Words and Phrases 212-14, 218-19 (1953). 
The rule actually encompasses the old materiality requirement by specifying
that the "fact" to which the evidence is directed be "of
consequence to the determination of the action."  For this reason, the
words "material" and "materiality" do not appear in these
rules.



  This rule restates existing Hawaii law.  In State v. Smith,
59 H. 565, 567, 583 P.2d 347, 349 (1978), the court defined the concept of
relevance:  "Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove a fact in
controversy or renders a matter in issue more or less probable."  The
court in Smith also relied upon the holding in State v. Irebaria, 55 H. 353,
356, 519 P.2d 1246, 1248-49 (1974), for the distinction between relevance and
sufficiency of the evidence:



The concept of
relevance, however, does not encompass standards of sufficiency.  Appellant's
contention that evidence which, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a
controverted fact, should be inadmissible is totally without basis in the law. 
It is often said that "[a] brick is not a wall."  ...Appellant
through a "sufficiency" standard would take away the building blocks
of a prima facie case.  The sufficiency standard should apply only when all the
bricks of individually insufficient evidence are in place and the wall itself
is tested.



  This rule preserves the Irebaria distinction between
relevance and sufficiency by establishing, as the requisite standard of
probability, that the consequential fact be rendered "more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  As the Advisory
Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 401 put it:  "Any more stringent
requirement is unworkable and unrealistic....  Dealing with probability in the
language of the rule has the added virtue of avoiding confusion between
questions of admissibility and questions of the sufficiency of the
evidence."



 



Case Notes



 



  Clothing found in trash, although not identified as being in
defendant's possession, admissible as part of State's circumstantial evidence. 
67 H. 581, 698 P.2d 293.



  Evidence of driver's drinking prior to accident relevant to
establish driver's negligence; evidence of prior accidents at same location
should have been admitted to show notice of potentially dangerous condition. 
68 H. 447, 719 P.2d 387.



  Trial court did not err in ruling that evidence of
motorcyclist's nonuse of helmet was not relevant under this rule, and thus, not
admissible under rule 402.  74 H. 308, 844 P.2d 670.



  Trial court did not err under rules 401 and 403 in admitting
evidence that indicated that plaintiff's symptoms may have been linked to drug
use and not solely to exposure to silicone.  78 H. 287, 893 P.2d 138. 



  "Legitimate tendency" test regarding admission of
evidence regarding a third person's motive to commit the crime charged,
comports with the relevancy test set forth in this rule.  79 H. 347, 903 P.2d
43.



  No abuse of discretion in admitting school nurse's testimony
as testimony was relevant because it was of "consequence to the
determination" as to whether the complainant was sexually assaulted.  80
H. 107, 905 P.2d 613.



  Expert medical testimony that "permanent, serious
disfigurement" would have resulted absent medical attention irrelevant
where that result was an element of the charged offense.  80 H. 126, 906 P.2d
612.



  Witness' testimony regarding witness' auto accident injuries
relevant to issue of plaintiff's damages.  80 H. 212, 908 P.2d 1198.



  Evidence that victim had $2,300 in cash on person after the
shooting irrelevant where fact of consequence was defendant's state of mind at
the time of shooting and reasonableness of that state of mind.  80 H. 307, 909
P.2d 1122.



  Evidence of gross weight of cocaine relevant and properly admitted
as it made the "consequential fact" that cocaine's net weight was at
least one ounce more probable than it would be without the evidence.  80 H.
382, 910 P.2d 695.



  Knife properly admitted as relevant evidence as its
attributes made likelihood that victims' injuries were life-threatening more or
less probable than without the evidence.  83 H. 335, 926 P.2d 1258.



  Trial court erred in ruling that victim's past use of a
handgun was not relevant, as victim's ownership and use of a handgun, and
defendant's knowledge of victim's past conduct when under the influence of
drugs, combined with the risk to life that victim posed, was relevant to the
issue of defendant's reasonable apprehension on the morning in question.  97 H.
206, 35 P.3d 233.



  Where evidence that child was a victim of battered child
syndrome was relevant to show that child's death was not an accident, but the
result of an intentional, knowing or reckless criminal act, giving rise to a
duty on defendant's part to obtain medical care for child pursuant to §663-1.6,
trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony that child was a victim
of battered child syndrome.  101 H. 332, 68 P.3d 606.



  Defendant's failure to proclaim defendant's innocence to
cellmate was irrelevant under this rule and, thus, not admissible by virtue of
rule 402.  104 H. 203, 87 P.3d 275.



  Testimony by defendant's cellmate that defendant desired a
reduction of the murder charge to manslaughter was irrelevant under this rule
under the circumstances of the case; defendant's reference to a reduction of
the charges against defendant did not make the existence of any fact regarding
whether defendant committed the murder "more or less probable than it
would be without" this testimony.  104 H. 203, 87 P.3d 275.



  The fact that defendant purchased bras for daughter and
complaining witness and the allegation that the girls had been sitting at table
in their underwear "a couple of days" before the incident were not
relevant to any of the events which occurred on date of incident, where, inter
alia, the purchase of bras by defendant would not tend to make more probable
any fact relating to the elements of sexual contact by defendant.  77 H. 340
(App.), 884 P.2d 403.



  Witness' testimony that witness suffered injuries in accident
relevant as to whether and to what extent the rear-end collision caused
plaintiff's injuries.  80 H. 188 (App.), 907 P.2d 774.



  Evidence of prior real estate transactions between seller and
broker had tendency to make broker's alleged breach of fiduciary duty more
probable and were relevant to broker's duty of loyalty.  84 H. 162 (App.), 931
P.2d 604.



  Trial court erred harmfully in excluding, pursuant to this
rule and rule 403, defendant's exhibit with respect to defendant's
theft-by-deception charges under §708-830(2), on the grounds that defendant's
analysis of the tax laws was irrelevant and that evidence of defendant's legal
theories would confuse the jury, where evidence that defendant, based on
defendant's understanding of the tax laws, had a good faith belief that
defendant did not owe taxes on defendant's wages was relevant to whether
defendant acted by deception and whether defendant had a defense under
§708-834(1).  119 H. 60 (App.), 193 P.3d 1260.



  Where, pursuant to §231-40, the Cheek interpretation of the
wilfulness requirement -- that a jury must be permitted to consider evidence of
a defendant's good faith belief that defendant's conduct did not violate the
tax laws, even if that belief was not objectively reasonable, in determining
whether defendant acted wilfully -- was adopted and applied in construing
§231-36(a), the trial court erred in excluding defendant's exhibit pursuant to
this rule and rule 403 on the grounds that defendant's analysis of the tax laws
was irrelevant and that evidence of defendant's legal theories would confuse
the jury.  119 H. 60 (App.), 193 P.3d 1260.