Rule 402  Relevant evidence generally
admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.  All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Hawaii, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules
adopted by the supreme court.  Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1]



 



Rule 402 Commentary



 



  This rule, similar to Fed. R. Evid. 402, establishes the
basic precondition for admissibility of all evidence:  it must be
"relevant" as that term is defined in Rule 401.  In State v. Smith,
59 H. 565, 567-68, 583 P.2d 347, 349-50 (1978), the court held:  "All
relevant evidence is admissible unless some rule compels its exclusion....  Our
laws give a [party] the right to introduce evidence of those relevant and
material facts which logically tend to prove the issues involved and which is
not otherwise excluded."  See State v. Irebaria, 55 H. 353, 519 P.2d 1246
(1974); Territory v. Henry, 39 H. 296 (1952); Bonacon v. Wax, 37 H. 57 (1945).



  There are, of course, many qualifications to the general
admissibility of relevant evidence.  The exclusionary rule in criminal cases,
see, e.g., State v. Santiago, 53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971), is a prime
example.  Rule 403 infra, requires exclusion of relevant evidence whenever the
relevance or probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."  Privilege (Article V) and hearsay (Article VIII)
rules frequently interpose a bar to the receipt of relevant evidence.



 



Case Notes



 



  Trial court did not err in ruling that evidence of
motorcyclist's nonuse of helmet was not relevant under rule 401, and thus, not
admissible under this rule.  74 H. 308, 844 P.2d 670.



  Evidence regarding search warrant was inadmissible as
irrelevant where existence of search warrant was not relevant to issue of
whether police officer's murder arose out of performance of official duties. 
75 H. 282, 859 P.2d 1369.



  Expert medical testimony that "permanent, serious
disfigurement" would have resulted absent medical attention irrelevant
where that result was an element of the charged offense; thus testimony was
inadmissible under this section.  80 H. 126, 906 P.2d 612.



  Evidence that victim had $2,300 in cash on person after the
shooting excluded as irrelevant where fact of consequence was defendant's state
of mind at the time of shooting and reasonableness of that state of mind.  80
H. 307, 909 P.2d 1122.



  Evidence of gross weight of cocaine relevant and properly
admitted as it made the "consequential fact" that cocaine's net
weight was at least one ounce more probable than it would be without the
evidence.  80 H. 382, 910 P.2d 695.



  Where purpose of exhibiting individual to jury is relevant to
an issue in dispute and does not contravene any other evidentiary requirements,
exhibition admissible.  81 H. 15, 911 P.2d 735.



  Accomplice's testimony regarding other accomplice's prior bad
acts was not relevant to defendant's claim of duress under §702-231 and was,
therefore, inadmissible under this rule.  101 H. 269, 67 P.3d 768.



  Where evidence that child was a victim of battered child
syndrome was relevant to show that child's death was not an accident, but the
result of an intentional, knowing or reckless criminal act, giving rise to a
duty on defendant's part to obtain medical care for child pursuant to §663-1.6,
trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony that child was a victim
of battered child syndrome.  101 H. 332, 68 P.3d 606.



  Proffered evidence properly excluded as irrelevant.  4 H.
App. 175, 664 P.2d 262.



  Defendant's failure to proclaim defendant's innocence to
cellmate was irrelevant under rule 401 and, thus, not admissible by virtue of
this rule.  104 H. 203, 87 P.3d 275.



  Although evidence that defendant had previously been
convicted of a felony was relevant for purposes of §134-7, evidence that
defendant may have received ineffective assistance of counsel during that prior
felony trial would not have any bearing on the validity of that felony
conviction; thus, trial court did not err in precluding evidence that defendant
may have received ineffective assistance during prior trial.  90 H. 489 (App.),
979 P.2d 85.