Rule 607  Who may impeach.  The
credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling the witness. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985]



 



RULE 607 COMMENTARY



 



  This rule, which is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 607,
rejects the traditional theory that a party calling a witness
"vouches" for his truthfulness and therefore is barred from
impeaching him.  See generally McCormick §38.  As the Advisory Committee's Note
to Fed. R. Evid. 607 puts it:



A party does
not hold out his witnesses as worthy of belief, since he rarely has a free
choice in selecting them.  Denial of the right [to impeach] leaves the party at
the mercy of the witness and the adversary....  The substantial inroads into
the old rule made over the years by decisions, rules, and statutes are evidence
of doubts as to its basic soundness and workability.



  This rule supersedes a statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §621-25
(1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §58; am L 1972, c
104, §1(r)), which precluded a party from impeaching his own witness "by
general evidence of bad character" but permitted impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement when the witness "prove[d] adverse."  In
construing the provisions of the prior statute, the Hawaii courts suggested that
a witness would "prove adverse" if his testimony was materially
inconsistent with the prior statement, his inconsistency came as a surprise to
the party offering his testimony, and he either expressly denied or, by
evasion, implied a denial of the prior statement, Territory v. Witt, 27 H. 177
(1923); see also Kwong Lee Wai v. Ching Shai, 11 H. 444 (1898).  Rule 607 thus
effects a significant change in Hawaii law in accord with a growing trend in
other jurisdictions, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code §785.  Another good reason for
abandoning the old impeachment limitation is that, as applied to defense
witnesses, its constitutionality is suspect in criminal cases, see Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).