Rule 609.1  Evidence of bias, interest, or
motive.  (a)  General rule.  The credibility of a witness may be attacked
by evidence of bias, interest, or motive.



(b)  Extrinsic evidence of bias, interest, or
motive.  Extrinsic evidence of a witness' bias, interest, or motive is not
admissible unless, on cross-examination, the matter is brought to the attention
of the witness and the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
the matter. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1]



 



RULE 609.1 COMMENTARY



 



  This rule has no federal counterpart, which means that
common-law principles of bias, interest, or motive impeachment govern the
practice in the federal courts.  The problem is that the common law is divided
on the question whether the impeaching material must, on cross-examination, be
brought to the attention of the witness being impeached as a precondition to
the proffer of extrinsic evidence.  McCormick §40.



  Rule 609.1 settles the issue and restates the rule of State
v. Murphy, 59 H. 1, 17-18, 575 P.2d 448, 459-60 (1978):



The general
rule is that a witness may be impeached through a showing of bias, hostility or
prejudice, and this may be done by use of the witness' own testimony or by
other evidence....  We believe that the correct rule is...that before any bias
of a witness can be introduced, a foundation must first be laid by
cross-examining the witness regarding the facts which assertedly prove the
bias.  Two reasons [are] recognized...for such a preliminary foundation. 
First, the foundational cross-examination gives the witness a fair opportunity
to explain statements or equivocal facts which, standing alone, tend to show
bias.  Second, such cross-examination lends expediency to trials, for if the
facts showing bias are admitted by the witness, the introduction of extrinsic
evidence becomes unnecessary.



 



Case Notes



 



  Admission of evidence of bias rests in the trial court's
discretion.  67 H. 581, 698 P.2d 293.



  Bias, interest, or motive is always relevant.  69 H. 204, 738
P.2d 812.



  Trial court abused discretion by unconstitutionally excluding
evidence of complainant's prior conviction, by prohibiting cross-examination of
complainant, from which jury could have inferred that complainant had a motive
to bring false charges against defendant and give false testimony at trial.  83
H. 109, 924 P.2d 1215.



  Where relevant evidence of witness' potential bias was
elicited at trial, trial court properly balanced the prejudice concerns of
defendant with the relevance and probative value of liability insurance evidence
to reveal witness' potential bias; thus, trial court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting evidence of bias, interest or motive with due regard for
rule 403.  106 H. 298 (App.), 104 P.3d 336.