Rule 611  Mode and order of interrogation
and presentation.  (a)  Control by court.  The court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.



(b)  Scope of cross-examination. 
Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.  The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as
if on direct examination.



(c)  Leading questions.  Leading questions
should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop the witness' testimony.  Ordinarily, leading questions
should be permitted on cross-examination.  When a party calls a hostile
witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party,
interrogation may be by leading questions. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch
1985]



 



Rule 611 Commentary



 



  This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 611.



  Subsection (a):  This subsection states the common-law
principle allowing the court broad discretion in determining order and mode of
interrogation.  6 Wigmore, Evidence §1867 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); McCormick §5. 
The intent is to define broad objectives and to leave the attainment of those
objectives to the discretion of the court.  This subsection restates existing
Hawaii law, see Lindeman v. Raynor, 43 H. 299 (1959); Flint v. Flint, 15 H.
313, 315 (1903); Mist v. Kawelo, 13 H. 302 (1901).  The principle was recently
reaffirmed in State v. Altergott, 57 H. 492, 506, 559 P.2d 728, 737 (1977),
where the court added:  "[I]n practice abuse [of discretion] is more often
found when complaint is made that the judge has unduly curbed the examination
than when undue extension of the discretion to permit the questioning is
charged."



  Subsection (b):  Limiting the scope of cross-examination to
the subject matters raised on direct examination plus credibility is the
traditional view, in support of which the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
wrote:



Although there are good arguments in
support of broad cross-examination from [the standpoint] of developing all
relevant evidence, we believe the factors of insuring an orderly and
predictable development of the evidence weigh in favor of the narrower rule,
especially when discretion is given to the trial judge to permit inquiry into
additional matters.  The committee expressly approves this discretion and
believes it will permit sufficient flexibility allowing a broader scope of
cross-examination whenever appropriate.



  Hawaii law is to the same effect, see Yamashiro v. Costa, 26
H. 54, 60-61 (1921); Booth v. Beckley, 11 H. 518, 522 (1898).



  Subsection (c):  This rule conforms to the traditional
common-law ban on the use of leading questions on direct examination and to the
traditional exceptions for the hostile, reluctant, and unwilling witness, the
child witness, the adult with communications problems, or the witness whose
memory is "exhausted," as well as the customary "preliminary
matters" exception.  McCormick §6.



  See Condron v. Harl, 46 H. 66, 81, 374 P.2d 613, 621 (1962):
"The allowance of leading questions is a matter for the exercise of
discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will be reversed only for
prejudicial abuse of discretion."  See also State v. Yoshino, 45 H. 640,
372 P.2d 208 (1962); Ciacci v. Wolley, 33 H. 247 (1934); Territory v. Slater,
30 H. 308 (1928); Territory v. Fong Yee, 25 H. 309 (1920).



 



Case Notes



 



  Court's allowing witnesses to supplement their answers with
further clarifying responses did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  78 H.
230, 891 P.2d 1022.



  Appeals court erred in determining that the trial deputy
prosecuting attorney's question during cross-examination amounted to
prosecutorial mistake or error because the prosecution was entitled to develop
the issue that defendant broached on direct examination and again on
cross-examination.  105 H. 352, 97 P.3d 1004.



  Trial court properly exercised discretion to control manner
in which testimony was gathered from defendant and limiting defendant's
testimony during defense presentation to matters not previously covered.  80 H.
450 (App.), 911 P.2d 85.