§657-13 - Infancy, insanity, imprisonment.
§657-13 Infancy, insanity, imprisonment.
If any person entitled to bring any action specified in this part (excepting
actions against the sheriff, chief of police, or other officers) is, at the
time the cause of action accrued, either:
(1) Within the age of eighteen years; or,
(2) Insane; or,
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution
under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than the person's
natural life;
such person shall be at liberty to bring such
actions within the respective times limited in this part, after the disability
is removed or at any time while the disability exists. [CC 1859, §1039; RL
1925, §2648; RL 1935, §3919; RL 1945, §10430; RL 1955, §241-12; am L 1963, c
13, §1 and c 85, §3; HRS §657-13; am L 1972, c 2, §37(1); gen ch 1985; am L
1989, c 211, §10; am L 1990, c 281, §11]
Cross References
Sheriff, etc., see §26-14.6.
Law Journals and Reviews
Tort and Insurance "Reform" in a Common Law Court. 14 UH L. Rev. 55.
Case Notes
Hybrid §301 Labor Management Relations Act/fair
representation claim not tolled by this section. 817 F. Supp. 850.
Deed of minor may be disaffirmed within reasonable time after
majority attained. 30 H. 184.
Mentally enfeebled person not barred by statute though suit
for cancellation of deed more than six years from execution. 31 H. 817, 901.
Laches is not imputable to one mentally incapacitated to
execute valid deed. 31 H. 817.
Amendment reducing period of infancy, during which statute of
limitations is tolled, from 20 to 18 years had effect of accelerating the date
on which the limitation statute commences to run so that action not brought
within two years after plaintiff had reached 18 was barred. 58 H. 101, 564
P.2d 1276.
Section applies to the limitations period provided in
§663-3. 63 H. 273, 626 P.2d 182.
Not applicable to actions against the State. 72 H. 77, 806
P.2d 957.
Tolls statute of limitations for tort actions arising out of
motor vehicle accidents during victims' minority. 72 H. 377, 819 P.2d 80.
Considering the definition of insanity and construing summary
judgment liberally in favor of non-movant, affidavits of doctors that patient
was mentally incompetent to manage patient's legal and business affairs were
sufficient to invoke tolling provisions of this section. 89 H. 244, 971 P.2d
717.
Because the city is neither the sovereign nor the surrogate
or alter ego of the sovereign, it is not entitled to sovereign immunity; thus,
it is subject to the State's tort laws in the same manner as any private
tortfeasor; as this section governs classes of "personal" tort
actions, such as "damage to persons or property", the infancy tolling
provision of paragraph (1) applies directly to personal injury actions against
the city; child was thus able to bring action, but as paragraph (1) did not
provide for tolling of parents' derivative actions and they did not timely
comply with §46-72, their individual claims were barred. 104 H. 341, 90 P.3d
233.
Cited: 20 H. 165; 75 F. Supp. 553, 563; 198 F. Supp. 78, 91.