§663-1 - Torts, who may sue and for what.

PART I.
LIABILITY; SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS

§663-1 Torts, who may sue and for what.
Except as otherwise provided, all persons residing or being in the State shall
be personally responsible in damages, for trespass or injury, whether direct or
consequential, to the person or property of others, or to their spouses or
reciprocal beneficiaries, children under majority, or wards, by such offending
party, or the offending party's child under majority, or by the offending party's
command, or by the offending party's animals, domestic or wild; and the party
aggrieved may prosecute therefor in the proper courts. [CC 1859, §1125; RL
1925, §2365; RL 1935, §4049; RL 1945, §10485; RL 1955, §246-1; HRS §663-1; am L
1972, c 144, §2(a) and c 189, §1; gen ch 1985; am L 1997, c 383, §65]

Cross References

Guardian ad litem, see §551-2.

Natural guardian; liability for torts of child, see §577-3.

Suits by and against, see §572-28.

Rules of Court

Guardian ad litem, see HRCP rule 17(c); DCRCP rule 17(c).
Affirmative defenses, see HRCP rule 8(c); DCRCP rule 8(c).

Law Journals and Reviews

Wrongful Termination Law in Hawaii. V HBJ No. 13, at pg. 71.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm. 7 HBJ 148.

Apportionment of Personal Injury Damages and Expert Medical
Opinion in Hawaii. 8 HBJ 25.

Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Rodrigues v. State
and Leong v. Takasaki. 11 HBJ 29.

Pharmaceutical Soundings in Hawaii. VII HBJ No. 13, at pg.
33.

Hawaii's Loss of Consortium Doctrine: Our Substantive,
Relational Interest Focus. VII HBJ No. 13, at pg. 59.

Wolsk v. State: A Limitation of Governmental Premises
Liability. 9 UH L. Rev. 301.

Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.: The Death of State of
the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability Actions Involving Inherently
Dangerous Products. 11 UH L. Rev. 175.

Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc.: Imposing a Duty to
Protect Against Third Party Criminal Conduct on the Premises. 11 UH L. Rev.
231.

Tort Law--Bertelmann v. Taas Associates: Limits on Dram Shop
Liability; Barring Recovery of Bar Patrons, Their Estates and Survivors. 11 UH
L. Rev. 277.

Masaki v. General Motors Corp.: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Loss of Filial Consortium. 12 UH L. Rev. 215.

Johnston v. KFC National Management Co.: Employer
Social-Host Liability for Torts of Intoxicated Employees. 14 UH L. Rev. 82.

Latent Disease and Toxic Torts in Hawaii: Analysis of the
Statute of Limitations, the Rule Against Splitting Causes of Action and
Nonidentification Theories of Liability. 15 UH L. Rev. 137.

Henderson v. Professional Coatings Corp.: Narrowing
Third-Party Liability in Automobile Accidents. 15 UH L. Rev. 353.

Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Remedies Available to
Victims in Hawaii. 15 UH L. Rev. 453.

AIDS Phobia: The Infliction of Emotional Distress and the
Fear of AIDS. 16 UH L. Rev. 143.

Reyes v. Kuboyama: Vendor Liability for the Sale of Intoxicating Liquor to Minors under a Common Law Negligence Theory. 17 UH L. Rev.
355.

Empowering Battered Women: Changes in Domestic Violence Laws
in Hawai'i. 17 UH L. Rev. 575.

Seller Beware: New Law Protects Hawai'i Home Buyers. 18 UH
L. Rev. 981.

BMW v. Gore: Curbing Excessive Punitive Damages. 19 UH L.
Rev. 311.

Touchette v. Ganal: Reaffirming the Judicial Activism of the
Hawai'i Supreme Court. 19 UH L. Rev. 345.

Interspousal Torts: A Procedural Framework for Hawai'i. 19
UH L. Rev. 377.

The Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Insurance Company:
Hawai'i Bad Faith Cause of Action for Insurer Misconduct. 19 UH L. Rev. 845.

Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet: Does the Law Allow
Private-Sector Employers to Read Their Employees' E-mail? 20 UH L. Rev. 165.

The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting the
Commercial Value of "Hot News" Information. 20 UH L. Rev. 421.

Russ Francis v. Lee Enterprises: Hawai'i Turns Away From
Tortious Breach of Contract. 23 UH L. Rev. 647.

Hawai'i's Response to Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation and the Protection of Citizens' Right to Petition the
Government. 24 UH L. Rev. 411.

Child Pornography on the Internet: The Effect of Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 on Tort Recovery for Victims Against
Internet Service Providers. 24 UH L. Rev. 763.

Fido Seeks Full Membership In The Family: Dismantling The
Property Classification of Companion Animals By Statute. 25 UH L. Rev. 481.

Scientific Expert Admissibility in Mold Exposure Litigation:
Establishing Reliability of Methodologies in Light of Hawai'i's Evidentiary
Standard. 26 UH L. Rev. 99.

The Strict Products Liability Sleeper in Hawai'i: Toward
Exclusion of the "Unreasonably Dangerous" Standard. 26 UH L. Rev.
143.

Punishment and Deterrence: Merely a Mantra; A Casenote on
State Farm v. Campbell. 26 UH L. Rev. 229.

Holding Hawai'i Nursing Facilities Accountable for the
Inadequate Pain Management of Elderly Residents. 27 UH L. Rev. 233.

Don't Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a
Camera-Phone: The Need For Privacy in the Public Sphere. 27 UH L. Rev. 377.

Global Warming: Attorneys General Declare Public Nuisance.
27 UH L. Rev. 525.

Knievel v. ESPN: Demonstrating the Need for a Common-Sense
Subjective Standard for Meaning in Defamation Law. 28 UH L. Rev. 231.

Extending Loss of Consortium to Reciprocal Beneficiaries:
Breaking the Illogical Boundary Between Severe Injury and Death in Hawai'i Tort
Law. 28 UH L. Rev. 429.

Hawai'i's Workers' Compensation Scheme: An Employer's
License to Kill? 29 UH L. Rev. 211.

Medical Malpractice in Hawai'i: Tort Crisis or Crisis of
Medical Errors? 30 UH L. Rev. 167.

From Anti-Injunction to Radical Reform: Proposing a Unifying
Approach to Class-Action Adjudication. 31 UH L. Rev. 155.

Case Notes

Where plaintiffs argued that State waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity through the enactment of §353-14 and the State's Tort Claims
Act [sic], §662-2 and this section, no express consent or applicable waiver
provisions found. 940 F. Supp. 1523.

Where the proper inquiry in this jurisdiction for the
assignability of a claim for relief is whether the cause of action alleges a
personal injury or an injury to property, and the complaint asserted
non-personal injuries, the professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,
and fraud claims were assignable. 113 H. 373, 153 P.3d 444.

Bad faith.

Hawaii supreme court, seeking to avoid inequitable or absurd
result, would allow plaintiff's bad faith claim, where plaintiff submitted
claims to defendant insurer for losses suffered as a third-party beneficiary of
insurance contract. 947 F. Supp. 429.

Independent cause of action for breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would not lie, where there was no coverage liability on
underlying insurance policy. 955 F. Supp. 1218.

Where defendant contended that claim for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was barred by two-year statute of
limitations governing damage to persons and property (§657-7), since there is
no element in the cause of action for bad faith that requires a plaintiff to
suffer personal injury, it is not in reality a cause of action based upon a "personal
injury", and the applicable statute of limitations is six years and is
found in the catchall provision of §657-1 (§657-1(4)). 986 F. Supp. 1334.

Limitations period applicable to cause of action for bad
faith, discussed; where complaint was not filed until almost one year after the
limitations period had lapsed, to the extent that complaint alleged a claim for
the tort of bad faith denial of benefits, summary judgment granted in favor of
defendant as to plaintiff's claim for tort of bad faith. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1204.

Violations of the unfair settlement provision,
§431:13-103(a), may be used as evidence to indicate bad faith in accordance
with the guidelines of Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Ins. Co. 27 F. Supp.
2d 1211.

Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided to plaintiff by chapter 386; prior to filing a separate suit for bad
faith denial of benefits or payments, plaintiff must first exhaust all
available administrative remedies before the department of labor and industrial
relations, disability compensation division. 28 F. Supp. 2d 588.

Insurer's motion granted to extent it sought summary judgment
as to claims against defendant, where uncontradicted evidence was that
defendant was the claims handler for subject insurance policy; defendant did
not have a contract with plaintiffs; defendant could not be liable to
plaintiffs for bad faith. 74 F. Supp. 2d 975.

Insurer's motion for summary judgment granted on defendant's
counterclaim alleging that insurer acted in tortious breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing by, among other things, its failure to pay
underinsured motorist policy benefits, improper use of "excuse" that
defendant violated consent-to-settle clause, and wrongful pursuit of its offset
theory. 176 F. Supp. 2d 1005.

Hawaii's Best Place bad faith tort is law that impacts
insurance, but does not solely regulate it; therefore, plaintiff's claim as
stated arising under Best Place bad faith tort did not fit within Employee
Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA) saving clause. Controlling precedent
mandated that plaintiff's claim was related to the processing of a claim and was
preempted by ERISA because ERISA's civil remedy was plaintiff's sole avenue of
relief. 242 F. Supp. 2d 752.

Where insured alleged that insurer breached covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by initiating action for declaratory judgment, insured
would be unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that insurer's
filing of lawsuit was based on an interpretation of disability insurance policy
that was unreasonable; among other things, a reasonable jury could decide issue
of fraud in insurer's favor based upon insured's failure to include 1990
surgery on insured's application for the policy. 248 F. Supp. 2d 974.

Insurance company did not breach the duty of good faith and
fair dealing when it decided not to defend the operator of a concrete recycling
plant or indemnify the owner where, inter alia, it appeared that plaintiffs did
not disagree with insurance company's assertion that at a minimum, there was a
genuine dispute as to whether coverage existed under the insurance policy. 307
F. Supp. 2d 1170.

Insurer's refusal to indemnify was not bad faith, where
insurer denied coverage based on an unsettled question of law and, based on the
court's ruling, was not ultimately obligated to indemnify insured; it was
premature to ascertain whether insurer's refusal to defend was bad faith. 504
F. Supp. 2d 998.

Controlling date for the purpose of calculating the statute
of limitations for plaintiff's claims of tortious breach of contract and bad
faith denial of insurance benefits was two years after the last payment of
motor vehicle insurance benefits; the date of plaintiff's receipt of payment,
within three days of the date on which the payment was mailed, was the date on
which the statute of limitations began to run. 520 F. Supp. 2d 1212.

Plaintiff's claim for bad faith denial of insurance benefits,
which arose out of defendants' decision to seek arbitration, failed as a matter
of law; any delay that was caused was reasonable in light of plaintiff's
actions and did not amount to bad faith conduct. 520 F. Supp. 2d 1212.

Bad faith cause of action may be brought by first-party
insured for insurer misconduct. 82 H. 120, 920 P.2d 334.

Breach of implied contractual duties owed by workers'
compensation insurer to employee, including duty to handle and pay claims in
good faith, gives rise to independent tort cause of action by employee, the
intended third-party beneficiary. 83 H. 457, 927 P.2d 858.

Where insured presented evidence that raised genuine issue of
material fact as to insurer's liability for bad faith if insurer's law firm's
conduct of defense breached law firm's duties towards insured and breach was
causally induced by insurer's actions, summary judgment erroneously entered in
favor of insurer on insured's bad faith claim. 90 H. 39, 975 P.2d 1159.

Any formal recognition of a claim for relief in favor of an
injured claimant against a third-party tortfeasor's insurance company for bad
faith settlement practices would require the assignment of the insured
tortfeasor's rights arising from an underlying insurance contract to the
injured plaintiff; the tort of bad faith settlement practices arises only from
a contract of insurance. 105 H. 112, 94 P.3d 667.

Where there was no underlying insurance contract from which
the duty of good faith settlement practices could arise, injured third-party
claimant had no right to sue self-insured car rental company for bad faith.
105 H. 112, 94 P.3d 667.

Where insurer's denial of plaintiff's claim for no-fault
benefits was based upon an open question of law--whether "the reasons"
as used in §431:10C-304(3)(B) means "all reasons"--there was no bad
faith on the part of insurer for not having stated all the reasons for its
denial of plaintiff's claim. 109 H. 537, 128 P.3d 850.

Where plaintiff alleged that insurer handled the denial of
plaintiff's claim for no-fault benefits in bad faith, plaintiff was not
precluded from bringing bad faith claim even where there was no coverage
liability on the underlying policy; thus, trial court erred in determining
that, because plaintiff's breach of contract claim failed, plaintiff's bad
faith claim must fail. 109 H. 537, 128 P.3d 850.

Where the question of whether the underinsured motorist
benefits settlement from non-party insurer would trigger the two-year statute of
limitations under §431:10C-315(a) (1993) for plaintiff's claim against
defendant insurer was an open question of law until this case, there was no bad
faith on the part of defendant insurer for having denied plaintiff's claim for
no-fault benefits on the basis of the statute of limitations. 109 H. 537, 128
P.3d 850.

Appellate court erred in affirming trial court's grant of
partial summary judgment on plaintiff's bad faith claim where there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether insurer breached its duty of good
faith by (1) denying consent to settle on the ground that tortfeasor was
financially secure and (2) unreasonably interpreting its policy as requiring
that the plaintiffs pursue tortfeasor to judgment as a precondition to
receiving underinsured motorist coverage. 118 H. 196, 187 P.3d 580.

As action for bad faith against insurer is an independent
tort, the proper limitation provision for bringing an action should not be that
provided in the insurance policy, but rather that provided in §657-7, which
limits causes of action for torts to two years. 88 H. 442 (App.), 967 P.2d
639.

Where insured's bad faith claim was not "any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing" under §658-5, and
action for bad faith in the first-party insurance context is independent of the
policy, an ongoing appraisal process did not bar insured from bringing a
lawsuit alleging bad faith handling of insured's claim. 88 H. 442 (App.), 967
P.2d 639.

Where claimant failed to make a counteroffer or attempt to
engage in meaningful settlement discussions with workers' compensation insurer
regarding insurer's offer before suing insurer for bad faith refusal to settle,
failure was fatal to claimant's bad faith claim as it left claimant with
nothing more than speculation to support claimant's allegations. 112 H. 195
(App.), 145 P.3d 738.

Where workers' compensation insurer's settlement offer simply
stated that the amount offered "would be for closure of your entire
workers' compensation claim", offer could not reasonably be interpreted as
requiring workers' compensation claimant to release insurer from tort
liability. 112 H. 195 (App.), 145 P.3d 738.

In the context of the Hawaii workers' compensation scheme, a
physician is an incidental beneficiary rather than an intended third-party
beneficiary of the employer's workers' compensation insurance policy; thus, as
physician was not an intended third-party beneficiary of insurer's insurance
policy, physician did not have a cause of action in tort for bad faith against
insurer. 114 H. 122 (App.), 157 P.3d 561.

Children.

Parent liable for tort of minor child when child would be
liable. 15 H. 124; 23 H. 541, 543. Father not liable for act of infant
unemancipated from childish instincts. 8 H. 715. Liability of infant for
damages to hired chattel resulting from infant's immoderate use of the
chattel. 8 H. 237. Contributory negligence of mother of six-year old child
not imputed to child. 29 H. 604. See 47 H. 281, 287, 386 P.2d 872. Degree of
care toward children on highway. 40 H. 417.

Child has no cause of action for injuries to parent not
resulting in death. 41 H. 634; 244 F.2d 604.

A six-year old may be capable of contributory negligence;
minor's standard of care. 47 H. 281, 386 P.2d 872.

Minor children liable in tort to parents, when. 51 H. 74,
450 P.2d 998. Minor children may sue their parents for negligence. 51 H. 484,
462 P.2d 1007.

Negligence; standard of care for children. 54 H. 611, 513
P.2d 487.

Parent may recover damages for loss of filial consortium of
an injured adult child. 71 H. 1, 780 P.2d 566.

Causation.

Motion to dismiss count of plaintiffs' third amended
complaint alleging that the design, manufacture, and/or production of subject
chemicals by certain defendants constituted an ultrahazardous activity granted;
the complaint was devoid of any allegation that plaintiffs' claimed injuries
flowed directly from the act of manufacturing the subject chemicals, nor could
plaintiffs make such causation allegations. 293 F. Supp. 2d 1140.

Intervening negligence and proximate causation. 45 H. 128,
363 P.2d 969.

Negligence. Causation construed. 57 H. 460, 558 P.2d 1018.

Where causation is a primary issue, it is plain and
reversible error for a trial court not to explain the meaning of "legal
cause" to a jury. 77 H. 282, 884 P.2d 345.

When read as a whole, or when considering both jury
instruction where trial court used term "legal cause" as opposed to "substantial
factor" and instruction that properly defined "legal cause", the
instructions given were not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous,
inconsistent, or misleading. 78 H. 230, 891 P.2d 1022.

Where department of education's (DOE) negligent acts
contributed to the conditions that facilitated the teacher's molestation of the
girl students, the DOE's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the
plaintiff parents' injuries; thus, trial court did not err in finding that the
DOE's negligence legally caused the plaintiff parents' various psychological
injuries. 100 H. 34, 58 P.3d 545.

Based upon the fact that the perpetrator of minor's injuries
had not been determined, department of human services social worker's
willingness and rush to entrust the care of minor to mother, complete disregard
of the medical evidence, and lenient verbal service agreement, and that minor
suffered injuries while in mother's care and custody, the trial court properly
concluded that department's conduct legally caused minor to sustain the
injuries. 117 H. 262, 178 P.3d 538.

In breach of express warranty actions based on seller's
failure to deliver goods in conformance with an express promise, affirmation of
fact, or description, "substantial factor" test proper standard to
apply in determining proximate cause. 86 H. 383 (App.), 949 P.2d 1004.

Evidence fell short of providing the causal nexus between any
alleged negligence of defendants and patient's death where there was no expert
medical testimony that negligence by defendants caused patient's death "to
a reasonable medical probability", leaving the jury to speculate that
defendants' "action or inaction might or could have" resulted in
patient's death seventeen months later. 119 H. 136 (App.), 194 P.3d 1098.

Where the causal link between any alleged negligence and
patient's death seventeen months after the surgeries was not within the realm
of "common knowledge", and the role that preexisting conditions
and/or subsequent complications played in patient's death was not within the
knowledge of the average layperson, patient sustained a "sophisticated
injury", and a jury needed expert medical testimony to determine whether
any alleged negligence by defendants contributed to patient's death; plaintiffs
were thus required to present expert medical testimony on the causal link
between any alleged negligence and patient's death. 119 H. 136 (App.), 194
P.3d 1098.

Damages.

Defendant insurance company's motion for summary judgment
granted as to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, where plaintiff alleged
that defendant's conduct was wanton and oppressive; there was not sufficient
evidence to reach clear and convincing standard, and thus the question of
punitives could not be put to a jury. 999 F. Supp. 1369.

If plaintiff succeeded on bad faith claim, and plaintiff
could show that plaintiff's emotional distress damages were proximately caused
by defendant insurance company's actions, plaintiff could recover damages for
plaintiff's emotional distress as incidentally flowing from the breach. 999 F.
Supp. 1369.

Any recovery of damages for loss of consortium by (former)
spouse limited to duration of plaintiffs' (i.e., patient and patient's spouse)
marriage. 125 F. Supp. 2d 1249.

Plaintiff failed to assert damages which were not
speculative; plaintiff's claims requiring the element of actual damages were
dismissed. 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272.

Punitive damages not allowed against principal unless
principal participated in the wrongful act or authorized or approved it. 8 H.
411; 24 H. 579; 29 H. 524. Punitive damages may be awarded though actual
damages nominal. 40 H. 492.

Explosives, concussion damage. 42 H. 353.

Use of mathematical formula to compute damages for pain and
suffering improper. 47 H. 408, 390 P.2d 740; 48 H. 22, 395 P.2d 365. But see
§635-52.

Defendant title company was liable to plaintiffs only for
damages limited to the transaction for which certificate of title search was
intended to influence, that is, only for damages plaintiffs suffered in the
transaction wherein they purchased the property; defendant's negligence was not
the proximate cause of the loss of anticipated profits. 51 H. 462, 462 P.2d
905.

Clear and convincing standard of proof adopted for all
punitive damage claims. 71 H. 1, 780 P.2d 566.

Punitive damages may be awarded in products liability action
based on underlying theory of strict liability where plaintiff proves requisite
aggravating conduct on part of defendant. 71 H. 1, 780 P.2d 566.

Plaintiff has duty to mitigate damages. 56 H. 507, 542 P.2d
1265.

Mental distress damages may be recovered in a products
liability implied warranty action. 74 H. 1, 837 P.2d 1273.

Apportionment of damages, discussed, where plaintiff had a
pre-existing condition, had been injured or plaintiff's condition had been
aggravated by independent acts of successive tortfeasors, and had allegedly
caused some of plaintiff's own injuries after the accident from which plaintiff
had brought suit. 77 H. 282, 884 P.2d 345.

Circuit court correctly granted plaintiff-appellee's motion
for directed verdict as to punitive damages regarding interference with
contract claim, where defendants-appellants failed to show actual damages. 78
H. 40, 890 P.2d 277.

Punitive damages may not be awarded in bad faith tort case
unless evidence reflects something more than the conduct necessary to establish
the tort. 82 H. 120, 920 P.2d 334.

Emotional distress damages resulting from breach of contract
recoverable only where parties specifically provide for them in the contract or
where the nature of the contract clearly indicates that such damages are within
the parties' contemplation or expectation in the event of a breach. 89 H. 234,
971 P.2d 707.

Tort recovery, including recovery of punitive damages, is not
allowed under Hawaii law for breach of contract in the absence of conduct that
(1) violates a duty that is independently recognized by principles of tort law
and (2) transcends the breach of the contract. 89 H. 234, 971 P.2d 707.

Where plaintiff alleging defamation failed to prove "actual
damages" caused by newspaper's negligence, summary judgment for newspaper
properly granted. 89 H. 254, 971 P.2d 1089.

Where a person is deprived of the use of his or her property
due to the tortious conduct of another, he or she may recover "loss of use"
damages; such damages are, as a general matter, limited to the period of time
reasonably necessary to obtain a replacement, to effect repairs, or the date
upon which the property is returned. 97 H. 38, 33 P.3d 204.

Under Hawaii law, a party is not immune from liability for
civil damages based upon that party's fraud engaged in during prior litigation
proceedings. 102 H. 149, 73 P.3d 687.

Where award of general damages, consisting of damages to
credit, general reputation, and loss of business opportunities, were personal
to aircraft lessors, appellate court erred by holding that general damages were
assignable. 102 H. 189, 74 P.3d 12.

The collateral source rule prohibits reducing a plaintiff's
award of medical special damages to reflect the discounted amount paid by medicare/medicaid;
the amounts billed in excess of the medicare/medicaid amount paid are not
irrelevant or inadmissible on the issue of medical special damages. 106 H. 81,
101 P.3d 1149.

Where damages alleged by association of apartment owners
against masonry subcontractor consisted of purely economic losses not
recoverable in negligence, the association's negligence claims based on
violations of contract specifications were barred by the economic loss rule.
115 H. 232, 167 P.3d 225.

As question of whether defendant's fraudulent
misrepresentation caused damage to plaintiffs by preventing them from receiving
the "fair compromise value" of their claims was one upon which the
trier of fact must be guided by expert legal testimony, trial court did not err
in concluding that "expert lawyer testimony directed to the numerous
compromise factors, and how they would apply to each plaintiff's case",
was required. 116 H. 277, 172 P.3d 1021.

Where plaintiffs, in their settlement fraud claim, did not
seek rescission of their settlement agreements in their complaint, but based on
the allegations of their complaint, "unequivocally and knowledgeably"
elected to affirm their settlement agreements and pursue an action for fraud,
trial court did not err in concluding that the measure of damages for the
plaintiffs' fraud action was "the fair compromise value of the claim at
the time of the settlement". 116 H. 277, 172 P.3d 1021.

Where unsubstantiated conclusions of plaintiffs' experts were
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude
summary judgment, trial court properly concluded that plaintiffs were "unable
to prove the fact or amount of settlement fraud damages as a matter of law"
and was thus correct in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. 116
H. 277, 172 P.3d 1021.

Appellate court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
any unreasonable interpretation of the policy by insurer would not have
prejudiced plaintiffs where there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether (1) insurer's persistent reliance on an unreasonable interpretation of
its underinsured motorist policy caused an unreasonable delay in payment of
benefits and (2) insurer's initial refusal to consider a potentially available
and expedient avenue of resolving the plaintiff's tort claim caused the
controversy to drag on longer than necessary, causing the plaintiffs to incur
both pre-lawsuit attorney's fees and loss of interest on principal. 118 H.
196, 187 P.3d 580.

Inconsistent for jury not to award pain and suffering general
damages where it awarded special damages for medical expenses and lost wages.
80 H. 188 (App.), 907 P.2d 774.

"Pure" comparative negligence principles should be
applied to reduce a plaintiff's recovery in those tort actions for breach of
express warranty where a plaintiff is found to be negligent. 86 H. 383 (App.),
949 P.2d 1004.

Defamation.

Defendants' statements implying attorney's poor client
representation constitutionally protected speech and not defamatory where
general and specific contexts in which statements were made did not imply
assertion of an objective fact and statements were incapable of being proved
true or false. 56 F.3d 1147.

Totality of the circumstances revealed that statements by
president of labor organization were a call to arms, not assertions of
objective fact; the statements were not defamatory, and therefore were fully
protected by federal labor law. 302 F.3d 998.

False statement that attorney had been a prosecutor in South Africa was libelous per se; no recovery for defamation based on a truthful statement
of fact. 825 F. Supp. 906.

Some statements that allegedly defamed plaintiff or cast
plaintiff in false light were privileged expressions of opinion. 825 F. Supp.
906.

Plaintiff was not a public figure for purposes of its
defamation claim. 833 F. Supp. 802.

Statements in editorial about plaintiff (when plaintiff was
mayor) were protected by First Amendment and thus, not actionable. 930 F.
Supp. 1403.

Where alleged defamatory statements occurred during a
conversation between an employee of defendant and representatives of defendant's
temporary disability insurer, there was a qualified privilege as defendant and
its insurer shared a common interest, their business relationship; an employer
who communicates information to its insurance carrier is acting, at the very
least, to promote the private interest of the companies; questions remained
regarding potential abuse of the privilege. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1241.

Defendant magazine's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or
in the alternative, for summary judgment granted, where, inter alia, plaintiff
complained of general taint of magazine article and plaintiff's complaint also
identified specific statements in the article that plaintiff took to be
defamatory. 190 F. Supp. 2d 1192.

Preemption by Fair Credit Reporting Act of plaintiff's
defamation and negligence claims against furnishers of credit information and
consumer reporting agencies, discussed. 293 F. Supp. 2d 1167.

Summary judgment granted for defendants on plaintiff's
defamation claim, where, inter alia, the allegedly defamatory statement was
true by plaintiff's own admission. 409 F. Supp. 2d 1206.

Plaintiff was a general public figure in the limited context
of the surfing community; because plaintiff was a public figure, plaintiff
would be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants
acted with "actual malice". 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081.

Public official. 50 H. 648, 448 P.2d 337.

Qualified privilege; publication. 52 H. 366, 477 P.2d 162.

Libel per se; qualified privilege. 53 H. 456, 497 P.2d 40.

Broadcast charging falsely that person is communist is libel
per se. 56 H. 522, 543 P.2d 1356.

Qualified privilege discussed. 57 H. 390, 557 P.2d 1334.

Trial court clearly erred, to defendant's prejudice, by
leaving to jury determination of existence of a qualified privilege. 76 H.
310, 876 P.2d 1278.

Defendant's statement not false or defamatory where statement
was rhetorical hyperbole--figurative or hyperbolic language that would negate
the impression that defendant was asserting an objective fact about plaintiff;
statement thus was constitutionally protected. 88 H. 94, 962 P.2d 353.

Where plaintiff in defamation action failed to prove that
newspaper had acted with actual malice when it erroneously published story
naming plaintiff as the target of an investigation, summary judgment for
newspaper properly granted. 89 H. 254, 971 P.2d 1089.

Defenses.

Fact that manufacturers of blood clotting agent followed
industry standards in negligence action by hemophiliac patients who tested
positive for HIV did not necessarily immunize defendants from liability. 971
F.2d 375.

It could not be disputed that by the time the underinsured
motorist benefits were paid, plaintiff either knew or should have known that
defendant's alleged refusal to engage in settlement negotiations caused
plaintiff injury; any claims for emotional distress were time-barred. 11 F.
Supp. 2d 1204.

Plaintiffs' claims against certain defendants were
time-barred, where those defendants were first named as parties in first
amended complaint filed more than two years after plane crash and the claims
did not relate back to the date the original complaint was filed. 289 F. Supp.
2d 1197.

Plaintiffs' negligence claims were dismissed with prejudice;
there was no basis for allowing derivative litigation over claims that an
opponent's prior litigation conduct in another case amounted to negligence.
330 F. Supp. 2d 1101.

Defendant automobile manufacturer may assert a defense of
comparative negligence to plaintiff's negligence and strict liability claims
regarding injuries stemming from the "second collision" between
plaintiff's head and the steering column that occurred due to the failure of
the airbags to deploy. 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091.

General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) rolling statute of
repose discussed in dispute arising from a helicopter crash: among other
things, the impeller which was modified was protected by the GARA and no
liability could be imposed upon defendants for the impeller. 457 F. Supp. 2d
1112.

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment granted as to
plaintiff's claim that defendants misappropriated and used plaintiff's name and
likeness in an unfavorable publication without plaintiff's authorization; the
published article, photographs, and liner notes were newsworthy and relevant. 528
F. Supp. 2d 1081.

Where defendants argued that the intentional infliction of
emotional distress/negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were
time-barred because the time began to run on the date of discharge, there was a
triable issue of fact as to when plaintiffs-intervenors discovered the cause of
their alleged emotional distress. 535 F. Supp. 2d 1149.

Contributory negligence. 48 H. 22, 395 P.2d 365. Assumption
of risk. 49 H. 1, 406 P.2d 887; 49 H. 351, 417 P.2d 816. Unavoidable accident.
47 H. 408, 390 P.2d 740; 48 H. 330, 402 P.2d 289.

Comparative negligence applies only to claims accruing after
July 14, 1969, and the rule of contributory negligence continues on claims that
accrued before that date. 52 H. 129, 471 P.2d 524.

Interspousal tort immunity upheld. 63 H. 653, 634 P.2d 586.

In implied warranty and strict products liability tort
actions, express assumption of risk is available as separate defense that may
bar recovery; implied assumption of risk is defense only when plaintiff's
assumption of risk is a form of contributory negligence. 74 H. 1, 837 P.2d
1273.

Assumption of risk defense generally applied to tort claims
for relief. 74 H. 85, 839 P.2d 10.

Compelled self-publication of the reason for termination by a
former employee to prospective employers does not satisfy the requirement of
publication to a third party necessary to sustain a claim for defamation. 100
H. 149, 58 P.3d 1196.

Union shop steward's claim for defamation was not preempted
by the National Labor Relations Act where steward pled that employer's
statements impugned steward's reputation and held steward up to scorn and
ridicule and feelings of contempt and execration in the community at large,
that the statements were untrue and that employer knew that they were untrue at
the time, and that the statements were made with malice. 109 H. 520, 128 P.3d
833.

By plaintiff's participation in the sport of golfing,
plaintiff assumed all of the ordinary dangers incident to the game, i.e., the
inherent risks, including the inherent risk that golf participants will be hit
by errant shots; as a co-participant, defendant's errant shot was neither
intentional nor reckless, and defendant had no duty to warn plaintiff of the
errant ball; thus, the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk applied
to bar plaintiff's claim against defendant. 110 H. 367, 133 P.3d 796.

In complaints alleging intentional interference with
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, tortious inducement
of breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contractual
relations, where there were no allegations that indicated that lawyers "possessed
a desire to harm which is independent of the desire to protect their clients",
and the complaints were devoid of any allegations that the lawyers "acted
for personal gain or with ill-will towards" plaintiffs, lawyers'
management of the inspection and review process of plaintiff's books and
records fell within the purview of the litigation privilege. 113 H. 251, 151
P.3d 732.

Where defendant lawyers' conduct at issue occurred during a
quasi-judicial proceeding (arbitration), notwithstanding the fact that the
proceeding was temporarily stayed, litigation privilege was applicable to
appeal. 113 H. 251, 151 P.3d 732.

UCC statute of limitations applies to breach of express
warranty claim for personal injury. 86 H. 383 (App.), 949 P.2d 1004.

Primary implied assumption of risk is a discrete and complete
defense in sports injury cases where the defendant's conduct at issue is an
inherent risk of the sports activity; in determining whether the defendant's
conduct is an inherent risk of the sports activity, the nature of the activity,
the relationship of the defendant to the activity and the relationship of the
defendant to the plaintiff must be considered. 96 H. 51 (App.), 25 P.3d 826.

Dram shop.

Person injured by intoxicated person may recover from tavern
which supplied liquor to the intoxicated person in violation of statute. 62 H.
131, 612 P.2d 533.

Duty.

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate facts to establish duty owed
by defendant, where, inter alia, no evidence found of custody or control of
plaintiff's employer's machinery or employees that would create special
relationship between defendant and plaintiff's employer or plaintiff. 863 F.
Supp. 1193.

In case arising out of alleged assault on airplane, tort
claim for breach of duty of reasonable care preempted by Airlines Deregulation
Act. 905 F. Supp. 823.

Evidence demonstrated that plaintiffs had never had a
relationship with defendant; without a relationship between plaintiffs and
defendant, there could be no legal duty. 920 F. Supp. 1080.

Defendant, which acted as custodian, granted summary judgment
on counts where plaintiff alleged that defendant acted in a negligent or
grossly negligent manner by permitting securities to be substituted into
custodial account and by releasing cash as alleged. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1255.

Plaintiff's negligence claim failed as a matter of law; there
was no "duty" to not arrest without probable cause. 127 F. Supp. 2d
1129.

In a case arising out of a plane crash where passengers
killed in the crash had obtained discounted tour ticket vouchers in exchange
for attending a time-share presentation and purchasing a time-share, defendants
(companies connected with the time-share presentation and the selling of the
ticket vouchers) owed no duty to them. 289 F. Supp. 2d 1197.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment denied, where the
court found the existence of a designated driver duty within the Restatement
(Second) of Torts §324A framework, and there were critical genuine issues of
material fact regarding all four of the elements required to sustain a
negligence claim. 415 F. Supp. 2d 1163.

Where defendant did not make a promise to the effect that
defendant would serve as the designated driver for motorist, defendant could
not be liable to third persons for the negligent undertaking of a duty as
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A. 488 F. Supp. 2d 1062.

No finding of negligence where defendants had no duty to
protect plaintiff from criminal acts of third person. 73 H. 158, 829 P.2d 512.

Publisher of work of general circulation that neither
authored nor guaranteed the contents of its publication had no duty to warn
public of accuracy of contents of its publication. 73 H. 359, 833 P.2d 70.

Trial court correctly refused to recognize new tort duty on
part of motorcyclists to wear protective headgear. 74 H. 308, 844 P.2d 670.

Section 281-78(a)(2)(A) (1989) imposes a duty to innocent
third parties upon a liquor licensee who sells alcohol to a minor; the duty
includes the situation where an innocent third party has been injured by an
intoxicated minor other than the minor to whom the liquor was sold, subject to
determinations by the trier of fact on the issue of reasonable foreseeability.
76 H. 137, 870 P.2d 1281.

Circuit court erred in granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment where plaintiff was a business visitor of hotel and there was
a genuine issue of material fact regarding issue of reasonable foreseeability.
79 H. 110, 899 P.2d 393.

Insurer has legal duty, implied in first-and third-party
insurance contracts, to act in good faith in dealing with insured; breach of
that duty gives rise to independent tort cause of action. 82 H. 120, 920 P.2d
334.

Plaintiff's allegations stated a claim that potentially could
warrant relief under a theory based on duty by defendant wife to refrain from
conduct that would create an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
husband's conduct. 82 H. 293, 922 P.2d 347.

Where deceased was not in the custody of defendant, a special
relationship did not exist to impose a duty on defendant to prevent deceased's
suicide. 83 H. 154, 925 P.2d 324.

Manufacturer not negligent in failing to warn of "blind
zone" danger where danger involved in using straddle carrier was obvious
and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, and generally known and
recognized. 85 H. 336, 944 P.2d 1279.

Manufacturers are not subject in Hawaii to an independent,
continuing duty to retrofit its products, subsequent to their manufacture and
sale, with post-manufacture safety devices that were unavailable at the time of
manufacture. 85 H. 336, 944 P.2d 1279.

No duty by insurance agent to advise insured of option to
stack coverage where no evidence agent had informed insureds in the past of
changes in insurance laws such that insured would rely on agent to inform them
of changes in available coverage without their inquiry. 87 H. 307, 955 P.2d
100.

As dangers of riding unrestrained in open cargo bed of pickup
truck are obvious and generally known to ordinary user, truck manufacturer had
no duty to warn potential passengers of those dangers. 87 H. 413, 958 P.2d
535.

Hawaii civil rights commission is subject to a duty to follow
its own administrative rules, utilizing reasonable care, and was potentially
negligent for instituting legal action barred by its own administrative rules.
88 H. 85, 962 P.2d 344.

Where police department did not have "special
relationship" with victim, department did not have duty to protect victim
or victim's parents from harm caused by assailant. 89 H. 315, 972 P.2d 1081.

Tire manufacturer and distributor and inner tube manufacturer
and distributor did not have duty to warn of dangers of multi-piece rim
assembly where neither manufacturer contributed to the alleged defect, had no
control over it, and did not produce it. 92 H. 1, 986 P.2d 288.

Where no evidence that road grader owner knew or had reason
to know of dangerous condition of tire rim assembly and that condition created
a foreseeable risk of harm to tire repairman, plaintiff failed to establish
genuine issue of material fact as to whether owner was negligent for failure to
discharge its duty of ordinary care or had either actual or constructive notice
of possible danger of lock ring exploding. 92 H. 1, 986 P.2d 288.

Because a commercial establishment should be aware of the
potentially hazardous conditions that arise from its mode of operation, an
injured plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had actual notice of the
specific instrumentality causing his or her injury; notice is imputed from the
establishment's mode of operation; application of this mode of operation rule
limited to circumstances such as in this case. 93 H. 417, 5 P.3d 407.

The duty to use reasonable care in the preparation of a body
for funeral, burial, or crematory services, or in the rendition of those
services, runs to the decedent's immediate family members who are aware of the
services and for whose benefit the services are being performed; immediate
family members are defined as the decedent's surviving spouse, reciprocal
beneficiary, children, parents, siblings, or any other person who in fact
occupies an equivalent status. 96 H. 147, 28 P.3d 982.

A physician does not owe a duty to non-patient third parties
injured in an automobile accident caused by the patient's adverse reaction to a
medication that is not a controlled substance and negligently prescribed by the
physician three days earlier where the alleged negligence involves such "prescribing
decisions" as whether to prescribe the medication in the first instance,
which medication to prescribe, and the dosage prescribed. 98 H. 296, 47 P.3d
1209.

A physician owes a duty to non-patient third parties injured
in an automobile accident caused by an adverse reaction to a medication
prescribed three days earlier where the physician has negligently failed to
warn the patient that the medication may impair driving ability and where the
circumstances are such that the reasonable patient could not have been expected
to be aware of the risk without the physician's warning. 98 H. 296, 47 P.3d
1209.

Department of education breached the duty it owed to molested
students' parents by (1) reinstating teacher without conducting a reasonable
investigation to ascertain another student's allegation; (2) failing to
supervise or restrict teacher's contact with children after principal became
aware or should have become aware that teacher resumed molestation conduct; and
(3) principal's interviewing and inducing students to disclose molestation and
failing to notify students' parents of that disclosure. 100 H. 34, 58 P.3d
545.

The duty of care that the department of education (DOE) owes
to students and their parents is, on a general level, a duty to take whatever
precautions are necessary reasonably to ensure the safety and welfare of the
children entrusted to its custody and control against harms that the DOE
anticipates, or reasonably should anticipate; this duty arises from the "special
relationship" that the DOE shares with its students and their parents.
100 H. 34, 58 P.3d 545.

Appellate court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
because privately owned road had been impliedly dedicated to the public, the
public had an easement over the road, which would have subjected the owner of
the easement to the duty to keep it in repair and to liability for injuries
caused by such failure; whether an implied easement exists depends on the
parties' intent and was a question of fact for the jury. 103 H. 385, 83 P.3d
100.

While the fact that the privately owned road was platted on a
subdivision map, that §265A-1 authorized counties to repair and maintain
private streets, and §46-16 authorized counties to regulate traffic on private
streets, and each of these factors was significant in determining which party
or parties had control of the private roadway, appellate court erred in
concluding as a matter of law that defendant property owners did not control
roadway and thus had no duty to maintain, repair, or warn of a dangerous
condition; the issue of control of the roadway was a question of fact for the
jury. 103 H. 385, 83 P.3d 100.

Under Act 190, L 1996, the State is required to warn of "extremely
dangerous" ocean conditions (1) that occur at "public beach parks",
(2) if these conditions are typical for the specific beach, and (3) if they
present a risk of serious injury or death; as the Ke'anae Landing area was not
a public beach park, the State, as the owner and occupier of Ke'anae Landing
and its surrounding ocean water, did not have a duty to warn of any "extremely
dangerous" ocean conditions at Ke'anae Landing. 109 H. 198, 124 P.3d 943.

Where Act 190, L 1996, imposed no duty upon the State to warn
of dangerous natural ocean conditions at "beach accesses, coastal
accesses, or in areas that are not public beach parks", trial court
correctly concluded that Act 190 relieved the State of any duty to warn
plaintiffs of any dangerous ocean conditions at the Ke'anae Landing area. 109
H. 198, 124 P.3d 943.

County did not have a duty to warn plaintiff of any dangers
associated with diving in Queen's Bath, an ocean tide pool, and did not
voluntarily assume a duty to warn by virtue of its signs pertaining to
hazardous ocean and trail conditions; any duty that county may have had towards
plaintiff because of the signs did not give rise to liability to plaintiff.
110 H. 189, 130 P.3d 1054.

Even if Queen's Bath is deemed a "de facto" beach
park, no liability on the part of the State or county arose because (1) the
dangers found in Queen's Bath are natural conditions, which do not trigger a
duty to warn on the part of the State and county, and (2) the provision of L
1996, Act 190, expressly exempt the State and county from liability for failing
to warn of dangerous natural conditions. 110 H. 189, 130 P.3d 1054.

Inasmuch as the issue of foreseeability in the context of
duty was a question of law for the court to resolve, the court, not the trier
of fact, had to determine the existence and scope of duty, if any, owed by
defendant to plaintiffs. 112 H. 3, 143 P.3d 1205.

Where evidence clearly established that the risk or hazard of
the buried cement bag being propelled in the air during a future excavation was
not what made the failure to remove the cement bag and to comply with the
contract specifications by defendant unreasonably dangerous, defendant's
general duty to use reasonable care did not include within its scope the protection
of plaintiff from the particular risk that plaintiff encountered; thus, trial
court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant. 112 H. 3, 143
P.3d 1205.

Where, after construction of the highway was completed, there
were complaints of water creating a potentially dangerous condition, the State
then had a duty to maintain the highway in a reasonably safe condition, which
included the duty to mitigate and warn of known hazards; the State breached
this duty and trial court erred in finding that the State's breach of duty was
not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's death. 113 H. 332, 152 P.3d
504.

Where plaintiff's attorney did not owe defendants an
actionable duty, trial court did not err in dismissing defendants' third-party
claim against attorney alleging negligent handling of a settlement between
attorney's client and defendants resulting in damage to defendants. 114 H.
202, 159 P.3d 814.

Based upon statutory and regulatory mandates, the legislature
created a duty flowing to children specifically identified to the department of
human services as being the subject of suspected abuse; thus, the department
had a duty to protect the minor under the circumstances of the case. 117 H.
262, 178 P.3d 538.

In child abuse case, based upon the credible testimony of
child protective services expert, and undisputed findings of fact relating to
department of human services social worker's failure to properly and timely
complete investigation into minor's injury, trial court correctly concluded
that the department--through its social worker--breached the duty to use the
same degree of care, skill, and ability as an ordinarily careful professional
in the social worker's field would have exercised under similar circumstances.
117 H. 262, 178 P.3d 538.

Where plaintiffs did not assert any constitutional
violations, their claims were grounded in common law principles of negligence,
and the case did not involve involuntary commitment or custodial care, trial
court erred to the extent that it believed that the Youngberg professional
judgment standard applied to case involving the department of human services'
improper investigation and failure to protect abuse victim from future harm.
117 H. 262, 178 P.3d 538.

Because of the obvious danger to young children, it was
unreasonable to require that swimming pool manufacturer furnish labels with its
pools warning of that danger; swimming pool manufacturer's duty to put a safe
product on the market includes duty to take such measures in manufacturing and
marketing the pool as will reasonably protect against injury to young children
arising from their use of the pool. 10 H. App. 547, 879 P.2d 572.

An accountant may be held liable to third parties under
§552(2) of Restatement of Torts for negligence in the preparation of an audit
report. 86 H. 301 (App.), 949 P.2d 141.

As neither a tenant nor a subtenant is a "business
visitor" of a landlord's office building, no "special relationship"
duty existed between subtenant and office building landlord. 104 H. 500
(App.), 92 P.3d 1010.

Government.

State which holds open a public thoroughfare for travel has
duty to maintain it in condition safe for travel. 50 H. 497, 443 P.2d 142.

A nonjudicial government officer has no immunity from suit
and is liable if officer was motivated by malice and not by an otherwise proper
purpose. 55 H. 499, 522 P.2d 1269.

A public official can be held liable for damages for the
malicious exercise of discretion. 2 H. App. 176, 628 P.2d 634.

Nonjudicial government official can be held liable for
general, special, and punitive damages if official maliciously exercised
official discretion or maliciously committed a tort. 2 H. App. 221, 629 P.2d
635.

Interference.

Defendant's motion to dismiss count regarding tortious interference
with contract denied, where defendant alleged that a director or officer may
not be liable for tortiously interfering with corporation's contract unless the
director or officer acted solely for personal benefit; plaintiffs stated a
claim for tortious interference with contract. 895 F. Supp. 1365.

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their claim for
tortious interference with contract had any factual basis. 920 F. Supp. 1080.

Plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations and business (containing separate torts of tortious interference with
contractual relations and tortious interference with a prospective business
advantage) failed as a matter of law. 190 F. Supp. 2d 1192.

Plaintiff's claim for damages resulting from defendants'
allegedly tortious interference with plaintiff's contractual relations with its
customers was preempted, where any determination of the applicability of state
tort law would require consideration of the scope of various provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement between plaintiff and defendant union; even if the claim
were not preempted, it would still be dismissed. 250 F. Supp. 2d 1244.

Summary judgment denied, where there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to each of the factors of intentional interference and proper
justification of the tortious interference with prospective contractual
relations claim. 458 F. Supp. 2d 1153.

Where defendants-appellants brought interference with
contract claim against plaintiff-appellee, there was no evidence that
plaintiff-appellee intentionally induced [third party] to breach agreement with
defendants-appellants, and defendants-appellants failed to prove damages
resulting from the alleged breach. 78 H. 40, 890 P.2d 277.

Hawaii law does not recognize tortious breach of contract
actions in the employment context. 89 H. 234, 971 P.2d 707.

Conspiracy to commit tortious interference with prospective
business advantage between certain "common purpose" defendant
corporations and also officer/shareholder of those corporations; claim failed
for insufficient evidence. 91 H. 224, 982 P.2d 853.

Tortious interference with prospective business advantage
recognized; elements. 91 H. 224, 982 P.2d 853.

Where complaint asserted that an actual, ongoing prospective
economic relationship existed between the physician-plaintiff/members and their
patients; members expected a reasonable future economic benefit from that
relationship; by requiring members to enter into participating physician
agreements, defendant was aware or should have been reasonably aware of their
expectancy of a future economic benefit; defendant maliciously and
intentionally disrupted their relationships with their patients by delaying,
denying, and reducing reimbursement; and such disruption imposed serious
financial hardships upon the members, thereby causing damage. Plaintiffs
satisfied the rudimentary pleading requirement for their claims of tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage. 113 H. 77, 148 P.3d 1179.

In complaints alleging intentional interference with
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, tortuous inducement
of breach of fiduciary duty and tortuous interference with contractual
relations, where there were no allegations that indicated that lawyers "possessed
a desire to harm which is independent of the desire to protect their clients",
and the complaints were devoid of any allegations that the lawyers "acted
for personal gain or with ill-will towards" plaintiffs, lawyers'
management of the inspection and review process of plaintiff's books and
records fell within the purview of the litigation privilege. 113 H. 251, 151
P.3d 732.

A plaintiff alleging the tort of interference with
prospective contractual relations must plead and prove six elements. 87 H. 394
(App.), 957 P.2d 1076.

Under circumstances of case, defendant's communication of
information to prospective employer's manager was privileged because it was
truthful; thus, defendant could not be held liable as a matter of law for any
alleged intentional interference with plaintiff's prospective employment
contract with prospective employer. 87 H. 394 (App.), 957 P.2d 1076.

Where loan broker did not present evidence showing that bank pursued
an improper objective of harming broker or used wrongful means that caused
injury in fact, trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor
of bank on broker's tortious interference with prospective business advantage
claim. 109 H. 35 (App.), 122 P.3d 1133.

Without evidence of an act of intentional inducement, loan
broker had no basis for its claim that bank tortiously interfered with broker's
contractual relationship with borrower; evidence merely of a breached contract
was insufficient to sustain a tortious interference with contractual relations
claim; thus, trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
bank on broker's tortious interference with contractual relations claim. 109
H. 35 (App.), 122 P.3d 1133.

Landowner.

Plaintiffs' claim for nuisance denied, where parties in the
lawsuit owned neighboring oceanfront lots in a luxury subdivision and
plaintiffs alleged that defendants' use of property created an unreasonable and
substantial interference with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their lot and
was thereby a nuisance. 338 F. Supp. 2d 1106.

Liability of