§702-215  Intentional or knowing causation;
different result from that intended or contemplated.  In the following
instances intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result shall be
deemed to be established even though the actual result caused by the defendant
may not have been within the defendant's intention or contemplation:



(1)  The actual result differs from that intended or
contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person
or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm
intended or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than
that caused; or



(2)  The actual result involves the same kind of
injury or harm as the intended or contemplated result and is not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct
to have a bearing on the defendant's liability or on the gravity of the
defendant's offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1975, c 163, §1; gen ch 1993]



 



COMMENTARY ON §702-215



 



  As indicated in the commentary to §702-214 this section
departs from the common-law concept of "proximate cause" (at best a
poor label for a host of largely unarticulated considerations) and analyzes the
question of whether a defendant will be held liable for having caused a
particular result not in terms of factual or "scientific" causation
(which has to be resolved according to the test set forth in §702-214) but in
terms of those factors which properly bear on the defendant's culpability with
respect to a result other than one which the defendant intended or
contemplated.  The factors to be considered are, as stated, whether the actual
result is more serious or extensive than the intended or contemplated result
and whether the actual result is too remote or accidental in its occurrence or
too dependent on another's volitional conduct to have a bearing on defendant's
liability (or the gravity of the defendant's offense).



  The Code follows the Model Penal Code[1] as supplemented by
the suggestion of Hart and Honore that provisions regarding liability for
unintended or uncontemplated results must be separately stated for those
instances when the difference in result is due to natural events and those
instances when it is due to the volitional conduct of another.[2]  Although the
commentary to the Model Penal Code would suggest that volitional conduct of
another is adequately covered as a factor which might make the actual result
"too remote or accidental," greater clarity is achieved by the
language of this Code.



 



SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §702-215



 



  Act 163, Session Laws 1975, amended this section in order to
phrase the propositions in positive rather than negative language.  It was felt
that this change would make these propositions clearer when included in jury
instructions.  This amendment was not intended to change the section in
substance but only in form.  Conference Committee Report No. 19.



 



__________



§702-215 Commentary:



 



1.  M.P.C. §2.03(2).



 



2.  Hart and Honore, Causation and the Law 357 (1959).