§702-221  Liability for conduct of another. 
(1)  A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or
by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.



(2)  A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another person when:



(a) Acting with the state of mind that is sufficient
for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible
person to engage in such conduct; or



(b) He is made accountable for the conduct of such
other person by this Code or by the law defining the offense; or



(c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the
commission of the offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]



 



COMMENTARY ON §702-221



 



  Subsection (1) of this section states the general principle
that penal liability, in the first analysis, rests on conduct; the conduct in
most instances is that of the accused but, as the Code states, the relevant
conduct may be that of a person for whose conduct the accused is legally
accountable.  Distinctions between principals and accessories are dispensed
with and a defendant may be convicted directly of an offense committed by
another for whose conduct the defendant is accountable.



  Subsection (2) states those instances when a defendant will
be held legally accountable for another's conduct.



  Subsection (2)(a) deals with the problem of the innocent or
irresponsible agent.  When the defendant intentionally or knowingly causes an
innocent person to engage in prohibited conduct, there is little difficulty in
holding the defendant accountable for such conduct.  Where the commission of an
offense requires recklessness or negligence on the part of the defendant, it is
sufficient that the defendant recklessly or negligently caused an innocent or
irresponsible person to engage in the conduct prohibited by the offense.  In
short, the Code couples the state of mind of the defendant with the conduct the
defendant has caused another to perform and determines the defendant's
liability accordingly.



  Subsection (2)(b) is intended to leave undisturbed those
pieces of legislation either within or outside of this Code which impose a
special measure of accountability for the behavior of another.  This type of
legislation usually involves the liability of a principal for acts of an
agent.  Thus, for example, the Legislature may deem it appropriate to impose on
a liquor licensee an absolute duty not to sell liquor to a minor.  If the duty
is nondelegable, a sale by an employee would result in the licensee's penal
liability.  Similarly, where strict liability is imposed it is "no more
unjust to hold the innocent master than his innocent servant, acting in the
course of his employment."[1]



  Subsection (2)(b) does not support the concept of strict
penal liability.  As this chapter makes clear, such liability is rejected as a
matter of general principle.  However, in extraordinary cases, especially in
the regulatory area, the Legislature may deem such liability necessary. 
Subsection (2)(b) is intended only to accommodate that determination.



  Subsection (2)(c) provides for legal accountability for penal
complicity.  The term "accomplice" is developed in following
sections.  Prior Hawaii law did not deal with the problem posed by subsection
(2)(a).  The court has held that a breach of a legal duty by an employee
renders the master liable.  The court said:  "The delegation of the duty
of supervising [publication of a newspaper], by the master to the servant, does
not free the master.  He is to be holden for the neglect or indiscretion of the
servant."[2]  What the court in effect did was to make the duty
nondelegable by case law.  Subsection (2)(b) would recognize such decisions if
predicated on legislation which either specifically or by construction imposed
this measure of accountability.  The subsection would also cover accountability
based on strict penal liability.  The previous Hawaii provisions with respect
to complicity, as they related to subsection (2)(c) and following sections, are
explained in the commentary on following sections.



 



Case Notes



 



  Instruction on law of principals and accomplices was not
erroneous.  59 H. 625, 586 P.2d 250.



  Liability as accomplice in commission of sexual abuse.  61 H.
475, 605 P.2d 75.



  Officer had probable cause to believe defendant was an
accomplice where:  (1) car's license plate and "punched" ignition
were located in such places that would suggest defendant knew vehicle was
stolen; and (2) defendant and car driver were parked at a house whose owner
knew defendant but not the driver, suggesting that defendant assisted in the
decision to park at the house, thereby aiding or attempting to aid driver's
commission of an unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle (UCPV) violation;
thus evidence was sufficient to provide more than a mere suspicion that
defendant committed the offense of UCPV either as a principal or accomplice. 
109 H. 84, 123 P.3d 679.



  Cited:  9 H. App. 551, 851 P.2d 926.



 



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§702-221 Commentary:



 



1.  M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 1, comments at 19 (1953).



 



2.  In re Lyons, 6 Haw. 452, 454 (1884).