§706-630  Discharge of defendant.  Upon
the termination of the period of the probation or the earlier discharge of the
defendant, the defendant shall be relieved of any obligations imposed by the
order of the court and shall have satisfied the disposition of the court,
except as to any action under this chapter to collect unpaid fines,
restitution, attorney's fees, costs, or interest. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L
1986, c 314, §31; am L 1998, c 269, §5]



 



COMMENTARY ON §706-630



 



  This section provides that the court may discharge the
defendant prior to the termination of the period of suspension or probation and
that, if the defendant is not so discharged, no formal discharge is required
upon termination of the statutory period of suspension or probation.  Upon
termination of the statutory period, the defendant is relieved of any further
obligation by operation of law.  This provision is a continuation of prior
Hawaii law.[1]



 



SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §706-630



 



  Act 269, Session Laws 1998, amended this section to allow
victims of crime to enforce a criminal restitution order in the same manner as
a civil judgment.  Conference Committee Report No. 89.



 



Case Notes



 



  Where defendant paid all monthly restitution amounts imposed
as a condition of probation sentence, there were no other grounds in record to
revoke defendant's probation, and probation term had expired, under this
section (1993), defendant should have been relieved of the obligations imposed
by the probation sentence; trial court thus erred in imposing
"free-standing" restitution order remaining in full force and effect
beyond termination of defendant's term of probation.  92 H. 36 (App.), 986 P.2d
987.



  Where Act 269's 1998 amendment took effect after defendant
was sentenced, by its own terms did not apply retroactively to extend
defendant's obligation to pay restitution beyond defendant's period of
probation, and did not empower the trial court to resentence defendant to a
freestanding restitution order, as defendant was not in violation of defendant's
conditions of probation stated in the 1995 resentencing order, trial court had
no authority to resentence defendant on May 4, 2000, by its restitution order. 
98 H. 137 (App.), 44 P.3d 288.



  Where defendant's term of probation had already ended when
the State charged defendant with criminal contempt for violating the no-contact
condition of probation, and the State failed to take any steps during
defendant's probation to revoke, modify or enlarge its terms and thereby toll
the period of probation, the district court no longer had jurisdiction to
revoke defendant's probation or modify or enlarge its terms; thus, by
convicting defendant of criminal contempt as a sanction for a probation
violation, the court essentially extended defendant's probation term for two
years, which was inconsistent with this section.  120 H. 312 (App.), 205 P.3d
577.



 



__________



§706-630 Commentary:



 



1.  See H.R.S. §711-80.