§707-711  Assault in the second degree. 
(1)  A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if:



(a) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
substantial bodily injury to another;



(b) The person recklessly causes serious or
substantial bodily injury to another;



(c) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
bodily injury to a correctional worker, as defined in section 710-1031(2), who
is engaged in the performance of duty or who is within a correctional facility;



(d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
bodily injury to another with a dangerous instrument;



(e) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
bodily injury to an educational worker who is engaged in the performance of
duty or who is within an educational facility.  For the purposes of this
paragraph, "educational worker" means: any administrator, specialist,
counselor, teacher, or employee of the department of education or an employee
of a charter school; a person who is a volunteer, as defined in section 90-1,
in a school program, activity, or function that is established, sanctioned, or
approved by the department of education; or a person hired by the department of
education on a contractual basis and engaged in carrying out an educational
function;



(f) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
bodily injury to any emergency medical services personnel who is engaged in the
performance of duty.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "emergency
medical services personnel" shall have the same meaning as in section 321-222;
or



(g) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
bodily injury to a person employed at a state-operated or -contracted mental
health facility.  For the purposes of this paragraph, "a person employed
at a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility" includes health
care professionals as defined in section 451D-2, administrators, orderlies,
security personnel, volunteers, and any other person who is engaged in the
performance of a duty at a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility.



(2)  Assault in the second degree is a class C
felony. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1979, c 84, §1; am L 1986, c 314, §52; am
L 1987, c 257, §1; am L 1988, c 279, §1; am L 2006, c 230, §29 and c 298, §16;
am L 2007, c 9, §19 and c 79, §1; am L 2008, c 100, §7]



 



Law Journals and Reviews



 



  Cruelty to Animals:  Recognizing Violence Against Nonhuman
Victims.  23 UH L. Rev. 307.



 



Case Notes



 



  Assault in the third degree is not a lesser included
offense.  68 H. 276, 711 P.2d 1289.



  Circuit court was obligated, even absent a request by either
party, to instruct the jury regarding the included offense of assault in third
degree where appellant was charged with committing offense of assault in second
degree; court's failure to do so constituted plain error.  76 H. 387, 879 P.2d
492.



  Conviction of defendant of offense of carrying, using or
threatening to use a firearm in the commission of a separate felony under
§134-6(a) and (e), the separate felony being second degree assault under
subsection (1)(a), vacated where there was no substantial evidence that
defendant caused substantial bodily injury to victim as required under
subsection (1)(a).  94 H. 241, 11 P.3d 466.



  The plain and unambiguous language of §853-4(2) does not
prohibit the grant of a deferred acceptance of no contest plea for assault in
the second degree under this section causing "substantial bodily
injury", as statutory prohibition expressly applies only to felony and
misdemeanor assaults inflicting "bodily injury" or "serious
bodily injury".  101 H. 409, 70 P.3d 635.



  Court's failure to personally engage defendant in
on-the-record colloquy to determine whether defendant understood consequences
of foregoing right to have jury instructed on third degree assault, the
lesser-included offense of second degree assault, constituted plain error.  85
H. 44 (App.), 936 P.2d 1292.



  Trial court's omission of the "strongly
corroborative" paragraph in the attempted assault in the second degree
instructions was presumptively prejudicial and omission was not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.  104 H. 517 (App.), 92 P.3d 1027.



  Although the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant
committed the offense of first degree assault, there was ample evidence to show
that the victim's injury satisfied the definition of "substantial bodily
injury" under §707-700 and that defendant thus committed the lesser
included offense of second degree assault in violation of subsection (1)(a);
thus the jury, having returned a guilty verdict against defendant for first degree
assault, must also have found sufficient evidence to prove the lesser included
offense of second degree assault.  116 H. 445 (App.), 173 P.3d 592.



  Cited:  55 H. 531, 534, 523 P.2d 299.