§707-716  Terroristic threatening in the
first degree.  (1)  A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening
in the first degree if the person commits terroristic threatening:



(a) By threatening another person on more than one
occasion for the same or a similar purpose;



(b) By threats made in a common scheme against
different persons;



(c) Against a public servant arising out of the
performance of the public servant's official duties.  For the purposes of this
paragraph, "public servant" includes but is not limited to an
educational worker.  "Educational worker" has the same meaning as
defined in section 707-711;



(d) Against any emergency medical services personnel
who is engaged in the performance of duty.  For purposes of this paragraph,
"emergency medical services personnel" shall have the same meaning as
in section 321-222; or



(e) With the use of a dangerous instrument.



(2)  Terroristic threatening in the first
degree is a class C felony. [L 1979, c 184, pt of §1(2); am L 1989, c 131, §1;
gen ch 1992; am L 2006, c 230, §31; am L 2007, c 79, §2]



 



Case Notes



 



  A U.S. military police officer is not a "public
servant" for purposes of this section.  552 F. Supp. 2d 1108.



  For purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction,
defendant who placed threatening telephone call from California to Hawaii engaged in conduct occurring within Hawaii.  72 H. 591, 825 P.2d 1062.



  Court erred in concluding section requires threat to be
communicated directly or indirectly to person and that communication of threat
to third party was insufficient.  75 H. 398, 862 P.2d 1063.



  Section not unconstitutional where threats sufficiently
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of
purpose and imminent prospect of execution.  75 H. 398, 862 P.2d 1063.



  Double jeopardy clause of Hawaii constitution did not bar
terroristic threatening prosecution of defendant who had been found guilty of
abuse under §709-906.  75 H. 446, 865 P.2d 150.



  Terroristic threatening not a lesser included offense of
intimidating a witness within the meaning of §701-109(4)(a); multiple
conviction of terroristic threatening and intimidating a witness not barred by
§701-109(4)(c).  75 H. 517, 865 P.2d 157.



  Where no evidence was presented that any "dangerous instrument"
other than a firearm was involved, which established an element of the
underlying felony under this section, §134-6(a) did not apply.  83 H. 229, 925
P.2d 797.



  Defendant's first degree terroristic threatening conviction
remanded for new trial where instructions did not sufficiently inform jury
that, to constitute a "true threat", defendant's threatening
utterance was objectively susceptible to inducing fear of bodily injury in a
reasonable person at whom the threat was directed and who was familiar with the
circumstances under which the threat was uttered.  95 H. 465, 24 P.3d 661.



  Defendant's first degree terroristic threatening conviction
remanded for new trial where trial court failed to instruct jury that it could
consider relevant attributes of both the defendant and the subject of the
allegedly threatening utterance in determining whether the subject's fear of
bodily injury, as allegedly induced by defendant's threatening utterance, was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances in which the threat was
uttered.  95 H. 465, 24 P.3d 661.



  Neither the free speech clause of the U.S. Constitution nor
that of the Hawaii constitution impose a temporal "immediacy"
requirement that must be met before words become subject to criminal
prosecution as "true threats".  95 H. 465, 24 P.3d 661.



  The offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree
does not require a nexus between the alleged threat and the threatened person's
status as a public servant where the threatened person is a government officer
or employee; thus, trial court did not err in failing to give a nexus
instruction.  111 H. 327, 141 P.3d 974.



  Trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could
consider the relevant attributes of both the defendant and the subject of the allegedly
threatening utterance in determining whether the subject's fear of bodily
injury, as allegedly induced by the defendant's threatening utterance, was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances in which the threat was uttered,
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was a reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to defendant's conviction.  111 H. 327,
141 P.3d 974.



  Terroristic threatening in second degree can be an offense
included in terroristic threatening in first degree; trial court's failure to
instruct jury on the lesser included offense was not plain error, where
defendant contended there was a rational basis in the record for jury to decide
that, although defendant made a terroristic threat, defendant did not do so
with a dangerous instrument as defined in §707-700.  10 H. App. 584, 880 P.2d
213.



  Terroristic threatening charge under paragraph (1)(d)
remanded for prosecutorial misconduct and where evidence of defendant's
violation of furlough was not a fact of consequence to any material issue under
this section.  82 H. 517 (App.), 923 P.2d 934.



  One may be charged with a violation of subsection (1)(d) when
a dangerous instrument is employed in connection with a threat to property as
proscribed by §707-715.  88 H. 477 (App.), 967 P.2d 674.



  Subsection (1)(c) was not unconstitutionally vague when
applied to defendant's conduct of threatening to kill public servants because
of their performance of official duties; this section gave defendant fair
notice that defendant's conduct was prohibited and afforded defendant the
opportunity to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.  105 H. 261 (App.),
96 P.3d 590.



  Where there were no jury instructions requiring unanimity as
to the person or persons threatened, thus allowing each juror seven choices as
to the persons threatened and not requiring all jurors to agree on no less than
one person, trial court violated the rule requiring a unanimous jury regarding
the person or persons threatened, which was necessary to prove the offense
charged.  114 H. 135 (App.), 157 P.3d 574.