§92-12  Enforcement.  (a)  The attorneygeneral and the prosecuting attorney shall enforce this part.

(b)  The circuit courts of the State shall havejurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this part by injunction or otherappropriate remedy.

(c)  Any person may commence a suit in thecircuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs for the purposeof requiring compliance with or preventing violations of this part or todetermine the applicability of this part to discussions or decisions of thepublic body.  The court may order payment of reasonable attorney fees and coststo the prevailing party in a suit brought under this section.

(d)  The proceedings for review shall not staythe enforcement of any agency decisions; but the reviewing court may order astay if the following criteria have been met:

(1)  There is likelihood that the party bringing theaction will prevail on the merits;

(2)  Irreparable damage will result if a stay is notordered;

(3)  No irreparable damage to the public will resultfrom the stay order; and

(4)  Public interest will be served by the stay order.[L 1975, c 166, pt of §1; am L 1985, c 278, §5]

 

Case Notes

 

  Entitles "any person" to "commence a suit inthe circuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs",regardless of the person's participation in any proceeding.  74 H. 365, 846P.2d 882.

  Award of attorneys' fees under subsection (c) intended toapply where citizen prevails against government; prevailing defendant privateparty thus not entitled to attorneys' fees under this subsection.  86 H. 132,948 P.2d 122.

  Plaintiffs, as a "private attorney general", hadstanding pursuant to subsection (c) to present case to determine theapplicability of the sunshine law to defendants' conduct--where five or morecity council members participated in a series of private one-on-oneconversations regarding, among other matters, the proposed reorganization ofthe council's standing committees--and to seek a declaration that it violatedthe sunshine law. 117 H. 1 (App.), 175 P.3d 111.

  Trial court did not err in hearing plaintiffs' suit as to theallegations that defendants' conduct relating to a council resolution violatedthe sunshine law where exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied to the case,including the public interest exception when the question involved affects thepublic interest and is likely that similar questions arising in the futurewould likewise become moot before a needed authoritative determination by anappellate court, and the exception when the case is capable of repetition, yetevades review.  117 H. 1 (App.), 175 P.3d 111.

  Where plaintiffs prevailed on some, but not all, of theirclaims, but plaintiffs' claims for relief involved a common core of facts andwere based on related legal theories, and much of counsel's time was devotedgenerally to litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hoursexpended on a claim-by-claim basis, trial court should not have reduced theplaintiffs' attorney's fees request by seventy-five per cent; plaintiffs werethus entitled to full attorney's fees pursuant to subsection (c).  117 H. 1(App.), 175 P.3d 111.

  As this chapter governs board meetings and board meetingminutes, including those of executive sessions, and this section, by its plainlanguage, permits "any person," including the county, to bring suitin circuit court "to determine the applicability of part I of this chapterto the discussions or decisions" of the council, the circuit court did noterr in determining it had jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter to determinewhether county council's executive session minutes had to be disclosed.  120 H.34 (App.), 200 P.3d 403.