§92-12  Enforcement.  (a)  The attorney
general and the prosecuting attorney shall enforce this part.



(b)  The circuit courts of the State shall have
jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this part by injunction or other
appropriate remedy.



(c)  Any person may commence a suit in the
circuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs for the purpose
of requiring compliance with or preventing violations of this part or to
determine the applicability of this part to discussions or decisions of the
public body.  The court may order payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs
to the prevailing party in a suit brought under this section.



(d)  The proceedings for review shall not stay
the enforcement of any agency decisions; but the reviewing court may order a
stay if the following criteria have been met:



(1)  There is likelihood that the party bringing the
action will prevail on the merits;



(2)  Irreparable damage will result if a stay is not
ordered;



(3)  No irreparable damage to the public will result
from the stay order; and



(4)  Public interest will be served by the stay order.
[L 1975, c 166, pt of §1; am L 1985, c 278, §5]



 



Case Notes



 



  Entitles "any person" to "commence a suit in
the circuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs",
regardless of the person's participation in any proceeding.  74 H. 365, 846
P.2d 882.



  Award of attorneys' fees under subsection (c) intended to
apply where citizen prevails against government; prevailing defendant private
party thus not entitled to attorneys' fees under this subsection.  86 H. 132,
948 P.2d 122.



  Plaintiffs, as a "private attorney general", had
standing pursuant to subsection (c) to present case to determine the
applicability of the sunshine law to defendants' conduct--where five or more
city council members participated in a series of private one-on-one
conversations regarding, among other matters, the proposed reorganization of
the council's standing committees--and to seek a declaration that it violated
the sunshine law. 117 H. 1 (App.), 175 P.3d 111.



  Trial court did not err in hearing plaintiffs' suit as to the
allegations that defendants' conduct relating to a council resolution violated
the sunshine law where exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied to the case,
including the public interest exception when the question involved affects the
public interest and is likely that similar questions arising in the future
would likewise become moot before a needed authoritative determination by an
appellate court, and the exception when the case is capable of repetition, yet
evades review.  117 H. 1 (App.), 175 P.3d 111.



  Where plaintiffs prevailed on some, but not all, of their
claims, but plaintiffs' claims for relief involved a common core of facts and
were based on related legal theories, and much of counsel's time was devoted
generally to litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours
expended on a claim-by-claim basis, trial court should not have reduced the
plaintiffs' attorney's fees request by seventy-five per cent; plaintiffs were
thus entitled to full attorney's fees pursuant to subsection (c).  117 H. 1
(App.), 175 P.3d 111.



  As this chapter governs board meetings and board meeting
minutes, including those of executive sessions, and this section, by its plain
language, permits "any person," including the county, to bring suit
in circuit court "to determine the applicability of part I of this chapter
to the discussions or decisions" of the council, the circuit court did not
err in determining it had jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter to determine
whether county council's executive session minutes had to be disclosed.  120 H.
34 (App.), 200 P.3d 403.