§343-7  Limitation of actions.  (a)  Any
judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of assessment required
under section 343-5, shall be initiated within one hundred twenty days of the
agency’s decision to carry out or approve the action, or, if a proposed action
is undertaken without a formal determination by the agency that a statement is
or is not required, a judicial proceeding shall be instituted within one
hundred twenty days after the proposed action is started.  The council or
office, any agency responsible for approval of the action, or the applicant
shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purposes of bringing judicial
action under this subsection.  Others, by court action, may be adjudged
aggrieved.



(b)  Any judicial proceeding, the subject of
which is the determination that a statement is required for a proposed action,
shall be initiated within sixty days after the public has been informed of such
determination pursuant to section 343-3.  Any judicial proceeding, the subject
of which is the determination that a statement is not required for a proposed
action, shall be initiated within thirty days after the public has been
informed of such determination pursuant to section 343-3.  The council or the
applicant shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purposes of bringing
judicial action under this subsection.  Others, by court action, may be
adjudged aggrieved.



(c)  Any judicial proceeding, the subject of
which is the acceptance of an environmental impact statement required under
section 343-5, shall be initiated within sixty days after the public has been
informed pursuant to section 343-3 of the acceptance of such statement.  The
council shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the purpose of bringing
judicial action under this subsection.  Affected agencies and persons who
provided written comment to such statement during the designated review period
shall be adjudged aggrieved parties for the purpose of bringing judicial action
under this subsection; provided that the contestable issues shall be limited to
issues identified and discussed in the written comment. [L 1974, c 246, pt of
§1; am and ren L 1979, c 197, §1(8); am L 1983, c 140, §10; am L 1992, c 241,
§3]



 



Case Notes



 



  Plaintiff's claims that Hawai‘i environmental policy act was
violated were barred; plaintiff did not submit comment and filed suit more than
sixty days after office of environmental quality control informed the public
that the state final environmental impact statement had been accepted.  307 F.
Supp. 2d 1149.



  Court has no jurisdiction over actions initiated after time
limit.  64 H. 126, 637 P.2d 776.



  Date of commission’s decision to grant SMA permit triggered
time period for appeal, not date when commission made express determination
that no environmental assessment was required for project; plaintiff’s
challenge to lack of environmental assessment thus timely.  86 H. 66, 947 P.2d
378.



  Where the federal construct of a procedural right was not
germane to case because this section, the statute at issue, establishes who and
under what circumstances the lack of an environmental assessment, may be
challenged, and federal cases recognizing this standard were inapposite because
they rested on non-analogous statutes, petitioner could not be afforded so-called
"procedural standing" under subsection (a).  100 H. 242, 59 P.3d 877.



  Where Hawaiian homes commission did not accept the proposal
for an environmental impact statement, the subject of the judicial proceeding
before the trial court was not the "acceptance" of such statement;
intervenors were not required to provide written comments pursuant to
subsection (c) as subsection (c) did not apply; intervenor's objections,
therefore, were subject to judicial review under subsection (b).  106 H. 270,
103 P.3d 939.



  Appellants established standing where they showed threatened
injuries under the traditional injury-in-fact test and procedural injuries
based on a procedural right test; the threatened injury in fact was due to
defendant's decision to go forward with harbor improvements and allow the
superferry project to operate at Kahului harbor without conducting an
environmental assessment; the procedural injury was based on various interests
appellants identified that were threatened due to the violation of their procedural
rights under this chapter.  115 H. 299, 167 P.3d 292.



  Where this section waived the State's sovereign immunity
against actions brought to challenge: (1) the lack of an environmental
assessment; (2) the determination that an environmental impact statement is or
is not required; and (3) the acceptance of an environmental impact statement,
sovereign immunity did not prevent the application of the private attorney
general doctrine against the State and the circuit court did not err in relying
on the doctrine as a basis for its award of attorney's fees against the State
and superferry jointly.  120 H. 181, 202 P.3d 1226.