State Codes and Statutes

Statutes > Missouri > T19 > C304 > 304_010

Definitions--maximum speed limits--cities, towns, villages,certain counties, may set speed limit, how set--slower speeds set,when--violations, penalty.

304.010. 1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Expressway", a divided highway of at least ten miles in lengthwith four or more lanes which is not part of the federal interstate systemof highways which has crossovers or accesses from streets, roads or otherhighways at the same grade level as such divided highway;

(2) "Freeway", a limited access divided highway of at least ten milesin length with four or more lanes which is not part of the federalinterstate system of highways which does not have any crossovers oraccesses from streets, roads or other highways at the same grade level assuch divided highway within such ten miles of divided highway;

(3) "Rural interstate", that part of the federal interstate highwaysystem that is not located in an urban area;

(4) "Urbanized area", an area of fifty thousand population at adensity at or greater than one thousand persons per square mile.

2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the uniform maximumspeed limits are and no vehicle shall be operated in excess of the speedlimits established pursuant to this section:

(1) Upon the rural interstates and freeways of this state, seventymiles per hour;

(2) Upon the rural expressways of this state, sixty-five miles perhour;

(3) Upon the interstate highways, freeways or expressways within theurbanized areas of this state, sixty miles per hour;

(4) All other roads and highways in this state not located in anurbanized area and not provided for in subdivisions (1) to (3) of thissubsection, sixty miles per hour;

(5) All other roads provided for in subdivision (4) of thissubsection shall not include any state two-lane road which is identified byletter. Such lettered roads shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hourunless set at a higher speed as established by the department oftransportation, except that no speed limit shall be set higher than sixtymiles per hour;

(6) For the purposes of enforcing the speed limit laws of this state,it is a rebuttable presumption that the posted speed limit is the legalspeed limit.

3. On any state road or highway where the speed limit is not setpursuant to a local ordinance, the highways and transportation commissionmay set a speed limit higher or lower than the uniform maximum speed limitprovided in subsection 2 of this section, if a higher or lower speed limitis recommended by the department of transportation. The department ofpublic safety, where it believes for safety reasons, or to expedite theflow of traffic a higher or lower speed limit is warranted, may request thedepartment of transportation to raise or lower such speed limit, exceptthat no speed limit shall be set higher than seventy miles per hour.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 304.120 or any otherprovision of law to the contrary, cities, towns and villages may regulatethe speed of vehicles on state roads and highways within such cities',towns' or villages' corporate limits by ordinance with the approval of thestate highways and transportation commission. Any reduction of speed incities, towns or villages shall be designed to expedite the flow of trafficon such state roads and highways to the extent consistent with publicsafety. The commission may declare any ordinance void if it finds thatsuch ordinance is:

(1) Not primarily designed to expedite traffic flow; and

(2) Primarily designed to produce revenue for the city, town orvillage which enacted such ordinance.

If an ordinance is declared void, the city, town or village shall have anyfuture proposed ordinance approved by the highways and transportationcommission before such ordinance may take effect.

5. The county commission of any county of the second, third or fourthclassification may set the speed limit or the weight limit or both thespeed limit and the weight limit on roads or bridges on any county,township or road district road in the county and, with the approval of thestate highways and transportation commission, on any state road or highwaynot within the limits of any incorporated city, town or village, lower thanthe uniform maximum speed limit as provided in subsection 2 of this sectionwhere the condition of the road or the nature of the area requires a lowerspeed. The maximum speed limit set by the county commission of any countyof the second, third, or fourth classification for any road under thecommission's jurisdiction shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hour ifsuch road is properly marked by signs indicating such speed limit. If thecounty commission does not mark the roads with signs indicating the speedlimit, the speed limit shall be fifty miles per hour. The commission shallsend copies of any order establishing a speed limit or weight limit onroads and bridges on a county, township or road district road in the countyto the chief engineer of the state department of transportation, thesuperintendent of the state highway patrol and to any township or roaddistrict maintaining roads in the county. After the roads have beenproperly marked by signs indicating the speed limits and weight limits setby the county commission, the speed limits and weight limits shall be ofthe same effect as the speed limits provided for in subsection 1 of thissection and shall be enforced by the state highway patrol and the countysheriff as if such speed limits and weight limits were established by statelaw.

6. The county commission of any county of the second, third, orfourth classification may by ordinance set a countywide speed limit onroads within unincorporated areas of any county, township, or road districtin the county and may establish reasonable speed regulations for motorvehicles within the limit of such county. No person who is not a residentof such county and who has not been within the limits thereof for acontinuous period of more than forty-eight hours shall be convicted of aviolation of such ordinances, unless it is shown by competent evidence thatthere was posted at the place where the boundary of such county road entersthe county a sign displaying in black letters not less than four incheshigh and one inch wide on a white background the speed fixed by such countyso that such signs may be clearly seen by operators and drivers from theirvehicles upon entering such county. The commission shall send copies ofany order establishing a countywide speed limit on a county, township, orroad district road in the county to the chief engineer of the Missouridepartment of transportation, the superintendent of the state highwaypatrol, and to any township or road district maintaining roads in thecounty. After the boundaries of the county roads entering the county havebeen properly marked by signs indicating the speed limits set by the countycommission, the speed limits shall be of the same effect as the speedlimits provided for in subsection 1 of this section and shall be enforcedby the state highway patrol and the county sheriff as if such speed limitswere established by state law.

7. All road signs indicating speed limits or weight limits shall beuniform in size, shape, lettering and coloring and shall conform tostandards established by the department of transportation.

8. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to alter anyspeed limit set below fifty-five miles per hour by any ordinance of anycounty, city, town or village of the state adopted before March 13, 1996.

9. The speed limits established pursuant to this section shall notapply to the operation of any emergency vehicle as defined in section304.022.

10. A violation of the provisions of this section shall not beconstrued to relieve the parties in any civil action on any claim orcounterclaim from the burden of proving negligence or contributorynegligence as the proximate cause of any accident or as the defense to anegligence action.

11. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty ofa class C misdemeanor, unless such person was exceeding the posted speedlimit by twenty miles per hour or more then it is a class B misdemeanor.

(RSMo 1939 § 8383, A.L. 1957 p. 631, A.L. 1965 pp. 95, 594, A.L. 1969 H.B. 46 & 483, A.L. 1972 H.B. 1297, A.L. 1979 S.B. 44, A.L. 1985 H.B. 288, et al. merged with S.B. 408, A.L. 1987 S.B. 83, A.L. 1991 H.B. 25, A.L. 1995 H.B. 717, A.L. 1996 H.B. 1047, A.L. 2004 H.B. 795, et al.)

(1960) A railroad track itself is a warning of danger and a highway traveler must exercise the highest degree of care in crossing the track. A motorist approaching a railroad crossing with which he is familiar who fails to look or to see that which is plainly visible if he performs his duty to look, is contributorily negligent. Pipes v. Mo. Pacific Railroad Co. (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 30.

(1960) Where information used some of the language of the statute in charging careless and reckless driving and went on to particularized saying that the vehicle was operated at a high rate of speed, weaving back and forth across the road and running through city stop signs, while not recommended for future use, held sufficient as an information. State v. Tevis (A.), 340 S.W.2d 415.

(1961) Operator of motor vehicle about to drive across railroad tracks on which a train is approaching is required to exercise the highest degree of care for his own safety. Reedy v. Missouri -Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 111.

(1961) Every operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care and such care includes the warning of other motorists on the highway while the vehicle is stopped on the paved portion of the road after the vehicle had stalled and ceased to run. Phillips v. Stockman (A.), 351 S.W.2d 464.

(1961) On trial for violating speed regulations under this section evidence as to prior conviction of offense committed subsequent to the offense for which the accused was on trial held admissible in evidence. State v. Hunt (A.), 352 S.W.2d 57.

(1962) Wife, seated in right front seat of car her husband left parked with the motor running, who in moving over to make room for another occupant accidentally stepped on accelerator causing car to lunge forward and crash through store, injuring plaintiff, became operator of the car within meaning of statute. Hay v. Ham (A.), 364 S.W.2d 118.

(1965) This section is designed to prevent danger and it is unnecessary for the state to show that any specific person was actually put in danger in order to sustain a conviction. State v. McNail (A.), 389 S.W.2d 214.

(1965) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Bartlett (A.), 394 S.W.2d 434.

(1966) Duty of a motorist to use the highest degree of care is not limited to the paved portion of a highway, but extends to the shoulder of the highway. Ely v. Parsons (A.), 399 S.W.2d 613.

(1966) To fulfill his statutory duty to exercise the highest degree of care at all times and to keep a careful and vigilant lookout for other persons and vehicles on the highway, a motorist is required to look in such an observant manner as to enable him to see that which a person in the exercise of the highest degree of care would be expected to see under similar circumstances, and he must be held to have seen what looking would have revealed. Weathers v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (A.), 403 S.W.2d 663.

(1968) Failure to yield the right-of-way is specifically denounced as an offense, but an information charging careless and imprudent driving by failure to yield the right-of-way at a place where required by statute to do so, includes the offense as descriptive of what happened and in what manner defendant drove imprudently. State v. Richards (A.), 429 S.W.2d 351.

(1971) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Rollins (A.), 469 S.W.2d 46.

(1972) To constitute careless and imprudent driving there must be conduct which shows under all the existing circumstances and conditions that the property of another or the life or limb of any person is endangered; therefore, evidence that defendant spun his car around two or three times in intersection, making tires squeal and throwing rocks, was insufficient to support conviction of the offense. State v. Todd (A.), 477 S.W.2d 725.

(1977) This section does not impose a duty to exercise the highest degree of care to save all persons from harm proximately resulting from operation of motor vehicles. Ford v. Monroe (A.), 559 S.W.2d 759.

(1984) Offense of careless and imprudent driving is not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes as a manslaughter charge. State v. Noerper (Mo.App.E.D.), 674 S.W.2d 100.

(1984) Director of revenue may not assess points for speeding violations on state limited access highways within city limits, if the city ordinance violates, duplicates or concurs with the state set limits. Knierim v. James (Mo. banc), 677 S.W.2d 322.

(1990) Motorist stopped on roadway to repair an automobile is considered to be "operating" an automobile within the provision requiring the highest degree of care. Phillips v. United States, 743 F.Supp. 681 (E.D.Mo.).

(1993) Where high speed chase by law enforcement officers resulted in one civilian death and substantial property damage and personal injury to others, statute that provides some regulations for operation of emergency vehicles does not create duty to particular individuals as distinguished from general public; therefore duty created is to public and not to individuals. Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F.Supp. 1436 (W.D.Mo.).

State Codes and Statutes

Statutes > Missouri > T19 > C304 > 304_010

Definitions--maximum speed limits--cities, towns, villages,certain counties, may set speed limit, how set--slower speeds set,when--violations, penalty.

304.010. 1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Expressway", a divided highway of at least ten miles in lengthwith four or more lanes which is not part of the federal interstate systemof highways which has crossovers or accesses from streets, roads or otherhighways at the same grade level as such divided highway;

(2) "Freeway", a limited access divided highway of at least ten milesin length with four or more lanes which is not part of the federalinterstate system of highways which does not have any crossovers oraccesses from streets, roads or other highways at the same grade level assuch divided highway within such ten miles of divided highway;

(3) "Rural interstate", that part of the federal interstate highwaysystem that is not located in an urban area;

(4) "Urbanized area", an area of fifty thousand population at adensity at or greater than one thousand persons per square mile.

2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the uniform maximumspeed limits are and no vehicle shall be operated in excess of the speedlimits established pursuant to this section:

(1) Upon the rural interstates and freeways of this state, seventymiles per hour;

(2) Upon the rural expressways of this state, sixty-five miles perhour;

(3) Upon the interstate highways, freeways or expressways within theurbanized areas of this state, sixty miles per hour;

(4) All other roads and highways in this state not located in anurbanized area and not provided for in subdivisions (1) to (3) of thissubsection, sixty miles per hour;

(5) All other roads provided for in subdivision (4) of thissubsection shall not include any state two-lane road which is identified byletter. Such lettered roads shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hourunless set at a higher speed as established by the department oftransportation, except that no speed limit shall be set higher than sixtymiles per hour;

(6) For the purposes of enforcing the speed limit laws of this state,it is a rebuttable presumption that the posted speed limit is the legalspeed limit.

3. On any state road or highway where the speed limit is not setpursuant to a local ordinance, the highways and transportation commissionmay set a speed limit higher or lower than the uniform maximum speed limitprovided in subsection 2 of this section, if a higher or lower speed limitis recommended by the department of transportation. The department ofpublic safety, where it believes for safety reasons, or to expedite theflow of traffic a higher or lower speed limit is warranted, may request thedepartment of transportation to raise or lower such speed limit, exceptthat no speed limit shall be set higher than seventy miles per hour.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 304.120 or any otherprovision of law to the contrary, cities, towns and villages may regulatethe speed of vehicles on state roads and highways within such cities',towns' or villages' corporate limits by ordinance with the approval of thestate highways and transportation commission. Any reduction of speed incities, towns or villages shall be designed to expedite the flow of trafficon such state roads and highways to the extent consistent with publicsafety. The commission may declare any ordinance void if it finds thatsuch ordinance is:

(1) Not primarily designed to expedite traffic flow; and

(2) Primarily designed to produce revenue for the city, town orvillage which enacted such ordinance.

If an ordinance is declared void, the city, town or village shall have anyfuture proposed ordinance approved by the highways and transportationcommission before such ordinance may take effect.

5. The county commission of any county of the second, third or fourthclassification may set the speed limit or the weight limit or both thespeed limit and the weight limit on roads or bridges on any county,township or road district road in the county and, with the approval of thestate highways and transportation commission, on any state road or highwaynot within the limits of any incorporated city, town or village, lower thanthe uniform maximum speed limit as provided in subsection 2 of this sectionwhere the condition of the road or the nature of the area requires a lowerspeed. The maximum speed limit set by the county commission of any countyof the second, third, or fourth classification for any road under thecommission's jurisdiction shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hour ifsuch road is properly marked by signs indicating such speed limit. If thecounty commission does not mark the roads with signs indicating the speedlimit, the speed limit shall be fifty miles per hour. The commission shallsend copies of any order establishing a speed limit or weight limit onroads and bridges on a county, township or road district road in the countyto the chief engineer of the state department of transportation, thesuperintendent of the state highway patrol and to any township or roaddistrict maintaining roads in the county. After the roads have beenproperly marked by signs indicating the speed limits and weight limits setby the county commission, the speed limits and weight limits shall be ofthe same effect as the speed limits provided for in subsection 1 of thissection and shall be enforced by the state highway patrol and the countysheriff as if such speed limits and weight limits were established by statelaw.

6. The county commission of any county of the second, third, orfourth classification may by ordinance set a countywide speed limit onroads within unincorporated areas of any county, township, or road districtin the county and may establish reasonable speed regulations for motorvehicles within the limit of such county. No person who is not a residentof such county and who has not been within the limits thereof for acontinuous period of more than forty-eight hours shall be convicted of aviolation of such ordinances, unless it is shown by competent evidence thatthere was posted at the place where the boundary of such county road entersthe county a sign displaying in black letters not less than four incheshigh and one inch wide on a white background the speed fixed by such countyso that such signs may be clearly seen by operators and drivers from theirvehicles upon entering such county. The commission shall send copies ofany order establishing a countywide speed limit on a county, township, orroad district road in the county to the chief engineer of the Missouridepartment of transportation, the superintendent of the state highwaypatrol, and to any township or road district maintaining roads in thecounty. After the boundaries of the county roads entering the county havebeen properly marked by signs indicating the speed limits set by the countycommission, the speed limits shall be of the same effect as the speedlimits provided for in subsection 1 of this section and shall be enforcedby the state highway patrol and the county sheriff as if such speed limitswere established by state law.

7. All road signs indicating speed limits or weight limits shall beuniform in size, shape, lettering and coloring and shall conform tostandards established by the department of transportation.

8. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to alter anyspeed limit set below fifty-five miles per hour by any ordinance of anycounty, city, town or village of the state adopted before March 13, 1996.

9. The speed limits established pursuant to this section shall notapply to the operation of any emergency vehicle as defined in section304.022.

10. A violation of the provisions of this section shall not beconstrued to relieve the parties in any civil action on any claim orcounterclaim from the burden of proving negligence or contributorynegligence as the proximate cause of any accident or as the defense to anegligence action.

11. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty ofa class C misdemeanor, unless such person was exceeding the posted speedlimit by twenty miles per hour or more then it is a class B misdemeanor.

(RSMo 1939 § 8383, A.L. 1957 p. 631, A.L. 1965 pp. 95, 594, A.L. 1969 H.B. 46 & 483, A.L. 1972 H.B. 1297, A.L. 1979 S.B. 44, A.L. 1985 H.B. 288, et al. merged with S.B. 408, A.L. 1987 S.B. 83, A.L. 1991 H.B. 25, A.L. 1995 H.B. 717, A.L. 1996 H.B. 1047, A.L. 2004 H.B. 795, et al.)

(1960) A railroad track itself is a warning of danger and a highway traveler must exercise the highest degree of care in crossing the track. A motorist approaching a railroad crossing with which he is familiar who fails to look or to see that which is plainly visible if he performs his duty to look, is contributorily negligent. Pipes v. Mo. Pacific Railroad Co. (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 30.

(1960) Where information used some of the language of the statute in charging careless and reckless driving and went on to particularized saying that the vehicle was operated at a high rate of speed, weaving back and forth across the road and running through city stop signs, while not recommended for future use, held sufficient as an information. State v. Tevis (A.), 340 S.W.2d 415.

(1961) Operator of motor vehicle about to drive across railroad tracks on which a train is approaching is required to exercise the highest degree of care for his own safety. Reedy v. Missouri -Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 111.

(1961) Every operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care and such care includes the warning of other motorists on the highway while the vehicle is stopped on the paved portion of the road after the vehicle had stalled and ceased to run. Phillips v. Stockman (A.), 351 S.W.2d 464.

(1961) On trial for violating speed regulations under this section evidence as to prior conviction of offense committed subsequent to the offense for which the accused was on trial held admissible in evidence. State v. Hunt (A.), 352 S.W.2d 57.

(1962) Wife, seated in right front seat of car her husband left parked with the motor running, who in moving over to make room for another occupant accidentally stepped on accelerator causing car to lunge forward and crash through store, injuring plaintiff, became operator of the car within meaning of statute. Hay v. Ham (A.), 364 S.W.2d 118.

(1965) This section is designed to prevent danger and it is unnecessary for the state to show that any specific person was actually put in danger in order to sustain a conviction. State v. McNail (A.), 389 S.W.2d 214.

(1965) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Bartlett (A.), 394 S.W.2d 434.

(1966) Duty of a motorist to use the highest degree of care is not limited to the paved portion of a highway, but extends to the shoulder of the highway. Ely v. Parsons (A.), 399 S.W.2d 613.

(1966) To fulfill his statutory duty to exercise the highest degree of care at all times and to keep a careful and vigilant lookout for other persons and vehicles on the highway, a motorist is required to look in such an observant manner as to enable him to see that which a person in the exercise of the highest degree of care would be expected to see under similar circumstances, and he must be held to have seen what looking would have revealed. Weathers v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (A.), 403 S.W.2d 663.

(1968) Failure to yield the right-of-way is specifically denounced as an offense, but an information charging careless and imprudent driving by failure to yield the right-of-way at a place where required by statute to do so, includes the offense as descriptive of what happened and in what manner defendant drove imprudently. State v. Richards (A.), 429 S.W.2d 351.

(1971) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Rollins (A.), 469 S.W.2d 46.

(1972) To constitute careless and imprudent driving there must be conduct which shows under all the existing circumstances and conditions that the property of another or the life or limb of any person is endangered; therefore, evidence that defendant spun his car around two or three times in intersection, making tires squeal and throwing rocks, was insufficient to support conviction of the offense. State v. Todd (A.), 477 S.W.2d 725.

(1977) This section does not impose a duty to exercise the highest degree of care to save all persons from harm proximately resulting from operation of motor vehicles. Ford v. Monroe (A.), 559 S.W.2d 759.

(1984) Offense of careless and imprudent driving is not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes as a manslaughter charge. State v. Noerper (Mo.App.E.D.), 674 S.W.2d 100.

(1984) Director of revenue may not assess points for speeding violations on state limited access highways within city limits, if the city ordinance violates, duplicates or concurs with the state set limits. Knierim v. James (Mo. banc), 677 S.W.2d 322.

(1990) Motorist stopped on roadway to repair an automobile is considered to be "operating" an automobile within the provision requiring the highest degree of care. Phillips v. United States, 743 F.Supp. 681 (E.D.Mo.).

(1993) Where high speed chase by law enforcement officers resulted in one civilian death and substantial property damage and personal injury to others, statute that provides some regulations for operation of emergency vehicles does not create duty to particular individuals as distinguished from general public; therefore duty created is to public and not to individuals. Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F.Supp. 1436 (W.D.Mo.).


State Codes and Statutes

State Codes and Statutes

Statutes > Missouri > T19 > C304 > 304_010

Definitions--maximum speed limits--cities, towns, villages,certain counties, may set speed limit, how set--slower speeds set,when--violations, penalty.

304.010. 1. As used in this section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Expressway", a divided highway of at least ten miles in lengthwith four or more lanes which is not part of the federal interstate systemof highways which has crossovers or accesses from streets, roads or otherhighways at the same grade level as such divided highway;

(2) "Freeway", a limited access divided highway of at least ten milesin length with four or more lanes which is not part of the federalinterstate system of highways which does not have any crossovers oraccesses from streets, roads or other highways at the same grade level assuch divided highway within such ten miles of divided highway;

(3) "Rural interstate", that part of the federal interstate highwaysystem that is not located in an urban area;

(4) "Urbanized area", an area of fifty thousand population at adensity at or greater than one thousand persons per square mile.

2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the uniform maximumspeed limits are and no vehicle shall be operated in excess of the speedlimits established pursuant to this section:

(1) Upon the rural interstates and freeways of this state, seventymiles per hour;

(2) Upon the rural expressways of this state, sixty-five miles perhour;

(3) Upon the interstate highways, freeways or expressways within theurbanized areas of this state, sixty miles per hour;

(4) All other roads and highways in this state not located in anurbanized area and not provided for in subdivisions (1) to (3) of thissubsection, sixty miles per hour;

(5) All other roads provided for in subdivision (4) of thissubsection shall not include any state two-lane road which is identified byletter. Such lettered roads shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hourunless set at a higher speed as established by the department oftransportation, except that no speed limit shall be set higher than sixtymiles per hour;

(6) For the purposes of enforcing the speed limit laws of this state,it is a rebuttable presumption that the posted speed limit is the legalspeed limit.

3. On any state road or highway where the speed limit is not setpursuant to a local ordinance, the highways and transportation commissionmay set a speed limit higher or lower than the uniform maximum speed limitprovided in subsection 2 of this section, if a higher or lower speed limitis recommended by the department of transportation. The department ofpublic safety, where it believes for safety reasons, or to expedite theflow of traffic a higher or lower speed limit is warranted, may request thedepartment of transportation to raise or lower such speed limit, exceptthat no speed limit shall be set higher than seventy miles per hour.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 304.120 or any otherprovision of law to the contrary, cities, towns and villages may regulatethe speed of vehicles on state roads and highways within such cities',towns' or villages' corporate limits by ordinance with the approval of thestate highways and transportation commission. Any reduction of speed incities, towns or villages shall be designed to expedite the flow of trafficon such state roads and highways to the extent consistent with publicsafety. The commission may declare any ordinance void if it finds thatsuch ordinance is:

(1) Not primarily designed to expedite traffic flow; and

(2) Primarily designed to produce revenue for the city, town orvillage which enacted such ordinance.

If an ordinance is declared void, the city, town or village shall have anyfuture proposed ordinance approved by the highways and transportationcommission before such ordinance may take effect.

5. The county commission of any county of the second, third or fourthclassification may set the speed limit or the weight limit or both thespeed limit and the weight limit on roads or bridges on any county,township or road district road in the county and, with the approval of thestate highways and transportation commission, on any state road or highwaynot within the limits of any incorporated city, town or village, lower thanthe uniform maximum speed limit as provided in subsection 2 of this sectionwhere the condition of the road or the nature of the area requires a lowerspeed. The maximum speed limit set by the county commission of any countyof the second, third, or fourth classification for any road under thecommission's jurisdiction shall not exceed fifty-five miles per hour ifsuch road is properly marked by signs indicating such speed limit. If thecounty commission does not mark the roads with signs indicating the speedlimit, the speed limit shall be fifty miles per hour. The commission shallsend copies of any order establishing a speed limit or weight limit onroads and bridges on a county, township or road district road in the countyto the chief engineer of the state department of transportation, thesuperintendent of the state highway patrol and to any township or roaddistrict maintaining roads in the county. After the roads have beenproperly marked by signs indicating the speed limits and weight limits setby the county commission, the speed limits and weight limits shall be ofthe same effect as the speed limits provided for in subsection 1 of thissection and shall be enforced by the state highway patrol and the countysheriff as if such speed limits and weight limits were established by statelaw.

6. The county commission of any county of the second, third, orfourth classification may by ordinance set a countywide speed limit onroads within unincorporated areas of any county, township, or road districtin the county and may establish reasonable speed regulations for motorvehicles within the limit of such county. No person who is not a residentof such county and who has not been within the limits thereof for acontinuous period of more than forty-eight hours shall be convicted of aviolation of such ordinances, unless it is shown by competent evidence thatthere was posted at the place where the boundary of such county road entersthe county a sign displaying in black letters not less than four incheshigh and one inch wide on a white background the speed fixed by such countyso that such signs may be clearly seen by operators and drivers from theirvehicles upon entering such county. The commission shall send copies ofany order establishing a countywide speed limit on a county, township, orroad district road in the county to the chief engineer of the Missouridepartment of transportation, the superintendent of the state highwaypatrol, and to any township or road district maintaining roads in thecounty. After the boundaries of the county roads entering the county havebeen properly marked by signs indicating the speed limits set by the countycommission, the speed limits shall be of the same effect as the speedlimits provided for in subsection 1 of this section and shall be enforcedby the state highway patrol and the county sheriff as if such speed limitswere established by state law.

7. All road signs indicating speed limits or weight limits shall beuniform in size, shape, lettering and coloring and shall conform tostandards established by the department of transportation.

8. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to alter anyspeed limit set below fifty-five miles per hour by any ordinance of anycounty, city, town or village of the state adopted before March 13, 1996.

9. The speed limits established pursuant to this section shall notapply to the operation of any emergency vehicle as defined in section304.022.

10. A violation of the provisions of this section shall not beconstrued to relieve the parties in any civil action on any claim orcounterclaim from the burden of proving negligence or contributorynegligence as the proximate cause of any accident or as the defense to anegligence action.

11. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty ofa class C misdemeanor, unless such person was exceeding the posted speedlimit by twenty miles per hour or more then it is a class B misdemeanor.

(RSMo 1939 § 8383, A.L. 1957 p. 631, A.L. 1965 pp. 95, 594, A.L. 1969 H.B. 46 & 483, A.L. 1972 H.B. 1297, A.L. 1979 S.B. 44, A.L. 1985 H.B. 288, et al. merged with S.B. 408, A.L. 1987 S.B. 83, A.L. 1991 H.B. 25, A.L. 1995 H.B. 717, A.L. 1996 H.B. 1047, A.L. 2004 H.B. 795, et al.)

(1960) A railroad track itself is a warning of danger and a highway traveler must exercise the highest degree of care in crossing the track. A motorist approaching a railroad crossing with which he is familiar who fails to look or to see that which is plainly visible if he performs his duty to look, is contributorily negligent. Pipes v. Mo. Pacific Railroad Co. (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 30.

(1960) Where information used some of the language of the statute in charging careless and reckless driving and went on to particularized saying that the vehicle was operated at a high rate of speed, weaving back and forth across the road and running through city stop signs, while not recommended for future use, held sufficient as an information. State v. Tevis (A.), 340 S.W.2d 415.

(1961) Operator of motor vehicle about to drive across railroad tracks on which a train is approaching is required to exercise the highest degree of care for his own safety. Reedy v. Missouri -Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 111.

(1961) Every operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care and such care includes the warning of other motorists on the highway while the vehicle is stopped on the paved portion of the road after the vehicle had stalled and ceased to run. Phillips v. Stockman (A.), 351 S.W.2d 464.

(1961) On trial for violating speed regulations under this section evidence as to prior conviction of offense committed subsequent to the offense for which the accused was on trial held admissible in evidence. State v. Hunt (A.), 352 S.W.2d 57.

(1962) Wife, seated in right front seat of car her husband left parked with the motor running, who in moving over to make room for another occupant accidentally stepped on accelerator causing car to lunge forward and crash through store, injuring plaintiff, became operator of the car within meaning of statute. Hay v. Ham (A.), 364 S.W.2d 118.

(1965) This section is designed to prevent danger and it is unnecessary for the state to show that any specific person was actually put in danger in order to sustain a conviction. State v. McNail (A.), 389 S.W.2d 214.

(1965) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Bartlett (A.), 394 S.W.2d 434.

(1966) Duty of a motorist to use the highest degree of care is not limited to the paved portion of a highway, but extends to the shoulder of the highway. Ely v. Parsons (A.), 399 S.W.2d 613.

(1966) To fulfill his statutory duty to exercise the highest degree of care at all times and to keep a careful and vigilant lookout for other persons and vehicles on the highway, a motorist is required to look in such an observant manner as to enable him to see that which a person in the exercise of the highest degree of care would be expected to see under similar circumstances, and he must be held to have seen what looking would have revealed. Weathers v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (A.), 403 S.W.2d 663.

(1968) Failure to yield the right-of-way is specifically denounced as an offense, but an information charging careless and imprudent driving by failure to yield the right-of-way at a place where required by statute to do so, includes the offense as descriptive of what happened and in what manner defendant drove imprudently. State v. Richards (A.), 429 S.W.2d 351.

(1971) Information failing to state that offense occurred on a highway did not charge a crime. State v. Rollins (A.), 469 S.W.2d 46.

(1972) To constitute careless and imprudent driving there must be conduct which shows under all the existing circumstances and conditions that the property of another or the life or limb of any person is endangered; therefore, evidence that defendant spun his car around two or three times in intersection, making tires squeal and throwing rocks, was insufficient to support conviction of the offense. State v. Todd (A.), 477 S.W.2d 725.

(1977) This section does not impose a duty to exercise the highest degree of care to save all persons from harm proximately resulting from operation of motor vehicles. Ford v. Monroe (A.), 559 S.W.2d 759.

(1984) Offense of careless and imprudent driving is not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes as a manslaughter charge. State v. Noerper (Mo.App.E.D.), 674 S.W.2d 100.

(1984) Director of revenue may not assess points for speeding violations on state limited access highways within city limits, if the city ordinance violates, duplicates or concurs with the state set limits. Knierim v. James (Mo. banc), 677 S.W.2d 322.

(1990) Motorist stopped on roadway to repair an automobile is considered to be "operating" an automobile within the provision requiring the highest degree of care. Phillips v. United States, 743 F.Supp. 681 (E.D.Mo.).

(1993) Where high speed chase by law enforcement officers resulted in one civilian death and substantial property damage and personal injury to others, statute that provides some regulations for operation of emergency vehicles does not create duty to particular individuals as distinguished from general public; therefore duty created is to public and not to individuals. Boyle v. City of Liberty, Mo., 833 F.Supp. 1436 (W.D.Mo.).