Entails not allowed--the remainder in fee simple--to whom it shallpass.
442.470. In cases where, by the common or statute law ofEngland, any person might become seized in fee tail of any lands,by virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, or byany other means whatever, such person, instead of being seizedthereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be, andshall become, seized thereof for his natural life only; and theremainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whomthe estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, deviseeor donee in tail, first pass according to the course of thecommon law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance.
(1955) Use by testator of technical language which at common law would create fee tail, was intended to be given its statutory significance and thus created a life estate with remainder over. Pixlee v. Petty (Mo.), 274 S.W.2d 257.
(1955) Deed "to J.R.B. and E.B. (his wife) and her bodily heirs by J.R.B." created life estate in J.R.B. and E.B. and, because they were husband and wife, their interest was by the entirety. Such life estate did not terminate during life of either J.R.B. or E.B. even though they were divorced, and the interest of their child was contingent on his qualifying as bodily heir of survivor at time of her death. Bullock v. Porter, 365 Mo. 572, 284 S.W.2d 598.
(1977) Held, adoption does not prevent adopted child from being "heir of the body" for the purpose of taking the fee on the death of his natural parent who was a tenant in tail. See also dissent. Morris v. Ulbright (Mo.), 558 S.W.2d 660.
Entails not allowed--the remainder in fee simple--to whom it shallpass.
442.470. In cases where, by the common or statute law ofEngland, any person might become seized in fee tail of any lands,by virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, or byany other means whatever, such person, instead of being seizedthereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be, andshall become, seized thereof for his natural life only; and theremainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whomthe estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, deviseeor donee in tail, first pass according to the course of thecommon law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance.
(1955) Use by testator of technical language which at common law would create fee tail, was intended to be given its statutory significance and thus created a life estate with remainder over. Pixlee v. Petty (Mo.), 274 S.W.2d 257.
(1955) Deed "to J.R.B. and E.B. (his wife) and her bodily heirs by J.R.B." created life estate in J.R.B. and E.B. and, because they were husband and wife, their interest was by the entirety. Such life estate did not terminate during life of either J.R.B. or E.B. even though they were divorced, and the interest of their child was contingent on his qualifying as bodily heir of survivor at time of her death. Bullock v. Porter, 365 Mo. 572, 284 S.W.2d 598.
(1977) Held, adoption does not prevent adopted child from being "heir of the body" for the purpose of taking the fee on the death of his natural parent who was a tenant in tail. See also dissent. Morris v. Ulbright (Mo.), 558 S.W.2d 660.
Entails not allowed--the remainder in fee simple--to whom it shallpass.
442.470. In cases where, by the common or statute law ofEngland, any person might become seized in fee tail of any lands,by virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, or byany other means whatever, such person, instead of being seizedthereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be, andshall become, seized thereof for his natural life only; and theremainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whomthe estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, deviseeor donee in tail, first pass according to the course of thecommon law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance.
(1955) Use by testator of technical language which at common law would create fee tail, was intended to be given its statutory significance and thus created a life estate with remainder over. Pixlee v. Petty (Mo.), 274 S.W.2d 257.
(1955) Deed "to J.R.B. and E.B. (his wife) and her bodily heirs by J.R.B." created life estate in J.R.B. and E.B. and, because they were husband and wife, their interest was by the entirety. Such life estate did not terminate during life of either J.R.B. or E.B. even though they were divorced, and the interest of their child was contingent on his qualifying as bodily heir of survivor at time of her death. Bullock v. Porter, 365 Mo. 572, 284 S.W.2d 598.
(1977) Held, adoption does not prevent adopted child from being "heir of the body" for the purpose of taking the fee on the death of his natural parent who was a tenant in tail. See also dissent. Morris v. Ulbright (Mo.), 558 S.W.2d 660.
