Evidence to be considered in assessing punishment in first degreemurder cases for which death penalty authorized.
565.032. 1. In all cases of murder in the first degree forwhich the death penalty is authorized, the judge in a jury-waivedtrial shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions tothe jury for it to consider:
(1) Whether a statutory aggravating circumstance orcircumstances enumerated in subsection 2 of this section isestablished by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) If a statutory aggravating circumstance orcircumstances is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether theevidence as a whole justifies a sentence of death or a sentenceof life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole,or release except by act of the governor. In determining theissues enumerated in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection,the trier shall consider all evidence which it finds to be inaggravation or mitigation of punishment, including evidencereceived during the first stage of the trial and evidencesupporting any of the statutory aggravating or mitigatingcircumstances set out in subsections 2 and 3 of this section. Ifthe trier is a jury, it shall not be instructed upon any specificevidence which may be in aggravation or mitigation of punishment,but shall be instructed that each juror shall consider anyevidence which he considers to be aggravating or mitigating.
2. Statutory aggravating circumstances for a murder in thefirst degree offense shall be limited to the following:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a priorrecord of conviction for murder in the first degree, or theoffense was committed by a person who has one or more seriousassaultive criminal convictions;
(2) The murder in the first degree offense was committedwhile the offender was engaged in the commission or attemptedcommission of another unlawful homicide;
(3) The offender by his act of murder in the first degreeknowingly created a great risk of death to more than one personby means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardousto the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder in thefirst degree for himself or another, for the purpose of receivingmoney or any other thing of monetary value from the victim of themurder or another;
(5) The murder in the first degree was committed against ajudicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecuting attorneyor former prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney or formercircuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or formerassistant prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney orformer assistant circuit attorney, peace officer or former peaceofficer, elected official or former elected official during orbecause of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commitmurder in the first degree or committed murder in the firstdegree as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The murder in the first degree was outrageously orwantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,or depravity of mind;
(8) The murder in the first degree was committed againstany peace officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance ofhis official duty;
(9) The murder in the first degree was committed by aperson in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peaceofficer or place of lawful confinement;
(10) The murder in the first degree was committed for thepurpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawfularrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself oranother;
(11) The murder in the first degree was committed while thedefendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding orencouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpetratea felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery,kidnapping, or any felony offense in chapter 195, RSMo;
(12) The murdered individual was a witness or potentialwitness in any past or pending investigation or past or pendingprosecution, and was killed as a result of his status as awitness or potential witness;
(13) The murdered individual was an employee of aninstitution or facility of the department of corrections of thisstate or local correction agency and was killed in the course ofperforming his official duties, or the murdered individual was aninmate of such institution or facility;
(14) The murdered individual was killed as a result of thehijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other publicconveyance;
(15) The murder was committed for the purpose of concealingor attempting to conceal any felony offense defined in chapter195, RSMo;
(16) The murder was committed for the purpose of causing orattempting to cause a person to refrain from initiating or aidingin the prosecution of a felony offense defined in chapter 195,RSMo;
(17) The murder was committed during the commission of acrime which is part of a pattern of criminal street gang activityas defined in section 578.421.
3. Statutory mitigating circumstances shall include thefollowing:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of priorcriminal activity;
(2) The murder in the first degree was committed while thedefendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotionaldisturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conductor consented to the act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder in thefirst degree committed by another person and his participationwas relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under thesubstantial domination of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate thecriminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to therequirements of law was substantially impaired;
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(1992) Trial court violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to give the mitigating-circumstance instruction that defendant requested -- "The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity." Missouri statutes prohibit the introduction of a defendant's juvenile record for any purpose. Lashley v. Armontrout, 957 F.2d 1495 (8th Cir.).
(1997) The offense must be a felony to be considered a serious assaultive offense. State v. Whitfield, 939 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.banc).
Evidence to be considered in assessing punishment in first degreemurder cases for which death penalty authorized.
565.032. 1. In all cases of murder in the first degree forwhich the death penalty is authorized, the judge in a jury-waivedtrial shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions tothe jury for it to consider:
(1) Whether a statutory aggravating circumstance orcircumstances enumerated in subsection 2 of this section isestablished by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) If a statutory aggravating circumstance orcircumstances is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether theevidence as a whole justifies a sentence of death or a sentenceof life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole,or release except by act of the governor. In determining theissues enumerated in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection,the trier shall consider all evidence which it finds to be inaggravation or mitigation of punishment, including evidencereceived during the first stage of the trial and evidencesupporting any of the statutory aggravating or mitigatingcircumstances set out in subsections 2 and 3 of this section. Ifthe trier is a jury, it shall not be instructed upon any specificevidence which may be in aggravation or mitigation of punishment,but shall be instructed that each juror shall consider anyevidence which he considers to be aggravating or mitigating.
2. Statutory aggravating circumstances for a murder in thefirst degree offense shall be limited to the following:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a priorrecord of conviction for murder in the first degree, or theoffense was committed by a person who has one or more seriousassaultive criminal convictions;
(2) The murder in the first degree offense was committedwhile the offender was engaged in the commission or attemptedcommission of another unlawful homicide;
(3) The offender by his act of murder in the first degreeknowingly created a great risk of death to more than one personby means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardousto the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder in thefirst degree for himself or another, for the purpose of receivingmoney or any other thing of monetary value from the victim of themurder or another;
(5) The murder in the first degree was committed against ajudicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecuting attorneyor former prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney or formercircuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or formerassistant prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney orformer assistant circuit attorney, peace officer or former peaceofficer, elected official or former elected official during orbecause of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commitmurder in the first degree or committed murder in the firstdegree as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The murder in the first degree was outrageously orwantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,or depravity of mind;
(8) The murder in the first degree was committed againstany peace officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance ofhis official duty;
(9) The murder in the first degree was committed by aperson in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peaceofficer or place of lawful confinement;
(10) The murder in the first degree was committed for thepurpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawfularrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself oranother;
(11) The murder in the first degree was committed while thedefendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding orencouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpetratea felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery,kidnapping, or any felony offense in chapter 195, RSMo;
(12) The murdered individual was a witness or potentialwitness in any past or pending investigation or past or pendingprosecution, and was killed as a result of his status as awitness or potential witness;
(13) The murdered individual was an employee of aninstitution or facility of the department of corrections of thisstate or local correction agency and was killed in the course ofperforming his official duties, or the murdered individual was aninmate of such institution or facility;
(14) The murdered individual was killed as a result of thehijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other publicconveyance;
(15) The murder was committed for the purpose of concealingor attempting to conceal any felony offense defined in chapter195, RSMo;
(16) The murder was committed for the purpose of causing orattempting to cause a person to refrain from initiating or aidingin the prosecution of a felony offense defined in chapter 195,RSMo;
(17) The murder was committed during the commission of acrime which is part of a pattern of criminal street gang activityas defined in section 578.421.
3. Statutory mitigating circumstances shall include thefollowing:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of priorcriminal activity;
(2) The murder in the first degree was committed while thedefendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotionaldisturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conductor consented to the act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder in thefirst degree committed by another person and his participationwas relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under thesubstantial domination of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate thecriminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to therequirements of law was substantially impaired;
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(1992) Trial court violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to give the mitigating-circumstance instruction that defendant requested -- "The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity." Missouri statutes prohibit the introduction of a defendant's juvenile record for any purpose. Lashley v. Armontrout, 957 F.2d 1495 (8th Cir.).
(1997) The offense must be a felony to be considered a serious assaultive offense. State v. Whitfield, 939 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.banc).
Evidence to be considered in assessing punishment in first degreemurder cases for which death penalty authorized.
565.032. 1. In all cases of murder in the first degree forwhich the death penalty is authorized, the judge in a jury-waivedtrial shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions tothe jury for it to consider:
(1) Whether a statutory aggravating circumstance orcircumstances enumerated in subsection 2 of this section isestablished by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) If a statutory aggravating circumstance orcircumstances is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether theevidence as a whole justifies a sentence of death or a sentenceof life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole,or release except by act of the governor. In determining theissues enumerated in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection,the trier shall consider all evidence which it finds to be inaggravation or mitigation of punishment, including evidencereceived during the first stage of the trial and evidencesupporting any of the statutory aggravating or mitigatingcircumstances set out in subsections 2 and 3 of this section. Ifthe trier is a jury, it shall not be instructed upon any specificevidence which may be in aggravation or mitigation of punishment,but shall be instructed that each juror shall consider anyevidence which he considers to be aggravating or mitigating.
2. Statutory aggravating circumstances for a murder in thefirst degree offense shall be limited to the following:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a priorrecord of conviction for murder in the first degree, or theoffense was committed by a person who has one or more seriousassaultive criminal convictions;
(2) The murder in the first degree offense was committedwhile the offender was engaged in the commission or attemptedcommission of another unlawful homicide;
(3) The offender by his act of murder in the first degreeknowingly created a great risk of death to more than one personby means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardousto the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder in thefirst degree for himself or another, for the purpose of receivingmoney or any other thing of monetary value from the victim of themurder or another;
(5) The murder in the first degree was committed against ajudicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecuting attorneyor former prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney or formercircuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or formerassistant prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney orformer assistant circuit attorney, peace officer or former peaceofficer, elected official or former elected official during orbecause of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commitmurder in the first degree or committed murder in the firstdegree as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The murder in the first degree was outrageously orwantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,or depravity of mind;
(8) The murder in the first degree was committed againstany peace officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance ofhis official duty;
(9) The murder in the first degree was committed by aperson in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peaceofficer or place of lawful confinement;
(10) The murder in the first degree was committed for thepurpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawfularrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself oranother;
(11) The murder in the first degree was committed while thedefendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding orencouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpetratea felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery,kidnapping, or any felony offense in chapter 195, RSMo;
(12) The murdered individual was a witness or potentialwitness in any past or pending investigation or past or pendingprosecution, and was killed as a result of his status as awitness or potential witness;
(13) The murdered individual was an employee of aninstitution or facility of the department of corrections of thisstate or local correction agency and was killed in the course ofperforming his official duties, or the murdered individual was aninmate of such institution or facility;
(14) The murdered individual was killed as a result of thehijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other publicconveyance;
(15) The murder was committed for the purpose of concealingor attempting to conceal any felony offense defined in chapter195, RSMo;
(16) The murder was committed for the purpose of causing orattempting to cause a person to refrain from initiating or aidingin the prosecution of a felony offense defined in chapter 195,RSMo;
(17) The murder was committed during the commission of acrime which is part of a pattern of criminal street gang activityas defined in section 578.421.
3. Statutory mitigating circumstances shall include thefollowing:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of priorcriminal activity;
(2) The murder in the first degree was committed while thedefendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotionaldisturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conductor consented to the act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder in thefirst degree committed by another person and his participationwas relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under thesubstantial domination of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate thecriminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to therequirements of law was substantially impaired;
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(1992) Trial court violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to give the mitigating-circumstance instruction that defendant requested -- "The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity." Missouri statutes prohibit the introduction of a defendant's juvenile record for any purpose. Lashley v. Armontrout, 957 F.2d 1495 (8th Cir.).
(1997) The offense must be a felony to be considered a serious assaultive offense. State v. Whitfield, 939 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.banc).
